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INTRODUCTION 
In 1941J Philip FonerJ in his Business and SlaveryJ 
made an appeal for a more detailed study of the Northern 
business man and his reaction to the coming of the Civil War. 
Countering the popular interpretation that the war was the 
product of two conflicting economic systemsJ Professor Foner 
presented his own observations regarding the concerted efforts 
of the New York financial interests to Check any and all move-
ments which tended to precipitate an intersectional struggle. 
The documented reactions of this particular group of Nor t h ern 
business men could not be explained in terms of an over-
simplified economic interpretation of the Civil War, and for 
this reason Professor Foner pointed to the need for more 
intensive research into the economic sources and materials 
1 
of the ante-bellum period. Foner's challenge has failed to 
arouse very much historical enthusiasm, apparently, for many 
recent historical treatments of the critical years before the 
Civil War continue to generalize upon the essential economic 
antagonisms of the North and the SouthJ and still look upon 
the Northern industrialist as the catalytic agent whiCh 
propelled the sections into bloody warfare. 
One of the most distinctive presentations of this 
1 Philip FonerJ Business and Slavery (Ghapel Hill, 
1941), PP• 318-322. 
i 
economic point of view came into the twentieth century with 
the writings of ~arles Beard. The South, according to Beard, 
was an area of nplanters operating in a limited territory with 
incompetent labor on soil of diminishing fertility 1 11 in contrast 
.. 
to the industrial men of the North who "swept forward ••• 
exulting in the approaching triumph of machine i ndustry, Land 
1 
wh2( warned the planters of their ultimate subjection.u Not 
only did Beard consider the Civil War to be an "irrepressible 
conflict" resulting from the clash of these two conflicting 
economies, but attributed the immediate cause of the war to 
Northern 11 capitalism. " 2 So intense was Beard r s criticism of 
the materialistic greed of Northern 11 capitalism11 and its 
immoderate demands upon the South, that one commentator 
remarked that "the Southern planters very nearly became the 
heroes of the narrative, and Beard very nearly became the ally 
f J .,. C lh u3 o ohn G • . a oun. 
This economic interpretation was carried into the 
twenties by the work of Vernon Farrington, who maintained most 
of the essential ideas of Beard regarding the origins of the 
lcharl.es and Mary Beard, The Rise of Almrican 
Civilization (2 vola.; New York, 1927), II, 6-7. 
2 Ibid. I p. 10. 
3 Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil 
~ (Princeton, 1954), P• 208. 
ii 
Ci vil War. Enthusiastic about the "agrarian democracyn of 
the Y/est, sympathetic at times toward the interests of the 
South, Parrington had little regard for the idea l s of a 
iii 
middle class which was busily engaged in "creating a plutocracy. ill 
I n the decades before the war, claimed Parrington, the major 
parties of t h e United States chose to follow the economic 
interests of "master groups, heedless of all humanitarian 
issues It; and once the war was over, the 11 slave economy could 
2 
never again thwart the ambi tiona of the capitalist economy." 
Widely circulated during the late twenties and early 
thirties, t h e age of the Great Depression, t h e economic interpre-
tations of Beard and Parring ton f ound obvious acceptance at a 
time when hostility to American capitalism and business methods 
was unusually strong. Many Southern historians, in particular, 
seized upon these ide a s to l e nd support to the thesis that war 
had been thrust upon an unwilling South. Frank L. Owsley, for 
example, constantly emphasized t he conflict between the agrarian 
South and t h e industrial North , which resulted in bloodshed 
when the industrial 11 plutocracyu of the North tried to force 
its way of life upon t h e South . 3 ~he philosophy of t h e North 
was intolerant, crusading and standardizing, wrote Owsley, and 
as a result, " Juggernaut drove h is car across the South ."4 
1vernon L. Parring tan, Main Currents in American 
1hought (3 vola.; New York, 1927-30), !II, xxiv. 
2I bid ., PP• xxiii, 3. 
3Frank L. Owsley, "The .ltundamental Cause of t h e 
·Civil War: Egocentric Sectionalism," Journal of Southern 
History, VII (1941), 4-6. . 
4Frank L. Owsley, "The Irrepressible Conflict," 
Twelve Southerners, I'll Take My Stand (New York, 1930), p. 91. 
Although in recent years many of the extreme 
conclusions of the Beard thesis have been somewhat mbdified, 
and concessions have been made in the direction of admitting 
certain points of similarity between North and South, many 
historians continue to stress the elements of secti onal 
11 divergencen in the years preceding the Civil War •1 W'ri ters 
continue to generalize upon New England's "hatred of Southerners 
and their institutions," and often describe this hatred as so 
intense that New England would "do everything possible to 
2 destroy slavery." The South is still depicted as a "static, 
agrarian, debtor section,n as opposed to a North which was a 
"dynamic, commercialized, industrializing, creditor section"; 
and that because of the presence of these conflicting econo1mc 
tendencies, there existed a "profound and irrepressible clash 
of material interests 11 which would inevitably lead to ttwar-
fare between the slave industrial system and the f ree industrial 
system."3 Industrial capitalism, "with the banners of 
righteousness, patriotism and pro gress over its head, 11 marched 
1Kenneth Stampp, And the War Came (Baton Rouge, 
1950), p. 2. 
2Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Demo-
cracy (New York, 1948), p. 24. 
3Gharles W. Thompson, The Fiery Epoch, 1830-77 
(Indianapolis, 1931), p. 25; Henry H. Simms, A Decade of 
Sectional Controversy, 1851-61 (Chapel Hill, 194~, p. 187. 
iv 
out to triumph over the agrarian ideals of the South.1 
"Bourgeois acquisitiveness ••• was in the saddle. Democracy, 
like the rest of the hindmost, was left for the devil."2 In 
short, to what Professor Charles Grier Sellers has aptly 
called the 11 myth of the Monolithic South, n there has been 
added another myth--that of the Moloch of the North, a huge, 
mechanical automaton, breathing flame, and moving inexorably 
forward to devour the hapless planters of the South. 3 
In reviewing the various economic interpretations 
regarding the clash of economic interests and the role of 
the Northern capitalist as the prime mover, one cannot help 
but compare the sweeping generalities regarding the pre-
Civil War business man, with the actual amount of factual 
data concerning his influence in the history of the period. 
In recent years the market has been flooded with book titles 
indicating a widespread interest in almost every aspect of 
the American business man. Hereditary influences, social 
1Avery Graven, The Repressible ~onflict, 1830-61 
(Baton Rouge, 1939}, PP• 96-7. 
2Avery Craven, Democracy in American Life (Chicago, 
1941), PP• 13, 111-12. 
3Cb.arles Grier Sellers, "Who Were the Southern 
Vfuigs?" American Historical Review, LIX (1954), 333-346. 
v 
backgrounds, intellectual qualifications and psychodynanuc 
motivations have all been statistically recorded, and have 
provided the background for a plethora of novels, plays and 
motion pictures pealing with the dramatic involvements of the 
American man of business.l American historiography, too, has 
shown a remarkable trend toward re-evaluating and re-
assessing the contributions of the American entrepreneur.2 
It is almost impossible to recognize the old "robber barons n 
of Ida Tarbell, Matthew Josephson and Henry Demarest Lloyd in 
Allan Nevins' treatment of John D. Rockefeller, or in the 
recently published study on the Standard Oil ~ompany of New 
3 Jersey. 
Unfortunately, however, very little of thi s modern 
interest in economic operations has been projected back into 
the pre-~ivil War period. The American business man is 
apparently regarded by many historians and social scientists 
as a comparatively new phenomenon which made its appearance 
1B • .0. Forbes, ed., America's Fifty Foremost Business 
Leaders (New York, 1948); Erank Taussig and Garl Joslyn, 
American Business Leaders: A S tud in Social Ori ~ins and Social 
Stratification New York, 1932 ; William Henry, ·The Business 
Executive: The Psychodynamics of a Social Role,tt American 
Journal of Sociology, LIV (1949), 286-291; William viiller, 
11 American Historians and the Business Elite," Journal of 
Economic History, IX (1949), 184-200. 
2Dexter Perkins, 11 We Shall Gladly Teach,n American 
Historical Review, LXI I (1957), 306. 
3 Allan Nevins, John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic A e 
of American Enterprise (2 vols.; New York, 1940 ; George Gibb 
and Evelyn Knowlton, lhe Resur~ent Years: History of the 
Standard Oil Company, 1911-27 New York, 1957). 
vi 
after 1870. As a result, t h e ante-bellum industrialist 
continues to remain an obscure fi gure, half-hidden in the 
mists. and shadows of h istory. 
The field of business history, and the more recent 
school of entrepreneurial history, to be sure, have made 
outstanding contributions to historical knowledge, by 
furnish ing a wealth of source material on the financial and 
industrial operations of early American business enterprises, 
especially those of New England origin. 'lhe Pepperell .(;ompany, 
the INhi tin lVfachine Works, and the Saco-Lowell Shops are only 
a few of the many local ventures wh ose h istories have been 
recorded by excellent business historians. 1 Such studies, 
however, tend to focus attention almost exclusively upon the 
financial structure and corporate operations of the indivi-
dual companies involved, make little attempt at historica l 
interpretation, and fail to analyze the interplay of those 
powerful social and political forces which were an integral 
part of the historical background of the pre-Civil War 
2 
economy. 
It is in the hope of contributing additional in-
1Evelyn H. Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress 
(Cambridge, 1948); 'I'homas R. Navin, 'fue Whitin Machine Works 
Since 1831 (;Gambridge, 1950); George s . Gibb, 1'he Saco-Lowell 
Shops: ~extile Machinery Building in New Eng land (Cambridge, 
1950). 
2see Louis M. Hacker, neview of Gibb and Knowlton, 
Resurgent Years, in 'lhe New York Times Book Review, Jan. 27, 
1957. 
vii 
sight regarding the reactions of the American business man 
toward the coming of the ·.Civil War that the author has chosen 
to study one particular group--the cotton textile manu-
facturers of Massachusetts, as particularly typified by the 
Lawrence family. In order to more fully appreciate the 
influence of these men upon the political life and institu-
tions of the United States in the years preceding the ~ivil 
War, it will be necessary to analyze not only their industrial 
capacities and material productivity, but to re-assess their 
influence upon the society in wh ich they lived, and to 
consider the important demands which that society made upon 
them. 
In introducing the ncolonial mind" to his readers, 
Vernon Farrington cautioned that 11 the Puritan and the 
Yankee were the two halves of the New England whole, It and 
that to overlook or underestimate the contributions of 
either "is grossly to misinterpret the spirit and character 
of primitive New England." 1 With Farrington's observation 
in mind, then, this present study is the story of what 
happened, later in the history of the Bay State, when the 
Puritan conscience collided head-on with the Yankee zeal for 
profit--when the moral desire to uproot the evils of slavery 
had to be weighed against the economic demands for more 
slave-grown cotton. 
1Parrington, Main Currents, I , 3-4. 
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CHAPTER I . 
:U>RDS OF THE LOOM 
Boston had always been noted for its gentlemen 
of property and standing. O.fficers o.f the :t:rown, young 
English bloods, prosperous colonial merChants, conserva-
tive Federalist squires--all these and many others had been 
a part of the long aristocratic heritage that started with 
European traditions and continued on into the post-revo-
lutionary years. There were, it is true, other towns of 
the Commonwealth where fortunes were evident and where 
first families were prominent, but Boston overshadowed 
them all. 
And yet, even Boston had never seen anything 
like the new aristocracy of wealth whi ch now characterized 
the fashionable society of Beacon Hill and set the economic 
patterns of State Street. During the early years o.f the 
nineteenth century, old established mercantile classes, 
grown rich on the profits of Europe and the Orient, had 
begun to merge with the manufacturers of cotton cloth. 
The association produced an economic and social elite 
whose influence would be felt throughout the Commonwealth 
and the nation. 1 
1Arthur B. Darling, Political Changes in 
Massachusetts, 1824-1848 (New Haven, 1925), PP• 7-8, 17-18. 
1 
The new manufacturing interests had unexpectedly 
emerged out of the disasters wh ich confronted New England 
during t h e Napoleonic strugg les. 'l,he mercantile empire 
of t h e Bay State had first been seriously shaken by 
Jefferson's crippling Embargo in 1807; and had then been 
completely devastated in the course of the War of 1812.1 
·(;augh t in the crossfire of economic warfare, her ships 
rotting at the docks, her specie rapidly diminishing and 
her entire economy crumbling , New England had been forced 
to seek safety, not in wooden hulls, counting houses or 
captains' cabins--but in crude factories. As an alterna-
tive to commercial oblivion, manufacturing seemed a 
practical solution, since it would not only provide a 
necessary outlet for the surplus capital of Boston, but 
would also meet the increasing demands of the interior 
sections of the country which were literally begging for 
the luxury of manufactured goods. 2 
1Louis M. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo 
(Durham, 1927), pp. 145-153; Samuel E . Morison, :iVIa.ri-
time History of Massachusetts (Boston, 1921), pp. 205-6. 
2v·vashington Expositor, March 19, 1~08 cited in 
Sears, Embargo, p. 164. John Gould Curtis, ' Industry and 
Transportation, n Gommonwealth History of Massachusetts 
(5 vols.; A. B. Hart, ed.; New York, 1929) (hereafter cited 
as 11 Comn . Hist."), IV, 413-14. 
2 
The production of American cotton goods had just 
begun when the end of the War brought stiff foreign 
competition and unexpected domestic jealousies.1 England 
dumped her stockpiles of textiles on the world market as 
soon as possible, and threatened to suffocate the "infant" 
industry. Desperately the Northern manufacturer called 
upon the national government for protection; and in the 
light of the enthusiastic national spirit which marked 
the character of the Fourteenth Congress, there was every 
reason for .the factory owner to expect that assistance 
would soon arrive. 2 
The high hope~ for federal assistance were soon 
rudely shattered as the weaknesses of the eventual 
Tariff of 1816 disclosed to the harassed cotton manu-
facturera the existence of a more subtle enemy at home--
the shipping interests. At the very moment when the cotton 
men were demanding tariff and protection, New England sea 
captains, merchants and traders were straining every nerve 
and muscle to keep alive in a hostile world market. The 
lNathan Appleton, Introduction of the Fower Loom 
(Lowell, 1858); ~aroline Ware, Early New England Cotton 
Manufacture (Boston, 1931). 
2N1les Register, VII (1815), 338-9; James Ford, 
"Social ~onditions and Social Changes," eomm. Hist., III, 
510-11; .Robert G. Albion, The Rise of the New York Port 
(New York, 1939), PP• 60-1. 
3 
last thing they wanted was a national program of restriction 
and control. Angrily they fought against protection, and 
eventually they- succeeded in modifying the tariff proposals 
of 1816 to the point where they promised everything and 
yielded nothing. 1 
And so the fight between the merchant and the 
miller--the wharf versus the waterfall--was in full force, 
with the cotton men getting the worst of it. Foreign 
competition, h igh commodity prices, phenomenal cotton 
prices, discouraging production costs and high wages between 
1816 and 1819 raised the question as to wheth er or not the 
2 man~acturer could possibly continue to operate. Only t h e 
disastrous economic crash of 1818-19 saved the situation. 
Vwhen the British manufacturer suddenly rejected the 
fantastic American cotton prices and i mported the less 
expensive East I ndia product, American cotton came crash ing 
down from more than thirty cents a pound to less than 
1Edward St anwood, f~erican Tar iff Controversies 
in the Nineteenth Centur:y: (2 vols.; Boston, 1903) 1 I 1 131-3 ;. 
Frank Taussig, Protection to Young Industries (Car®ridge, 
1883) 1 p. 34 ; John Slyi 11 lVIassachusett~ in the National Government, 1820-l86l,t ..Comm. Hist., I V, 285. 
2Harold U. Faulkner, " Political History ct: 
Massachusetts, n :tbid., pp. 76-7;: George Dangerfield, Era of 
Good Feelings (New York, 1952), PP• 178-9. 
4 
fourteen. ~ommodity prices collapsed, and agricultural 
staples toppled as European harvests improved and the 
British corn laws went into operation. The bottom had 
fallen out of the market,and a crippled economy plummeted 
to earth, splintered and broken.1 
Andd the shambles of the economic debacle, it 
was the manufacturer, ironically enough, who emerged, not 
only unscathed, but in better shape than before. As the 
prices of cotton, foodstuffs, raw materials, wages and 
rents fell, the prospect for the manufacturer looked mutih 
brighter. Now, for the first time, he could produce at a 
profit and take advantage of the fallen market to handicap 
his foreign competition. 2 Profits led to pnosperity, and 
prosperity led to self-confidence, as cotton manufacturing 
experienced an unprecedented growth and development during 
the early twenties, to the point where the cotton men 
could now assume an air of relative indifference to the 
tariff question.3 New factories were being built every 
1 Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, P• 178. 
England imported 117,955 bales of cotton from the Orient 
in 1817, and 227,300 bales in 1818. 
2Taussig, Protection, pp. 24-5; Stanwood, 
Controversies, I, 174-5. 
3Niles ltegister, XXI (1821), 39; Amos Lawrence to 
Abbott Lawrence, -·April 26, May 25, 1819, William R. Lawrence, 
Extracts from the Diary and Correspondence of the Late 
Amos Lawrence (Boston, 1855), PP• 72-3. 
5 
day, and Ddll towns were rising throughout the Bay State, 
as two distinctive industrial areas gradually took shape. 
In the southern part of the State, the cotton 
industry spread from the Providence-Pawtucket area up 
along the Blackstone River and moved northeast into 
Massachusetts, where it exploited the phenomenal water 
powers of the Fall River. Throughout the twenties and 
thirties the number of mill towns multiplied, extending 
along the various small rivers, identical with their rows 
of workers' houses, the small water power site, the factory, 
and the ever-present 11big house on the hill" where the 
owner lived.1 The characteristics of multiplicity and 
decentralization, typical of the physical aspects of the 
southern New England manufacturing area, were carried over 
into the financial operations as well. Ownership was 
usually by individual or by partnerships, with certain 
prominent families exerting considerable influence. Capital 
funds continued to be fairly limited, seldom extending 
beyond the original financing and re-invested small profits.2 
~dward c. Kirkland, A History of American Economic 
Life (New York, 1949), PP• 334-5; LOuis Hacker, 1riumph of 
lmlerican ~apitalism (New York, 1940), PP• 261-2. 
2
ware, Cotton,pp. ~~ 1381 estimates average capi-talization .at not more than ~3o,uoo. 
6 
To the north o~ Boston, however, industrial 
operations developed in a much more highly organized and 
centralized manner. 'lhe "Boston Ma.n~acturing Company" 
at Waltham with which Francis :C. Lowell, Nathan Appleton 
and Patrick Tracy Jackson had been associated during the 
war, had proven so successful that the investors decided 
to expand. In 1820 they decided that the splendid water 
power of the Pawtucket F'alls on the Merrimac River, with 
its thirty foot drop, would be ideally suited for the 
type of manufacturing they had in mind. Moving quickly 
and quietly, the enterprisers bought up the titles to 
most of the water power sites and real estate in the 
locality, and on December 1, 1821, formed themselves into 
the "Merrimac Manufacturing .Company" with a capital stock 
of six hundred shares. Patrick T. Jackson and Nathan 
Appleton were the principal stock-holders with 180 shares 
apiece; while 150 shares were distributed to the Boston 
Manufacturing ~ompany. The wheels of a new plant began 
to roll on September 1, 1823, turning out not only 
increased amounts of the regular cloth and sheeting which 
the facilities of the Waltham plant could not provide~ but 
also manufacturing fancy fabrics and printed calicoes on a 
scale never seen before in the United States.1 
1Appleton, Power Loom, PP• 17-25. Also see Nathan 
Appleton and John A. Lowell, Correspondence in Relation to 
the Early History of the <City of Lowell (Boston, 1848), 
PP• 10-11, 17-19. 
7 
The dominant characteristics of these "northern" 
manufacturing developments, even during the initial 
decade of their industrial development, were their 
high degree of capital organization and the corporate 
structure of their administrations. The original capital-
ization of the Lowell Mills, for example, had already 
passed the million dollar mark, as increased amounts of 
Boston capital began to see the possibilities in widening 
the scope of their investments. With increased liability 
and the further complexity of managerial responsibility, 
however, neither partnerships nor joint-stock arrange-
ments were considered adequate or safe, and so the 
corporation form, authorized by State charter, came 
into greater use. With this financial system, not only 
were the liabilities of the shareholders themselves 
limited, but more important to the enterprisers, muCh 
larger amounts of capital stock could be obtained through 
the sale of corporate seeurities.1 
So successful were the operations of the new 
plants, and so rapidly did the new industrial locality 
bui~d up--due in great part to the organizing genius of 
Francis c. Lowell and his ideas regarding a paternal mill 
community--that by 1824 the district was incorporated into 
1Edwin M. Dodd, American Business ~orporations 
until 1860: With Special Reference to Massachusetts 
(.Cambridge, 1954), PP• 338-9. Darling, Massachusetts, P• 11, 
estimates capital investment in the late 30's at $12,ooo,ooo. 
8 
a town which was named, appropriately enough, "Lowell~·n. 
As the new town prospered and the Merrimac Manufacturing 
Company paid out encouraging dividends (one hundred 
dollars a share in 1825), other companies began to 
spring up. The Merrimac ~ompany was selling land and 
water rights to the Hamilton I~ufacturing ~ompany as 
early as 182~ and that company started operations with a 
capitalization of $600,000. By 1828 the Appleton Company 
and the Lowell Company had been incorporated. In 1830, 
the Suffolk and Tremont Mills had selected sites along 
the Merrimac, and by 1839 the Boott Mills and the Massachusetts 
""J 
Mills were starting production.1 
It was during this period that the Merrimac 
Company gave reduced rates to two brothers who had been 
operating a most successful dry goods business in Boston, 
but who now wished to expand into textile manufacturing. 
Amos and Abbott Lawrence entered the field of industrial 
enterprise in 1830; and although Amos was forced to retire 
from active business the following year because of a 
recurrent illness, the foresight and acumen of his younger 
brother, Abbott, caused the name of Lawrence to become as 
1Perry Walton, The Story of Textiles (Boston, 
1912), pp. 208-9; Appleton, Power LOom, pp. 25-9; Dodd, 
Corporations, P• 384. 
9 
1 
well known as that of Lowell itself. Amos would become 
prominent in a variety of charitable and philanthropic 
works throughout Massachusetts; Abbott wou~d shortly gain 
reknown as a millionaire industrialist and ~ongressman; 
while their eldest brother, Luther, would not only become 
president of the Bank in Lowell, but be elected Mayor of 
that city in 1838. 2 
This movement of the Lawrences from trade to 
manufacturing was only one example of a significant 
transfer of shipping capital into cotton factories by the 
mid-l830 1s. An increasing number of ship owners, merchants, 
importers and exporters, exasperated by falling profits, 
threw in their lot with the Lowells, the Appletons, and the 
Lawrences. Using their stores as local outlets for their 
own manufactured goods, the new investors found that they 
could use the profits from their commercial enterprises 
1 . Lawrence, Diary, PP• 147-9; Hamilton Hill, Memoir 
of Abbott Lawrence (Boston, 1883), PP• 23-6. Almost all 
the private papers and correspondence of Abbott Lawrence 
were destroyed in the great Boston fire of 1872. 
2An imaginative German author wrote a fictionalized 
account of the "secrets" of Abbott Lawrence's success. See 
Ralph Anders, Der Weg zum Gluch, oder die Kunst Millionar 
zu Werden (Berlin, 1856). See also Boston ~ourier, July 3, 
1858, for a critical review of the book by George Ticknmr. 
10 
to keep the factories running, and even pay their factory 
workers in store goods when times were slow.1 With new 
wealth released for additional investment, and the American 
consumer relying on a home industry, New England manufacturing 
received a greater impetus than ever before. This is not to 
suggest, of course, that ship-owners and mill-owners 
immediately put aside their differences of opinion on matters 
of economic policy. Shippers still wanted free trade, and 
manufacturers continued to believe in the principles of 
protection. But while these points of contention continued 
to exist, the bitterness and intensity of feeling WhiCh had 
existed prior to 1824 gradually diminishe~. The Ship-
owners, for their part, modified their opposition to the 
nation's tariff policy when they saw that their foreign 
trade did not necessarily suffer. The mill-owners, on the 
other hand, no longer fearing foreign competition now 
that production costs and more efficient power machinery 
permitted them more influence in the domestic market, 
placed much less emphasis on the importance of high 
protective duties. T.hey continued to favor a general 
national protective policy, but assumed an almost indifferent 
attitude on the subject of specific rates and duties. 
1 Sarah Forbes Hughes, ed., Letters and Recol-
lections of John Murray Forbes (2 vola.; Boston, 1889), I, 
116-117. Also see Morison, History, P• 225; Albion, 
New York, P• 63. 
11 
Nathan Appleton, the manufacturer, expressed the opinion 
that after 1825 the cotton industry would have been 
highly profitable "even without protection at all." Once 
the power loom was introduced, he wrote, tta tariff was of 
little or no importance."1 Abbott Lawrence agreed with 
his colleague's appraisal of the situation, and when he 
represented the State of Massachusetts at the Harrisburg 
Convention of 1827, called to formulate a tariff program, 
Lawrence insisted that the cotton men recommend that 
Congress merely pass "adequate duties. "2 As far as the 
cotton men were concerned, the crisis had been passed. 
And so, with their formerly divergent interests 
gradually moving in the direction of a more harmonious 
relationship, the merchants, the shippers and the manu-
facturers of Boston began to build a financial empire. 
They still did not always see eye-to-eye, but at least 
by 1828 they were all looking in the same direction. 
Additional capital and eager investors produced a rash of 
1Nathan Appleton, Speech on the Bill to Reduce 
and Otherwise Alter the Duties on Imports, January 23, 
1833 (Washington, 1833), P• 22. Also see Susan M. Loring, 
ad., Selections from the Diaries of William Appleton, 
1786-1862 (Boston, 1922), PP• 40-1. 
2Abbott Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Feb. 2, 4, a. 
14, 1828, Amos Lawrence Letters, Mas, Massachusetts 
Historical Society (hereafter cited as 11M.H.S. 11 ), I, 30; 
Robert Means to Amos Lawrence, Sept. 24, 1828, Amos 
Lawrence Papers, l~s, M.H.s., Box 1. 
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new mills and factories all over New England; and this 
steady concentration on manufacturing resulted in the 
phenomenal growth of industrial cities and towns. 
Established enterprises were expanding profitably, new 
factories were developing additional markets and customers, 
and the manufacturing interests of Massachusetts found 
that they had built up a total capital investment of some 
$12,000,000 by 1840, with every indication that the figure 
would go much higher. 1 
Not satisfied to rest on their economic laurels, 
however, the cotton men were constantly exploring every 
opportunity for additional investment. When a Daniel 
Saunders of Andover suggested a new source of power on 
the Merrimac, the Lawrences, the Lowells, the Lymans, 
together with Nathan Appleton and Patrick T. Jackson were 
soon busy buying up the land, laying out the sites and 
drawing up the papers for a new company. The "Essex 
:!:ompany; 11 as it was called, was incorporated in 1845 with 
a stock of a million dollars, and the new town was named 
"Lawrence, n after the company's first president and out-
standing stockholder, Abbott Lawrence. BranChing out from 
1 See A. L. Letters, M.H.s., II, 222 (1837), for 
statistics o~ Lowell manufactures and a list of major 
factories. 
J3 
here, Lawrence became president and principal stockholder 
of the Atlantic Cotton Mills which were started in 1846; 
and when the Pacific Mills were incorporated in 1853, with 
an original capitalization of two million dollars, its 
president was also--Abbott Lawrence.1 Although other 
ind~viduals were permitted to buy stock in the various 
manufacturing enterprises of Massachusetts as they were 
established during these middle years, it is noticeable 
that few were taken into active partnership. ~ontrol of 
the expanding industry always remained in the hands of ~ 
Lawrences, the Lowells, the Appletons and their immediate 
associates in Boston, so that before long, a small group 
of some twelve or fifteen Boston capitalists was 
actually controlling most of the great corporations of the 
State.2 
As the interests of the merchant and the manu-
facturer grew closer, the profits from both the production 
and the sale of cotton cloth began to mount. Quite 
naturally the interested parties began to look for cheaper 
~ill, Abbott Lawrence, PP• 23-6; Walton, Textiles, 
PP• 218-220. 
2Hunt•s Merchants' Magazine, XLrV 
See also Vera Schlakman, "Economic Historl 
Town: A Study of Uhicopee, Massachusetts, 
Studies in History, XX {1934), 35 ff. . 
(1861), 173-6. 
of a Factory 
Smith ~ollege 
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and more efficient means of transportation between the 
sales and exchange center of Boston and such inland points 
of market and production as Lowell, Lawrence, Providence, 
Fall River, Worcester and Springfield. It is not too 
surprising, therefore, to find the manufacturers interesting 
themselves in the prospects of railroad transportation 
during its formative years. In order to develop railroad 
connections between Boston warehouses and the cotton 
factories, the leading textile manufacturers, in 1830, 
voted $100,000 as a bonus to the Boston and Lowell Rail-
road.1 Abbott Lawrence was one of the most active pro-
moters of various trunk lines and continued to be a 
liberal subscriber to suCh projected developments as the 
Boston and Providence Line as well as the more elaborate 
and daring undertaking of the great "Western Railroad" 
whiCh would go from Worcester to Albany.2 
The technique of combining foreign trade with 
domestic manufacturing and overland transportation, how-
ever, only added to the complexities of the financial 
problems. The conversion of foreign currency, the expense 
1Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLV (1861), 114-
130; Dodd, Corporations, PP• 261-2. 
2Boston Daili Atlas, Oct. 6, 10, 16., 1835;: Hill, 
Abbott Lawrence, PP• 0-11. 
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and inconvenience of redeeming notes from the various 
local banks, and the general instability of the State's 
decentralized currency situation, served to convince the 
economic leaders of the Commonwealth that they must take 
a hand. The Suffolk Bank, therefore, was the answer--
established in 1818 under the leadership of the original 
group of Waltham manufacturers, including the Lowells, 
the Lawrences and the Appletons, closely followed by 
members of Boston's oldest merchant families, with John A. 
L::>well and William Lawrence serving on the Board of Di-
rectors. Remaining almost completely under the sur-
veillance and control of the same closely knit group 
which was already well on the way to controlling the 
prominent features of the Massachusetts economy, the 
Suffolk Bank provided a financial stability that was 
beneficial to both its investors and to the State. At 
the same time, by rigidly controlling the extension of 
credit and the payment of specie, the Suffolk was able to 
suppress speculative local banking and check expansion of 
undesirable and less organized forms of economic enter-
prise.1 
1 Sister M. Grace Madeleine, Monetary and Banking 
Theories of Jacksonian Democracy (Philadelphia, 1943), 
pp. 147-151; Davis R. Dewey, State Banking before the 
Civil War (Washington, 1910) 1 PP• 82-96. 
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With interlocking financial interests now 
fusing the profits of manufacturing, transporting, 
selling and financing cotton textiles, the new aristocracy 
of the Commonwealth commanded both econoDdc allegiance and 
social acceptance. Like a great magnet Boston not only 
displayed its own glittering aristocracy, but exerted a 
powerful attraction upon the various local societies 
scattered throughout the Bay State, gradually drawing 
them into its own orbit where they would be absorbed and 
integrated with "Boston's own ·.~· Every day new families 
were moving down from Salem and Newburyport, from 
Worcester and New Bedford to blend their social and 
economic fortunes with those of the Boston groups. 
Nathan Appleton had come down from New Hampshire as a 
merchant to become a leader in the textile industry. 
The Lawrence brothers had moved in from Middlesex County 
to set up in the importing business before they engaged 
in manufacturing. The Lowells, already associated with 
such prominent mercantile families as the Cabots, the 
Higginsons and the Russells, had now linked up with the 
Jacksons through the marriage of Francis e. Lowell to 
Patrick Tracy Jackson's sister, Hannah. John Amory Lowell's 
son, Augustus, was married to Abbott Lawrence's da~ter, 
Katherine; and in 1842 Abbott's nephew, Amos Adams Ie.wrence, 
married Sarah Elizabeth Appleton, the niece of Nathan 
Appleton. Thus the cycle was complete. Not only were the 
17 
Lowells, the Lawrences and the Appletons partners in 
industry and colleagues in business, but now had further 
integrated their interests through the powerful agency of 
kinship and marriage. 1 
Moving into Boston society, the new msnufacturer 
was gradually accepted into the higher social echelons 
with the older members of Boston 1s mercantile aristocracy. 
By the 1830 1s the industrialists were taking up residence 
in the fashionable red-brick houses in Louisburg Square 
and Mount Vernon Street, receiving their guests in the 
long high-studded rooms which were such a characteristic 
part of Back Bay homes. In 1836 Abbott Lawrence moved 
into the old Amory house at number eight Park Street, to 
be situated, conveniently enough, right next door to the 
residence of his daughter 1 s father-in-law, Mr. John Amory 
Lowell. 2 
On Sundays, the Lawrence brothers would join 
with such prominent figures as Nathan Hale, the noted 
editor, Harrison Gray Otis, the magnificent Federalist, 
1Amos Lawrence to Abbott Lawrence, September, 
18~2, A. L. Papers, M.H.S., Box 1; Kenneth W. Porter, 
The Jacksons and the Lees (2 vola.; Cambridge, 1937}, I, 
88 ff.; and Ferris Greenslet, The Lowells and their Seven 
Worlds (Boston, 1946}. 
2Robert M. Lawrence, Old Park Street and its 
Vicinity (Breton, 1922}, PP• 79-80. 
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and various members of the Perkins family, on their way 
to Unitarian services. Carefully they would make their 
way past "Brimstone Corner" at the junction of Park and 
Tremont Streets, where one of the latest ministers from 
orthodox Yale College would be upholding the traditions 
of tne Bible and the Trinity. l''inally arriving at the 
Brattle Square Church of Boston, these Unitarians could 
settle back in their pews and find a more reasonable and 
intellectual approach to ~hristian theology. This pre-
dominance of the Lawrence family in Unitarian circles 
led Ralph Waldo Emerson to caustically describe the 
Christianity of the Brattle Square Church as "the beet 
diagonal line that can be drawn between Jesus Christ and 
Abbott Lawrence.nl 
The rest of the week was spent in a fairly 
constant routine of work, conversation, coffee and 
commuting. Early in the brisk mornings the bueine sa men 
walking down from their homes on Beacon Hill would nod 
pleasantly to those who were just arriving from their 
suburban dwellings in Brookline, Milton and Newton.2 
1 Lawrence, Diary, pp. 184-6. See Edward E. Hale, 
"Religious . and Social ·Changes," Oomm. Hist., IV, 254, and 
Darling, Massachusetts, P• 25 • . 
2Hughes, Forbes, I, 6-7; William Lawrence, ~fe 
of Amos A. Lawrence: With Extracts from His Diary and 
~orrespondence (Boston, l888), PP• 59-60. 
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First they would go to their respective offices to spend 
most of the morning preparing their correspondence, 
surveying the latest financial statements and issuing 
whatever instructions were necessary for the operations 
of the day. About noon-time, the gentlemen of business 
and trade would gather up their hats, sticks and gloves, 
and make their way to the n 1 ~hange" to discuss some 
., 
of the more informal (yet extremely important) aspects 
of economic enterprise with their relatives and associates. 1 
This mid-day walk took them to the "old" State House on 
the corner of State Street and Washington, where the 
center of attraction was the famous "Topliff News Room" 
on the first floor overlooking State Street, a combina-
tion club and reading-room for Boston's leading merchants 
and business men. Anything and everything pertaining to 
their interests was available--newspapers and periodicals 
from all over the world, listings of the entrances and 
clearances of vessels from every port, and information 
bulletins from foreign correspondents. 2 Here, during 
the noon hours, the business elite would discuss matters 
1T. L. Nichols, Forty Years of American Life, 1821-
1§21 (New York, 1937), PP• 84-5. 
2rn 1842 Topliff's News Room was moved to the new 
Merchants Exchange Building which was erected on State 
Street. See Morison, History, PP• 239-40. 
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of mutual interest, until it was time for them to return 
home. Back up the Hill, or out into the "country" they 
would go for dinner, which would be served at two or three 
o'clock, followed by recreation or exercise. In the warmer 
weather, riding and hunting were favorite pastimes, While 
in the winter, sleighing and skating were delightful w&JS 
of passing the afternoons, as the office staffs, back in 
Boston, carried on the details of the business.l 
As the factory owner assumed positions of greater 
economic importance and social prominence, it was inevitable 
that he should begin to desire a corresponding amount of 
political power. The first significant step came in the 
Congressional elections of 1830, when Nathan Appleton, 
the well-known manufacturer and protectionist, defeated 
Henry Lee, merchant and free-trader. 2 From this point 
on, protection took precedence over free-trade, and the 
Yankee manufacturers proceeded to move into positions 
of political power. Utilizing the resources of a strong 
National Repuolican Party, the conservative elements of 
the Bay State saw their interests being sponsored at 
lHughes, Forbes, I, 6-7; Lawrence, Amos A. 
Lawrence, PP• 60-62; William Lawrence, Memories of a 
Happy Life (Boston, 1926), pp. 4-6. 
2 Darling, Massachusetts, p. 12. 
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home and in the nation's capital by an imposing array of 
talent. With the State administration headed by such men 
as the popular Levi Lincoln, and later, the handsome, 
polish ed Bdward ~verett, reputed to be the wealthiest man 
in Boston, Massachuset t s was bound to follow the 11 rightu 
path . 11 Hones t John" Davis represented the protectionist 
point of view in the United States Senate, consistently 
supporting the position of Senator Daniel viebster, to whom 
Nathan Appleton and Abbott Lawrence had sold shares in 
their corporations and for whom these gentlemen would 
later lead subscriptions of ~100,000, in order to maintain 
the renowned orator in public life. Appleton, already 
in the House of Representatives, was joined by his fellow-
manufacturer in 1834, when Lawrence was elected as 
1 Representative from Massachusetts. 
With so many representatives of industry, 
capital and protection moving into such key positions of 
political power, it issnall wonder that the business 
interests of Massachusetts could feel certain that before 
long the political atmosphere would reflect that same 
stability and order which already characterized 
lHill Abbott Lawrence, pp. 56-8; Faulkner, 
" lViassachusetts, {. Gomm. Hi st., I V, 88-9. 
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the economics and society of the State. Many. certainly, 
would agree with the words of Amos Lawrence to his son, 
who was just entering Harvard ~ollege, as he wrote 
complacently: "our local affairs are very delightful in 
this state and city. We have no violent political 
animosities; and the prosperity of the people is very 
1 great." 
Political affairs, however. were to prove any-
thing but "delightful1 as the age of Jacksonian democracy 
began to raise disturbing ideas at both the national and 
state levels. In local politics. new parties were 
already popping up almost everywhere. A rich druggist 
by the name of David Henshaw {who had never been accepted 
into Boston's social elite) had helped form a Jackson 
.party in Massachusetts made up of rural and urban democrats, 
and including a number of so-called "silk-stocking demo-
crats" who represented those die-hard shippers who still 
refused to make peace with the manufacturers. Although 
the Republicans succeeded in preventing these Jackson men 
from gaining control of the Bay State, the political 
1Amos Lawrence to Amos A. Lawrence, Jan. 16, 
1831. Lawrence. Diary, pp. 103-104. See also Appleton, 
Diaries, p. 38. 
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problem became more difficult when federal patronage 
passed into the hands of the local Democrats after 11 0ld 
liickory's 11 election in 1828. 1 
I n 1828, too, a third party came into existence, 
known as the 11 Antimasons," who by 1830 had elected three 
State senators and a score of house members. A polyglot 
group, made up of former Federalists, dissatisfied 
Republicans and unrewarded Democrats, the Antimason 
party became extremely popular for a time, representing 
all things to all men. Particularly disturbing was the 
tendency of this new group to absorb elements of existing 
parties by combining appeals for protection and internal 
improvements with demands for reform and "general welfare" 
le gislation. Eagerly and confidently the Antimasons were 
looking forward to the elections of 1833 as a true test 
of their power. 2 
As if the political picture in the Bay State 
were not sufficiently confusing , a fourth political 
1Faulkner, 11 Ma.ssachusett s, 11 ~omm. Hist., IV, 
79-80, and Dar ling, iv'Iassachuset ts, pp. 56-9. 
2Ibid., pp. 85-9; Faulkner, "Massachusetts, n 
Gomm. Hist., IV, 81-3. 
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party now put in its appearance--the Workingmen's party. 
Although it did include such "workingmen" as mechanics~ 
masons, ship caulkers and urban laborers, the new party 
drew its chief supporters primarily from the agricultural 
prole tariat of the rural districts who had decided to 
put their hostility to the "idle city rich" . and the 
"accumulators" of wealth into political form. · Amos 
Lawrence was furious at this development. "We are 
literally all working men," he wrote to his son; "and 
the attempt to get up a 'Working-Men's Party' is a libel 
upon the whole population, as it implies that there are 
among us large numbers who are not working men1" 1 
Undaunted by such criticism, the Workingmen's 
party, too~ was looking forward to the elections of 1833 
with much enthusiasm, encouraged by its rapid success in 
the inland towns of the western counties and in the sea-
port towns of the east. 2 
The elections of 1833, then, produced not only 
four political parties, but a flurry of excitement and 
campaign oratory the like of which had not been seen in 
1 . Amos Lawrence to Amos A. Lawrence, Jan. 16, 
1831, Lawrence, Diary, pp. 103-4. 
2 Boston Post, Sept. 7, Oct. 9, 1832. 
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Ivlassachusetts for many years. And the results were as 
exciting as the preliminaries! The Gubernatorial race ended 
in a deadlock. Davis, the Antimason candidate, received the 
largest number of votes, but failed to get a majority. He w~ 
followed by John Quincy Adams, Republican, with Marcus Morton, 
the perennial Jackson candidate, in third place. It was 
Adams, now, who held the balance of power, and he made up 
his mind, with calm deliberation, as everyone watched and 
waited. After consulting with Davis, Adams publicly 
withdrew from the race in favor of t he Antimason--Jackson 
was not going to get the benefit of his votel 1 
This virtual merger of t he Republicans with the 
.Antimasons (they now began to call themselves "Whigs, 11 
because of their opposition to uKing Andrewlt) caused the 
latter party to rapidly lose its distinguish ing character-
istics; and it gradually ceased to be a possible threat 
to the established community of the Bay State. 'Tine yaar 
1833 also marked the decline of the Workingmen's party as 
a separate political movement, as the losses sustained i~ 
the elections convinced many of the leading members that 
success lay in combining with the national party of Andrew 
2 Jackson. Before long, then, a large number were filing 
1Faulkner, n:Massachusetts," Comm. IIist., IV, 84; 
Darling, Massachusett s , PP• 115-118 • . 
2Boston Post, Oct. 29, 1835. 
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into the ranks of the Democratic Party, leaving the 
"Whigs " holding the local field. 1 
The only other dark cloud on the political 
horizon during the : t hirties, was the annoying issue 
of the Bank. When Jackson issued his famous Veto 
Message in the summer of 1832, refusing to agree to a 
re-chartering of the Second National Bank, Boston 
society had reacted in alarm. 2 Not that the closing 
of the Bank itself caused undue panic. Boston business 
had long ago taken the precaution of creating its own 
private banking system which , by this time, controlled 
as much capital as Mr . Biddle 1 s BBnk, and which was 
actually a financial rival of the national banking 
system. Indeed, Nathan Appleton, the Lawrences, and 
other leading Boston businessmen had been trying to get 
Nicholas Biddle to modify his stand on the Bank issue. 
For a long time many Bay State business leaders had been 
convinced that Biddle was deliberately manipulating 
finances as a counterattack against Jackson. 3 In 1834, 
1Judge Henry Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, 
Dec. 6, 1834, A. L. Letters, M.H.S., III. 
2Abbott Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, June 2, 6, 9, 
July 2, 1832, A. L. Papers, M.H.s., Box 1. 
3Boston Courier, March 30, 1837. Also see A. L. 
Letters, M.H.S., IV, for a lengthy appraisal of the 
Jacksonian economic program, written by Abbott Lawrence, 
March 27 , 1837. 
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in hopes of 'putting an end to this dangerous feud, Nathan 
Appleton headed a co~ttee of Boston financiers who joined 
with a similar New York group to demand that Biddle cease 
his caprieious policy which was playing havoc with their 
financial credits.1 
No, it was not the monetary situation itself 
which disturbed Boston's men of property--it was the 
apprehension that Jackson's widely publicized Veto was 
only the initial step in an all-out attack on property 
and position, a prelude to class warfare. "This is the 
most wholly radical and basely Jesuitical document that 
ever emanated from any administration, in any country,• 
protested the conservative Daily Atlas, deploring the 
public stand of the President. "It falsely and wickedly 
alleges that the rich and powerful throughout the country 
are waging a war of oppression against the poor and the 
n2 weak •••• 
Undoubtedly, many Bostonians experienced the 
same apprehensions as the cynical Whig who felt that 
Jackson would eventually suppress all banks, destroy all 
1Appleton, et al., to Board of Directors of the 
United States Branah Bank at Boston (draft} June 21, 1834. 
Also see Appleton to Nicholas Biddle (drattf, July, 1834, 
Appleton Papers, Mas, M.H.S. 
2Boston Daily Atlas, July 17, 19, 21, 1832. 
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paper currency, and return to the "barter of the patriarchal 
1 
age." It was more on a basis of principle, then, rather 
than enthusiasm for the bank or regard for Biddle, which 
led Boston business leaders to support the Bank against 
Jackson's determination to destroy it. 
The repercussions of the Bank fight, however, 
proved more disastrous than even New England had antici-
pated. With Jackson withdrawing public deposits, and with 
Btddle contracting and expanding credit almost at will, 
the financial situation throughout the country became 
alarmingly unstable. As the Government money now in 
"pet banks" was put into fabulous land specula tiona and 
expansive internal improvements, scarcity of funds caused 
a new crop of banks to appear. Larger issues of paper 
money came pouring out, prices spiraled upward and credit 
was stretched to the breaking point. The business 
community watched in horror and held its breath.2 Then 
came the crash. 
Hardly had the portly Martin Van Buren carefully 
seated himself in the Presidential chair in 1837 when the 
1Darling, Massachusetts, p. 143. 
2Amos Lawrence to his sister, March 16, 1835, 
Lawrence, Diar~, p. 130. See Also Sly, "Massachusetts,n 
Comm. Hist., I , 289. 
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financial crash precipitated the worst depression the 
nation had ever seen. Banks everywhere suspended 
payments, the most important mills in Lowell were 
practically closed, nearly half the spindles of 
Massachusetts ceased operations, and scarcely a manu-
facturer in the boot and shoe industry escaped bankruptcy. 
Almost unable to believe his eyes, Amos Lawrence called 
it 11 the most violent pecuniary revulsion that has been 
anticipated for more than a year, •• and said it was "more 
severe than our worst fears." 1 Massachusetts business 
held on tight, trimmed its financial sails, and rode out 
the frightening storm. Special scrip was issued by the 
State of Massachusetts during the crisis and commanded 
higher prices in loans overseas than any other State in 
the Union. Over a million dollars in State bonds were 
issued and the proceeds appropriated to railroad 
construction all through the ~ommonwealth. Gradually 
Massachusetts banks began to resume specie payment on a 
limited basis as the amount of specie on deposit in the 
vaults started to slowly increase. 2 
1 Lawrence, Diary, p. 141. See also James Means 
to Amos Lawrence, May 15, 1837, A. L. Papers, M.H.s., 
Box 1. 
2Darling, Massachusetts, PP• 203-204, 236-7. 
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Unexpectedly1 however 1 it was the Jackson party 
and its associates who suffered some of the worst effects 
of the financial panic in Massachusetts. The officers of 
the local "pet" bank 1 the Commonwealth Bank 1 had 1 like 
so many others 1 engaged in land speculations which 
involved the Uank runds. By the fall of 1837 1 the first 
director died, personally bankrupt 1 the second director 
was found to be $80 1 000 in debt to the Bank 1 and the Bank 
itself was falling to pieces. With almost dramatic 
irony, the Whigs themselves were able to supply the coup 
de grace--when the ~ommonwealth Bank applied to the 
Suffolk Bank for financial assistance. The Suffolk 
refused: The .Commonwealth was forced to close 
January 11, 1838, and brought down with it such affiliated 
corporations as the Commonwealth Insurance ~ompany and 
the Warren Association, whose funds had been invested in 
the Bank.1 
Delighted beyond words, the local Whigs swarmed 
all over the Jacksonians--directing their sharpest 
attacks at David Henshaw 1 local Democratic manager, who 
had been a leading figure in the defunct Bank and the 
bankrupt corporations. Down in Washington, Dm iel Webster 
was thundering for a special investigation by the Secretary 
1 
Darling, Massachusetts, PP• 224-6. 
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of the Treasury and demanding a report to Congress. Ba~ck 
home, the Massachusetts Whigs continued to torment the 
Democrats with the responsibility for causing bank 
failures and business depression. Hit from every side, the 
Jackson men did not have a chance, and in the elections 
of 1837, Edward Everett beat Marcus Morton by nearly five 
to three. 1 During the entire period of over twenty years, 
from 1828 to 1850, the Jackson Democrats campaigned 
successfully only twice. Marcus Morton took the Governor-
ship ~n 1839, but had both Houses against him. In 1842, 
Morton won the post a second time, and had the support 
of the Senate--but was ousted the following year by 
George N. Gibbs, the conservative Whig candidate, who 
held office for the next seven years.2 
Boston business men settled back to review their 
position by the close of the 1830's--and found it good. 
In spite of the jealous pretensions of s~lk-stocking 
Democrats, the competitive ambitions of Antimasons, the 
levelling tactics of Workingmen, and the absurd theories 
of Jacksonian Democracy, the men of wealth and influence 
seemed to be seated more firmly in power than ever before. 
94. 
1Boston Daily Atlas, Nov. 17, 1838. 
2 Faulkner, "Massachusetts," Connn. Hist., IV, 88-
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"The result of the election in Massachusetts is a matter 
of devout and grateful feelings to every good citizen," 
wrote Amos Lawrence gravely; and there were many 11 goodn 
citizens who would agree with him. 1 Everything , once 
again, seemed to be normal, orderly and quiet. 
~uiet, that is, if one chose to ignore the 
outbursts of that madman up at :Lvlerch ants' Hall, Vi lliam 
Lloyd Garrison, and h is ridiculous attacks against 
slaveryl 
1Amos Lawrence to Jonathan Chapman, November~~' 
1844, Lawrence, Diary, p. 192. 
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CHAPTER II 
BROAD~LOTH AND COTTON 
His Honor~ Harrison Gray Otis, Mayor of the -Gi ty 
of Boston, did not understand it at all. On his desk 
were explosive letters from the Governor of Virginia and 
the Governor of Georgia~ demanding that he take action 
against some "incendiary" newspaper~ published .in Boston, 
that was being circulated among the plantations, inciting 
the black people to riot and revolt. Nat Turner's 
abortive uprising in August~ 1831~ had recently struck 
terror into the heart of the entire South~ and many 
Southern leaders were now blaming this fiery sheet, 
the Liberator, for inciting the Negro rebellion. 
Although Turner and his associates denied ever having 
seen the paper, the South demanded an end to suCh out-
rageous publications. Senator Hayne had just sent a 
blistering letter insisting upon action against the 
editor~ and the National Intelligencer even now was 
publicly inquiring of "the worthy mayor o.f the City of 
Boston•• whether any law could be found to prevent publica-
l 
tion of such "diabolical papers." 
1 Samuel Eliot Morison~ The Life and Letters of 
Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848 (2 vola.; ~B=o~s~t~o~n~,~l~9~1~3~)~~~I~I~.~,~2~5~9;-~2~6~1~.~~~~~~~ 
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Mayor Otis was at a complete loss. Although the 
~berator had been making its appearance for almost a year 
now, he had never heard of it--nor had any of his friends 
or acquaintances. Obviously, however, this was a matter 
that must be looked into; and so the Mayor ordered an 
investigation of the offending publication. In due time 
His Honor was informed that the paper called the Liberator 
was edited by a man named Garrison, whose office was 
nothing but an nobscure hole, 11 whose only 11 visible 
auxiliary11 was a Negro boy, and whose supporters were only 
a few ninsignifican t persons of all colors. 111 
Otis breathed a sigh of relief--only a tempest 
in a teapot--and sat down to assure his friends in the 
South that this unf~ tunate incident was of no con-
sequence. This new "fanaticism, 11 he wrote, had no 
influence whatsoever among persons of consequence in the 
Bay State. "Nor was it likely, " he emphasized, "to make 
proselytes among the respectable classes of our people." 
11In this, however, 11 sighed a bewildered Harrison 
Gray Otis, some years later, in a masterpiece of under-
statement, 11 I was mistaken. 112 
1 Morison, Otis, II, 261-2. 
2 Ibid., P• 262. 
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Just !!2:!, mistaken he had been, even Otis him-
self' would never know. This nobscure" little paper and 
ita "fanatic" editor were des tineq to completely revolution-
ize the whole process of the anti-slavery movement in the 
United States, and tear apart what has been significantly 
called the 11 great conspiracy of silence." 
There had been anti-slavery agitation long 
before America had ever heard of William Lloyd Garrison; 
but for the most part the ~proach had been rational, the 
technique gentlemanly, and the demands moderate and 
gradual. 
Furthermore, plans and programs did not seem to 
matter very much during the 1820's, with issues like the 
Bank, Nullification, the tariff, party battles and 
Western lands occupying the center of the national stage. 
Who could blame Mayor Otis for underestimating the efforts 
of William Lloyd Garrison? The editor himself complained 
that he found "contempt more bitter, opposition more 
active, detraction more relentless, prejudice more 
stubborn, and apathy more frozen" in New England, even 
more "than among slave owners themselves." The early 
issues of his papers caused hardly a ripple upon the 
smooth surface of Boston. "Suspicion and apathy," moaned 
Garrison, were the reactions to his Liberator, as the 
rent became harder to meet each day. Even when apathy 
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gave way to curiosity, and Boston did begin to take 
notice, the results were anything but encouraging. 
Looked upon generally as agitators, cranks and "queers," 
Abolitionists were not socially acceptable in any respecta-
ble circle .1 
Garrison seemed to t hrive on opposition, however. 
-with the imperturbability of a saint, the self-assurance of 
a martyr, and the vocabulary of a devil, Garrison struck 
back, blow for blow, gradually gathering a small band of 
followers about him. Encouraged even by this meager 
indication of support, Garrison enthusiastically proposed 
the formation of some sort of organization in order to 
formulate polic y and gain new adh erents. By t h e opening 
of t he year 1832, the New England Antislavery Society had 
been formed, as the Abolitionist organized hi s crusade 
for immediate and unconditional emancipation. 2 
Up to now, conservative Bostonians could laugh 
at Garrison, sneer at his newspaper, and ostracize those 
who saw fit to follow t h e movement. But by the mid-
thirties, things h ad developed to the point where the 
_, 
1Liberator, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1831; Wendell Phillips 
Garrison and r 'rancis Jackson Garrison, 'V 'illiam Lloyd 
Garrison 1 1805-1879: n1e Story of his hife Told by his Children (4 vols.; New York, 1885-1889), I, 224. Also see 
Robert G. Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, Feb. 5, 1847, Robert G. 
Winthrop Papers, lviss, M.H.S., JOUCVI , 115. 
2Garrison, Life, I, 277-9. 
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Abolitionists simply could not be scoffed out of existence--
stronger measures were necessary. Boston business men in 
general--and cotton manufacturers like the Lawrences in 
particular--were outraged by what they considered to be an 
irrelevant issue 1 dragged in by the heels 1 which might 
upset the peace and the prosperity of the ~ommonwealth. 
Boston's men of property and standing had their own ideas 
regarding the perplexing problem of slavery and its 
eventual solution--but they did not include the fanatical 
proposals of Garrison. If a Christian gentleman felt the 
need of putting his moral opposition to slavery into some 
tangible form, the " .colonization" plan proposed by the 
American .Colonization Society offered an attractive 
solution. 1 The opportunity to donate sufficient funds to 
send Negroes off to Africa made it possible for a gentle-
man to assist the individual Negro, without involving 
himself in an unsavory controversy regarding the nature 
of the institution itself. 11 I h ave never countenanced 
these abolition movements 1 tt old Amos Lawrence wrote to a 
friend in South ~arolina, assuring him that the Abolitionists 
did not represent the views of the general community. He 
did go on to explain, however 1 that he had often "lent a 
hand11 in the Colonization movement, wh ich he was convinced 
would 11 make a greater ch ange in the condition of the 
lBoston Dai l y Atlas, Dec. 23, 1835. 
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l blacks than any event since the Christian era." "Liberia," 
he told Elliott Cresson of Philadelphia, 11 now promises to 
be to the black man what New England has been to the 
Pilgrims, and Pennsylvania to the Friends. n2 
Lawrence's son, Amos A. Lawrence, too, expressed 
a simi lar interest in the Liberian experiment, both in h is 
capacity as trustee and director of the Episcopal !fi ssion 
in Africa, and as a personal subscriber to the Coloniza-
tion program. On one occasion young Lawrence donated a 
thousand dollars to the cause, from "a young merchantn 
to which h is father added another t housand, from 11 an old 
merchant"; and both were constantly called upon for private 
assistance to some worthy Negro individual or family 
seeking to gain freedom. 3 
Many other prominent citizens of the Bay State 
worked with the Lawrences in trying to gain acceptance 
for the Colonization program. Mayor Harrison Gray Otis, 
lLawrence, Diary, pp. 317-18. 
2Amos Lawrence to Elliott Cresson, June 12, 1851, 
ibid., PP• 299-300. 
3I bid. Also see Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 
53-4; J. K. Douglas to Amos Lawrence, August C J, Sept. 10, 
1846, A. L. Letters, lVI .H.S., VII, 53, 61; Stephen Fairbanks 
to Amos A. Lawrence, June 16, 1851, A. A. L. Letters, 
M. H.S., IX, 41. 
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himself was a heavy investor in cotton manufacturing. He 
had purchased a majority interest (about $100,000) in 
the Taunton Manufacturing Gompany, and held additional 
blocks of stock in at least half a dozen other large manu-
facturing corporations •1 Writing to his friend, Nathan 
Appleton the manufacturer who was then serving in the 
House of Representatives, Otis pleaded for a program of 
Federal colonization. He favored a plan which would divide 
an annual appropriation among the various plantation 
states, and would then be used by each of the states "in 
its own moden for colonization. Such an arrangement would, 
argued Otis, cut the ground away from the violent demands 
of the Abolitionists. 2 Writing to Daniel Webster in the 
Senate, the Mayor of Boston repeated his proposals, and 
added ominously: 11 there will be no peace or security for 
us untill LSi£! you buy up the Virginia negroes and send 
u3 them off •••• 
The Abolitionists, however, were quick to 
condemn what Garrison sneeringly labeled "that popular 
2 Ibid., PP• 288-9. 
3 Ibid., PP• 265-6. Also see Boston Courier, 
Feb. 16, 1832, for an appeal for a national colonization 
program, written by Otis under pseudonym of "Suggestor." 
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but pernicious doctrine of gradual abolition," and went 
out of their way to attack the policy of colonization 
which was known to have the active support of prominent 
Bostonians. ~harging the American Colonization Society 
with being a secret agency for slaveholders, Garrison 
claimed that it was "solemnly pledged not to interfere 
with a system unfathomly deep in pollution," nourished 
on 11 fear and selfishness," and encrusted with "corroding 
evii. nl 
Seriously disturbed about the unsettling effects 
which the Abolitionist movement was having at home, the 
Northern cotton interests began to be genuinely alarmed 
concerning the possible repercussions which Garrison 
and his followers would have on the slaveholding South. 
Already there were dangerous signs from the South as 
outraged planters threatened serious economic sanctions 
unless the Northerners put an end to the abolitionist 
agitation. 11 The people of the North must go hanging 
these fan~tical wretches if they would not lose the 
benefit of Southern trade," threatened the Richmond Whig; 
1 William Lloyd Garrison, 1~oughts on African 
Colonization (Boston, 1832), passim. See also Garrison, 
Life, I, 290-314. 
-
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while the prominent editor, James De Bow began to conjure 
up the awful picture of grass growing in the streets of 
Broadway. 1 Learning of an out burst of pro-Abolitionist 
sentiment among the workers in the Lowell Mi lls, the 
Southern pres s flew into a rage. Lamenting the fact that 
Abolitionism had made such inroads into the working class, 
a boycott was proposed which would cause Lowell to 11 wi ther 
or be forced to expel the Abolitionists. 112 Colonel ~ illiam 
Sparks, a prominent Louisiana planter hastened to warn 
Amos Lawrence of the latest sentiments below the Mason-
Dixon line. 11 There is much excitement in the Whole South 
upon the subject of Aboli t i on 1 " he wrote, 11 and I. fear 
the very worst for the prosperity of the Country •••• " 
Then, as if to add to the urgency of his appeal, the 
planter included a thinly veiled warning: 11 fuere will be 
strong measures taken in this state during the winter, 
some which I can not now mention but wh ich will be alarming 
t o t he people of the North ••• and I fear t h e late Lowell 
affair will cause some resolutions which will be acted on 
3 
aimed at her manufactures. 11 
1De Bow 1 s Commercial Review, XXIX (1860), 318; 
Philip F'oner, Business and Slavery {Chapel Hill, 1941), p. 4; 
Albion, New York, pp . 98-9. 
2Niles Register, XLVIII, Oct. 3, 1835; Bernard 
i\llandel, Labor: Free and Slave (New York, 1955), pp. 7 4-5. 
3William Sparks to Amos Lawrence, Oct. 17, 1835, 
A. L. Letters , M. H .S., IV. Also see Oswald Garrison Villard, 
11
'ln e Anti-Slavery Crisis in :Massa chusetts," Comm. Hist., I V, 
310-312. 
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Boston manufacturing and shipping interests sought 
some way out of this frightening situation. The business-
men of Massachusetts were now inextricably bound up with 
the fortunes of the Cotton Kingdom--and the South knew it. 
The manufacturing, the financing and the transportation of 
cotton had become such an integral part of the industrial 
and financial life of the New England area, that it was 
considered nothing short of economic suicide to tamper 
with the mutually advantageous arrangements. 
Within ten years after the appearance of Eli 
Whitney's famed "cotton gin 11 the cotton crop of the South 
had quadrupled itself. With the vast cultivation of the 
inexpensive and hardy "upland" or short-staple cotton 
(superseding the more expensive 11 sea-island11 or long-
staple cotton), production grew at phenomenal rates. 
Sprawling white fields in the South grew larger and 
larger each year, keeping pace with the increasing demands 
1 
of British machines and American factories. 
As the world's first great industrial power, 
it was obvious that Great Britain would absorb by far the 
1 David .Cohn, The Life and Times of King Cotton 
(New York, 1956}, pp. 3-38; William E. Dodd, The Cotton King-
dom (New Haven, 1920), pp. 25-6; Avery Graven, The :Coming 
or-the Civil War (New York, 1942), pp. 94-117. 
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larger part of the South's valuable output during the early 
part of the nineteenth century. 1 Gradually~ however~ the 
fluffy product found its way into the expanding mills and 
factories of the North. With cotton spindles increasing 
from one million to over two million between 1830-1840~ 
American factories were soon using over one hundred million 
pounds of Southern cotton. 2 By 1830 the industrial North 
had become wedded~ not only to the South's production of 
cotton, but tn the institution of slave labor which made 
such valuable production possible. Northern factories 
depended upon a steady flow of cotton upon which to base 
their profits. Northern bankers who grew rich by extending 
liberal (but risky} credit to Southern planters against 
next year's crop, insisted on good relations and a stable 
economy. 3 Northern shippers looked forward eagerly to 
increasing cotton production as one of America's chief 
items of export. In 1821 cotton was already America's 
leading export, constituting over thirty-five per cent of 
1rn 1825., the u. s. raised three-quarters of the 
228~000.,000 pounds of cotton imported by Britain. Jeannette 
Mirsky and Allan Nevins~ The World of Eli Whitney (New Yor~~ 
1952} I P• 91. 
consumed 
pounds. 
A. A. L. 
2Amos A. Lawrence estimated the 
by New England alone, in 1850., 
Amos A. Lawrence to R. J. Ward, 
Letterbook, M.H.s.~ I, 264. 
amount of cotton 
at 15o,ooo.ooo 
Feb. 10, 1851, 
3 Clement Eaton, History of the Old South (New York, 
1949), PP• 406-7. 
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the total; by 1850 Southern cotton would account for 
nearly sixty per cent of total exports--a major factor in 
the consideration of Northern shipping interests. Yankee 
shipping not only looked to the busy looms of Lawrence and 
Lowell for one of its valuable export commodities, but 
depended upon the raw cotton from the South to provide the 
most important medium of the Massachusetts carrying trade. 1 
The growth of the cotton manufacturing industry 
in Massachusetts had brought t he influential business and 
commercial classes of New England into close relationship 
with the powerful cotton-raising, slave-owning class of 
the South. The result was that the economic interests of 
the otherwise disparate sections drew both parties into an 
unusually tolerant, friendly and cordial relationship. 
The New England mills were accustomed to following the 
practice of either sending Northern purchasing agents 
southward to purchase cotton at such centers as Memphis, 
Mobile, New Orleans or Galveston; or else of contacting 
Southern factory representatives who selected the grades 
of cotton specified by the mill owners back North. 2 
1Morison, History, PP• 215, 231-2; Albion, .lli!.!£ 
York, PP• 98-9; F'oner, Business, P• 4. 
2Evelyn Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress (Cambridge, 
1948), PP• 37-8;. Dane Yorle_., The Men and Times of Pepperell 
(Boston, 1945), PP• 30-1. 
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In addi t. ion to t h e official employees and purchs.sers sent 
into the South, the North ern manufacturers also utilized 
t h e talents and the influence of close friends and 
relatives to ascertain the exact status of the economic 
situation, and to further augment the personal relationships 
that were being steadily developed. One of the best 
examples of this combination of market research and public 
relations can be seen in the extended tour that was 
conducted by young .Amos Adams Lawrence through the South 
and Y~est, as a commission agent for various Boston firms--
most notably that of nA & A Lawrence . n Determined that 
at least one of his sons should take over the business in 
order to preserve the 11 good name" of the .Gompany, Amos had 
arranged with his brother Abbott to supply his son with 
letters of reference, and to send him around the country 
to learn the business from the ground up.l 
When Amos A. Lawrence graduated from Harvard in 
1835, h e set out on an intensive survey of business 
prospects in the West and the South. His first stop was 
\ ashington, during the first part of January, 1836. 
Attending sessions of the Congress, he was particularly 
1Amos Lawrence to Abbott Lawrence, September ~ ~, 
1832, A. L. Papers, ivl.H.S., Box 1, folder 2. 
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attracted to the Senate, and sent a ten-page letter back 
to h is father outlining the serious debates he had heard 
in the Senate over the question of slavery. Carefully 
he emphasized the fears of many of the Southern Senators 
concerning the incendiary nature of the Abolitionists in 
the Jorth. Senator ·Calhoun, wrote young Lawrence, insisted 
that t h e South must have some n t e s timony11 that would 11 soothe 
the anger of the slaveholders against the whole North: 
'lhey required pacification and must have itl 11 1 
Leaving the Nation's capital, Lawrence headed 
South, and nothing but hospitality and good will seemed 
to greet the young New Englander as he visited Charleston, 
South Carolina and then made his way back up to Pittsburgh, 
.Pennsylvania. 2 .(;ommenting on the 11 solid wealth" of this 
latter city, Lawrence carefully sent his father back a list 
of the best commercial prospects, and expressed the hope that 
an "inexhaustible source of wealth 11 could soon be diverted to 
11 our city. n3 Down to ~Y'.aeeling, Virginia, across to Cincinnati, 
over to Louisville, Kentucky, lining up wholesalers, jobbers and 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 7, 8, 
1836, A. £. Letters, M. H.S., I, 410, 411. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 18, 
1836, A. L. Papers, ~.H .S., Box l, folder 2. 
3 Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Oct. 23, 
1836, ibid. 
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buyers; then down to Florence, Alabama, went the young 
traveling salesman, making new contacts and adding to his 
list of future "prospects • 1• Cutting straight across to 
Memphis, he then took the boat down the Mississippi to 
Natchez, taking a little time out to stop in at the crowded 
little taverns and admire the 11 pretty · ladies 11 who were 
trav ,e ling the same route • 1 
Arriving at New Orleans, Lawrence was given a 
warm reception by the prominent cotton planters and 
merchants of the city who were close friends of his father 
and uncle. "~ like your New Englanders~" boomed a prosperous 
1~. Pritchard expansively; and one of the old cotton planters 
chuckled and suggested to the novice that if the Northern 
manufacturers and the Southern planters could get together 
and find a way to by-pass the New Yorkers, 11 it will be a 
great benefit to us both." "Yes," added Pritchard, . 
"and when we get our line of packet ships to Europe we 
will save another slice of our own loafl 11 Plans were 
obviously being formulated below the Ma s on-Di xon line~ and 
Lawrence lost no time in telling his father all about them. 2 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, A. L. Letters, 
M.H.S., II~ 118. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Dec. 22, 1836, 
A. L. Papers, M. H.s., Box 1, folder 2. Also see Henry 
Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 25, 1837, A. L. Letters, 
M. H.S., I I, 196. 
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From New Orleans, Lawrence went to Mobile, and 
from there by railroad to Macon, Georgia, early in 183'7. 
The young merchant was apalled at the lack of thrift 
among the planters, their careless handling of accounts 
and receipts, and their general lack of savoir faire. 
ttWha t I had imagined a Southern planter is a very rare 
sight, 11 he told his father; 11 I mean a well educated 
gentleman." 1 Setting out from Macon, the young man took 
time to visit the cotton mills along the Chattahoochee, 
just north of Milledgeville. "Everybody called upon us," 
he wrote, "because we brought letters from A & A L & Co., 
who have a great reputation here." By way of indicating 
the value of the personal relations which the New Englanders 
had been careful to cultivate, Lawrence told his father: 
11 Every man here who knows anything about Boston says he 
feels under great obligations to ~~. Abbott Lawrence (or 
to you sometimes) that he was very civil to them in 
Boa ton, and that they attended !. party at his house. n 
Then he added, 11 I never saw the good results of politeness 
n2 
so plainly before •••• 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. '7, 183'7, 
A. L. Papers, M.H.S., Box 1, folder 2. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 11, 183'7, 
ibid. 
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By the following week Lawrence was making his 
way through the city of Charleston, South Carolina, meeting 
with such noted Southerners as James Hamilton, former 
governor and political leader of the State, and dining with 
50 
t h e Rutledges, the Ogelthorpes, the Reids and the Gilchrists. 
Although the young man was pleased by the fact that men 
complimented him for the "political consistency of Massachusetts,n 
he was careful to describe to his father the almost hysterical 
fear whicn gripped the city because of the Abolitionist 
threat. Imagining the dreaded Abolitionists to be "very 
powerful" in the North, wrote Lawrence, the authorities 
had placed a special patrol on duty in the city at eight 
o'clock every night, and h ad set up a guard house where 
arms and arrmunition were kept nin case of any disturbance. 111 
A week later, t h e young merchant was crossing into 
Virginia, and h e was much more enthusiastic about prospects 
for manufacturing in the Petersburg area. Riding out with 
a group of Virginians, he inspected a cotton mill which 
had just been erected. Obviously impressed, the young man 
wrote to h is father: "I f manufacturing coarse cotton can 
succeed in this part of the country, it will be here."2 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 21, 1837, 
A. L. Papers, Box 1, folder 2. 
2~\mos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 24, 1837, 
ibid. 
Arriving back in Washington, Lawrence found 
Congress in as much of a turmoil over the slavery issue as 
it had been a year earlier. Describing the contest in the 
House over the gag rule, Lawrence noted a significant 
change of attitude which had taken place. ttour members 
are no longer disposed to tolerate the insults of the 
South," he pointed out to his father, "and instead of 
opposing abolition as they have done, they will advocate 
the Right of Petition and the freedom of speeCh.ul 
The multiplicity of such professional and personal 
contacts between the enterprisers in the North and their 
counterparts in the South led to the most amiable of 
relations. Southern planters vacationed at Boston hotels 
as they might at summer resorts, and were warmly received 
into the best private homes in the city. Their sons at 
Harvard, with generous allowances and dashing manners, 
courted the young ladies of the North, attended dinners 
and parties in Beacon Street homes, and reported regularly 
to such gentlemen as the Lawrences on their marks and 
deportment, which would be duly reported to their fathers 
in the South. In short, so many warm and happy friendships 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Feb. 10, 1837, 
A. L. Letters, M.H.S., II, 218. 
- - - -::: 
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were formed, that is was almost impossible for prominent 
Boston families to regard all slaveholders as inherently 
1 
evil. 
A complementary economic system between the 
North and the South, a tolerant regard for the rights and 
privileges of the other, and a warm social relationship 
which augmented the close economic ties--these were the 
valuable contributions to national unity and harmony 
wnich conservative Bostonians like the Lawrences felt 
were now being jeopardized by the immoderate demands 
and dangerous threats of the Abolitionists. The Northern 
businessman, they felt, must reassure his Southern friends 
that the disturbing elements were only a small lunatic 
fringe which was not at all representative of Northern 
views, and at the same time, take positive steps to 
curtail the activities and the influence of the offending 
elements themselves. 
In virtually all his appeals to his Southern 
brethren, the Northern businessman emphasized the fact 
~obert Means to Amos Lawrence, Beaufort, So. 
Carolina, March 10, 1823, May ~l, 1824, A. L. Papers, 
M.H.S., Box 1; H. A. Bullard to Lawrence, New Orleans, 
Jan. 28 1 1832, April 5, 1838, A. L. Letters, M.H.S., III; 
John L. Toomer to Lawrence, Charleston, June 24, Ju..l1e 28, 
1840, ibid., IV; William Sparks to Lawrence, Bonaventure, 
La., Nov. 1, 1841, Aug. 29, 1842, ibid., v. 
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that any solution to the slavery problem was to be 
accomplished only in accordance wi th the wishes of each of 
the Southern states. This was one of the most significant 
points of the conservative argument against abolition. 
Slavery, the average Boston businessman would concede, 
was an integral part of the American historical process, 
given specific sanction by the terms of the Constitution of 
the United States itself. While he might personally deplore 
the institution of slavery itself, he felt that any 
solution of the issue was only constitutionally possible 
by and with the consent of the respective states. Although 
Webster, in his famous 0 Reply to Hayne," might publicly 
casti gate slavery as a moral and political evil, he was, 
at the same time, forced to admit that the Federal Govern-
ment could have nothing to do with an institution which 
"has always been regarded as a matter of domestic policy 
1 
left with the States themselves." 
Amos Lawrence made it clear to Robert Rhett of 
South Carolina that he would never interfere in the 
question "unless requested by my brethren of the Slave-
holding States 0 ; and his son, Amos A. Lawrence, expressed 
1 FletCher Webster, ed., The Writings and Speeches 
of Daniel Webster (18 vols.; National Edition, Boston, 
1903 ) I VI , 12 • 
53 
the opinion that as a Whig he was honor-bound to preserve 
the original compact of the Union by which slavery was 
1 
recognized. 11 We must be magnanimous to the South, 11 he 
•· 
wrote. 115lavery cannot be extended . Whether it can ever 
be got rid of in this country is doubtful. It is a curse 
i mposed by the sins of our ancestors, and we must bear it 
patiently."2 When Harrison Gray Otis wrote to Benjamin 
Faneuil Hunt, a prominent lawyer of ~harleston, he 
indicated his willingness to leave the emancipation of 
slaves "to yourselves, to time, tb the Providence of God. 11 
Otis assured him that he "never doubted that the states 
of this union are inhibited by the federal compact from 
interfering with the plantation states in the management 
of their own slaves. The Jetter and the spirit of the 
"3 constitution are opposed to it.... The majority of 
conservatives in IVIaa·sachusetts would seem to agree with 
Jared Sparks the historian, who considered slavery a 
1Amos Lawrence to Robert B. Rhett, Dec. 12, 
1849, Lawrence, Diary, PP• 274-6. 
2 I .bid., p. 112. 
3 Harrison Gray Otis to Benjamin Hunt, Oct. 17, 
1831, Ioorison, ~' II, 262-3. 
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great calamity but a problem which was impossible of 
solution. "Slavery exists," he wrote, 11 by the Constitution 
1 
and the laws." As far as Boston businessmen were concerned, 
that ended the matter. 
But to t he Abolitionist, the mere fact that the 
Constitution of the United States countenanced the 
institution of slavery settled nothing. It only meant 
t hat the Constitution was wrong, and must either be ch anged--
or abandoned. 11 'lhe ballot box," charged Garrison in his 
Liberator, "is not an anti-slavery, but a pro-slavery 
argument, so long as it is surrounded by the u. s. Constitu-
tion11--a constitution, moreover, which he classified as 
11 a covenant with death and an agreement with hell. " 2 
'MVendell Phillips agreed that one of the "primary objects" 
of Abolitionists was 11 to dissolve the American Union. 113 
Any compact with slavery was evil, the Abolitionists 
argued, and such a union must necessarily be dissolved 
1nar~ing, Massachusetts, p. 152. 
2 Liberator, XIV, Feb. 8, April 12, 1844. 
3 Ibid., May 24, 1844. 
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in accordance with the principles of the "higher law." 
Dissolution of the Union of the States, then, was the 
only possible solution in America, especially since it 
would not only end the complicity of the Northern states 
in maintaining the immoral institution of slavery; but 
would also eliminate once and for all, the dangers of the 
extension of slavery into the territories of the North.1 
A shudder of horror ran through the conservative 
North at this latest evidence of political blasphemy. 
To preach Abolition was one thing--there was just no 
accounting for personal idiosyncracies--but to publicly 
denounce the sacred ~onstitution and to preach disunion 
was quite another thing. 2 There was too much at stake 
to let a disorganized group of maniacs and anarchists 
continue to go their way unchallenged and unopposed. 
The time had come for action, if the friendship of the 
South were to be retained. ~onservative Northerners 
made a desperate and ~ncerted effort to convince the 
South that the Abolitionists were no t a true reflection 
of Northern sympathies.3 Constantly the Vfui gs pleaded 
1Garrison, ~~ III, ·96-133. 
2 Boston Post, Nov. 20, 1835. 
-
3see Webster, Writings, X, 38. 
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with their Southern brethren to make a sharp distinction 
between the Abolitionist and the remainder of the North. 
n'Ihe Whigs were the first to denounce the Abolitionists,n 
the Boston Daily Atlas pointed out, as it warned the South -
land not to associate Abolitionists like Garrison and Tappan 
with the Whig Party. 1 Excited petitioners flooded t;ongress 
with their memorials, and in Boston, a huge mass meeting 
of some fifteen hundred citizens was ca lled for F'aneuil 
Hall on August 21, 1835. Presided over by Mayor Theodore 
Lyman, Jr., and Abbott Lawrence, the assembly was attended 
by the best elements of Boston society. 2 I nvitations 
had been sent out to prominent slaveholders to come and 
witness the good intentions of Boston's men of business; 
and as the hall began to fill up, Mr. Benjamin Robbins 
Gurtis noted with satisfaction the "numerous Southern 
gentlemen twho7 came from all parts of the country to be 
present at the meeting.n3 The assemblage listened to the 
words of the venerable Harrison Gray Ot~s, now seventy 
1 Boston Daily Atlas, Sept. 30, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, 
1835. 
2Ibid., .Aug. 22, 1835. See also George Benson to 
George W. Benson, Aug. 7, 1835; J. Farmer to Francis 
Jackson, Aug. 21, 1835, Garrison Papers, Rare Book Department, 
Boston Public Library (hereafter cited as "B.P.L."), V, 36, 41. 
3Benjamin Gurtis to George Ticknor, Aug. 23, 1835, 
Banjamin R. Curtis, A Memoir (2 vols.; Boston, 1879), I, 72. 
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as he warned that slaveholders would regard any attempt 
at abolition as 11war in disguise upon their lives, their 
property, their rights and institutions, an outrage upon 
their pride and honor, and the faith of contracts." By 
the close of his eloquent oration, the elderly statesman 
had his ~udience on its feet cheering his appeal that the 
"Thirteen stripes may not be merged in two dismal strains 
of black and redl 111 
Even the most sanguine of the visitors from the 
South should have been satisfied by the Boston meeting; 
and the conservative Atlas took pleasure in reprinting a 
lengthy editorial, taken from a New Orleans newspaper, 
which praised the speeCh of Harrison Gray Otis, and 
indicated that his words were universally commended through-
2 
out the South. Denunciations of Garrison and his colleagues 
had come so fast and furiously that Garrison's friends, 
fearing for his life, pleaded with him to leave the city. 
Reluctantly he consented, and for about a month he and 
his wife stayed away from Boston. In October, however, 
1 Morison, ~' II, 271-2. See William Lloyd 
Garrison to Henry E. Benson, Aug. 29, 1835, Garrison 
Letters, B.P.L., I, 65. 
2 Boston Daily Atlas, Oct. 17, 1835. 
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Garrison made known his return, and the Liberator announced 
the regular meeting of the Boston Female Antislavery 
Society to be held at three o'clock, October 21, 1835.1 
~he recent Faneuil Hall meeting, he felt, might well prove 
to be a boomerang. The 11 fiery spirits" of the South would 
certainly be satisfied with nothing short of sup~essing 
.Abolitionism by legal enactments--or "mobocratic violence," 
and the latter he dismissed as a practical impossibility.2 
But trouble was brewing. The rumor spread quickly through 
the city that George Thompson, a prominent British 
emancipationist {that "infamous foreign scoundrel" one 
placard called him), would address the gathering.3 A 
menacing crowd was already at the doors of 46 Washington 
Street when Garrison arrived at his office, which adjoined 
the small lecture hall, but the preparatiom inside went on 
as scheduled. Promptly at three o'clock, however, the mob 
burst in, broke up the ladies' meeting, and began a fruit-
less search for ~ompson. Pushing into Garrison's office, 
a group of the intruders started after the editor himself, 
1 Boston Daily Atlas, Oct. 14, 1835; Boston Post, 
Oct. 21, 1835. 
2 William Lloyd Garrison to Henry E. Benson, Aug. 25, 
1835, Garrison Letters, B.P.L.; I , 64. 
3 Boston Daily Atlas, Oct. 16, 1835. 
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until Mayor Lyman and the Sheriff who had just rushed upon 
the scene, helped him to escape through a rear window. A 
shouting mob finally caught up with Garrison, however, threw 
a rope around him and dragged him triumphantly through the 
1 
streets. Ragged and torn, he was being hauled toward 
Boston ~ommon by his howling captors, when two burly brothers, 
Daniel and Aaron ~orley, elbowed their way through, rescued 
Garrison, and fought their way into the safety of the ra ty 
Hall. As the angry mob demanded its prey, Garrison was 
quickly spirited out, shoved into a waiting hack, and 
driven off to the Leverett Street jail for his own pro-
tection--after being booked as a "rioter." The next day, 
Mayor Lyman dismissed the charges, advised Garrison to 
leave town, and released him. Garrison decided to follow 
the Mayor 1 s advice and journeyed to Providence with his 
2 
wife for a much needed rest. 
Of the nature of the mob which had attacked him, 
1Boston Post, Oct. 22, 1835. See Garrison, Life, 
II, 10-30, for a complete account of the "Boston mob.w---
Also see George W. Lyman to Rev. Benton Smith, June 30, 
1879, Miscellaneous Mas, M.H.S. 
2 Boston Post, Oct. 23, 1835. William Lloyd 
Garrison to George W. ~nson, Oct. 26, 1835, Garrison 
Letters, B.P.L., I, 76; George Thompson to Garrison 
Oct. 22, 1835; George W. Benson to Garrison, Oct. ~j', 1835, 
Garrison Papers, B.P.L., V, 60, 62; Garrison to Samuel E. 
Sewall, Oct. 24, 1835 1 Grenville H. Norcross, Mas, M.H.S. 
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Garrison had no doubt. "It was planned and executed," he 
insisted, 11not by the rabble, or the workingmen, but by 
'gentlemen of property and standing from all parts of the 
city. 1 nl ~"/endell Phillips, who had been a non-partisan 
witness to the event, later gave a classic description of 
the assault being conducted by the "gentlemen" of the 
city--in "broadcloth and in broad daylight"; and James L. 
Homer, editor of the Commercial Gazette, described the mob 
as "gentlemen of property and influence."2 The conservative 
character of the rioters was confirmed by a visitor from 
Baltimore, Ivir. T . .L. Nichols, who chanced to see the historic 
outburst as he walked through the city. liMerchants and 
bankers of Boston, assembled on 'Change in State-Street," 
he related, tt and believing him /Tnompson7 to be at the 
office of Garrison's Liberator, the y gathered tumultuously, 
and came around fro m State-Street into Washington Street, 
determined to put a stop to the eloquenc:e of t h e English 
1Garrison, Life, II, 30. 
2wendell Phillips, Speeches 1 Lectures and Letters (Boston, 1892), p. 214. Gited from a speech he made, 
twenty years later, in commemoration of the "Boston lvlob." 
See also James Homer to George Rand, Aug. 19, 1852, Garrison, 
~~ II, 10-11. 
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1 
Abolitionist." Although the evidence is circumstantial, 
there would seem to be little doubt that some persons 
close to Boston's leading merchants and businessmen had 
decided to demonstrate their good will to their Southern 
brethren by deeds as well as by words. Even the newspapers 
of Boston, regardless of party affiliation, showed little 
sympathy with Garrison. Although they deplored mob violence 
and pleaded for law and order, they made it quite clear 
that they considered that Garrison and his colleagues had 
brought retaliation upon themselves. 2 By the first of 
the following year, young Amos Lawrence could write back 
to his father from the nation's capital, his opinion that 
the attacks against the Abolitionists had aChieved their 
purpose. Senator Benton declared that the "indignation 
manifested at the North during the last summer" was proof 
that Northerners were as hostile to Abolition doctrine as 
any "reasonable Southerner could wish." Mr. Buchanan of 
Pennsylvania, reported the young merchant, also approved 
of the steps taken against the Abolitionists, and said 
he had "no doubt that the Senators of the North were as 
1 
T. L. Nichols, Forty Years of American Life, 
1821-1861 (New York, 1937), PP• 84-8. 
2 
Boston Daily Advertiser, Oct. 22, 1835; Boston 
Daily Atlas, Oct. 22, 1835; Boston~~ Oct. 22, Oct. 24, 
1835. 
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indignant as the South at such black proceedings •••• u1 
If there were many, like young Lawrence, who 
expected that the years of 11 terrorn would intimidate the 
Abolitionists into inactivity, they were doomed to 
disappointment. The violence of 1835-6 not only failed to 
halt t h e Abolition movement--it acted as a fatal boomerang 
by providing more s ympathy and more converts t h an the move-
ment had ever been able to gain through its own exertions.2 
1he list grew alarmingly, as men of wealth, background 
and position joined themselves to Garrison's cause. 
Wendell Phillips, Harvard 1 51, a member of a leading 
fami ly, and Edmund Quincy, son of a noted Harvard president, 
joined th e ranks. 3 1he prominent Dr. Henry Ingersoll 
Bowditch became an Abolitionist af ter witnessing the 
attack on Garrison. Even the influ.ential merch ant, John 
i:vlurray Forbes, long indifferent to t h e problem of slavery, 
11 changed my whole feeling with regard to itn after the 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 8, 
1836, A. L. Letters, M. H.S., I, 411. 
2Dwight Dumond, Antislavery Ori~ins of' the -cavil 
War in the United States (Ann Arbor, 1939, p. 58; Hilary 
Herbert, The Abolition Crusade and its Consequences (New 
York, 1912), pp. 84-5; Garrison, Life, II, 188-9. 
3 Ibid., p. 185. Also see Wendell Phillips, 
Speeches, pp. 1-10. 
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murder of Elijah Lovejoy in Illinois. 1 James Russell 
Lowell and Ralph ~aldo Emerson soon added their literary 
talents to those of John Greenleaf Whittier and before 
long, became influential factors in the drive for 
emancipation. 2 Membership was increasing every day, and 
by 1838 there were over two hundred anti-slavery societies 
in 1vlassachusetts alone, with enough funds to send out 
propagandists and literature to all parts of the country. 
:l.'o make matters worse, the slavery question was 
becoming an important political issue. Up to now, 
~~ssachusetts had witnessed its own version of the Victorian 
Compromise as both V'w'higs and Democrats uniformly side-
stepped the issue of slavery and refused to sponsor either 
Garrison or his unpopular program. This was perfectly 
agreeable to Garrison himself, since he resisted all 
attempts to involve his Abolition movement in politics, 
and emphasized his ideal of "non-resistance.n3 
1Hughes, Forbes, I, 100; Villard, u'Ihe Antislavery 
Crisis, u -Cornrn. His t., IV, 324. 
2Greenslet, Lowells, PP• 253-4. Also see t;harles 
Sumner to Dr. Lieber, Jan. 9, 1836, Edward Pierce, iviemoir 
and £etters of Gharles Sumner (4 vols.; Boston, 1877-93), 
I., 173. 
3Darling, 1\1a.ssachusetts, pp. 156-7; Garrison, Life, 
II, 200-202; Liberator, Dec. 15, 1837; Boston Post, Nov. 18, 
1835. 
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But the question of slavery could hardly be kBpt 
out of the turbulent political arena. Western Abolitionists 1 
headed by James G. Birney and Theodore Weld had already 
gone into political action; and the New York group, led by 
William Jay and the Tappan brothers, was beginning to 
i s nore Garrison's "no-government" order.1 In Massachusetts, 
too, such men as Henry B. Stanton and John Greenleaf 
Whittier had decided that political action was of greater 
value than Garrison was willing to admit. "Passive 
Abolitionism"· was fast becoming a thing of the past, as 
Abolitionists came to believe that future success lay in 
the political pressures which could be created;. and they 
swung in behind the newly-formed Liberty Party which had 
nominated Birney for the Presidency in 1840. 2 
All of this was most disturbing to men like Abbott 
Lawrence and Nathan Appleton, who still controlled the 
conservative policies of the Vftlig Party in Massachusetts. 
Vfuile it was true that the situation had not yet become 
critical, and there seamed to be no immediate danger to 
1 
Garrison, Life, II, 333 ff. 
2 
Villard, "Antislavery Grisis 1 11 .Oomm. Hist., IV, 
335-6. 
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Whig fortunes in the Bay State, something would have to 
be done. Obviously trying to retain their political status, 
t he men of wealth and influence fought against what they 
considered to be divisive influences. Protesting against 
"misgovernment and maladministration,u the "Cotton lfil.1.igs" 
sponsored a series of meetings, rallies and processions, 
and urged the nation to follow their leadership as the 
1 
only means of maintaining "true democracy • 11 'l'o show 
t h eir good intentions to their Southern brethren, they 
invited visitors from the South to attend t heir gala 
celebration of Bunker Hill Day, and the gentlemen of 
Boston were de lighted to r eceive delegates from as far 
South as Alabama, lvlississippi, Tennessee and Louisiana. 2 
Such steps were considered necessary, in view of the 
alarming political developments within the Bay State and 
in Washington. 
For one thing, the slavery issue was drawing 
greater popular interest than ever before in state and 
local elections. What about the morality of slavery? 
l Boston Daily Atlas, Nov. 9, 1840; Boston Daily 
Advertiser, Nov. 9, 1840. 
2 Boston Daily Atlas, Sept. 11, 1840; Boston 
Daily Advertiser, Sept. 12, 1840. Also see Lawrence, 
Diary, PP• 154-5. 
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What about the extension of slavery? What about slavery 
in Texas? What about the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia? Candidates of both leading parties were amazed 
at the number, and appalled at the intricacies of the 
questions on slavery with which whey were confronted. 
Party leaders were shocked into the realization that 
slavery had already become a serious campaign issue. 1 
1hen too, all was not harmonious within the local 
ranks of the Whig Party in the Bay State. Rising young 
political leaders like Qlarles .Francis Adams, John G. 
Palfrey, Gharles Sumner and Horace Mann, were chaf'ing at 
the bit, demonstrating an ambition to capture influence in 
the party and direct it into different channels. Nothing 
serious had occurred yet--but it was a development that 
needed watching. The new Abolitionist-sponsored Liberty 
party was slowly picking up votes in the State--not many, 
of course, compared with the major parties, but enough 
to give the antislavery elements an uncomfortable 
advantage in a close election, and a dangerous edge if the 
2 Whig Party should splinter1 
1 
Robert ~ . Winthrop, Jr., A Memoir of Robert c. 
Winthrop (Boston, 1897), pp. 24-6; Darling, ~~ssachusetts, 
PP• 248-9. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 289-93, 317-18;; Faulkner, "Massachusetts," 
Comm. Hist., IV, 90-1. 
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Most disturbing of all~ however, was the alarming 
rate at which the slavery issue was being brought into 
national prominence. If the South had been outraged and 
dishonored by the activities of one lone man and h is puny 
newspaper, what would happen if the same sort of vitupera-
tion were brou~~t into t h e very halls of Gongress itself? 
If the long white thread which stretched from the planta-
tion to the mill had been endangered by the ravings of a 
single reformer, what would happen if the Gapital resounded 
to the voices of dozens of national legislators? 1 
This consideration became all the more frightening 
as national events during the 1840's forced the issue of 
slavery even furth er into the forefront of political debate. 
Westward expansion, rebellion in Texas, and war with Mexico 
were destined to focus the eyes of the nation upon the 
complexities of slavery and its .C:onstitutional right to 
exist and to expand. I t was in trying to find a moderate 
and workable solution to these explosive developments that 
the Northern manufacturers began their search for a way 
to balance their economic security with their moral principles. 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, July 29, 
Sept. 15, 1840, A. L. Papers, M.H.s., Box 1, folder 2. 
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CHAPTER III 
COTTON VERSUS CONSCIEN~E 
The Boston manufacturer did not like slavery--
as a matter of fact, he personally abhorred it as a 
grievous sin--but he had made repeated efforts to re-
assure the Cotton Kingdom that he would not lift a finger 
to interfere with that institution where it already 
existed under the sanction and protection of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
The extension of Negro slavery outside of these 
limits, on the other hand, was an entirely different 
matter; and many industrialists and their colleagues felt 
no compunction in taking issue with territorial expansion 
wherever and whenever it foreshadowed the simultaneous 
expansion of slavery. "Vi.hile ••• I feel it to be my duty 
distinctly to say that I would~ave to the masters of 
slaves every guaranty of the Constitution and the 
Union ••• , 11 said Rufus !:hoate to a meeting of the Young 
Men's Whig Glub of Boston, 11I still controvert the 
power, I deny the morality, I tremble for the consequences, 
of annexing an acre of new territory, for the mere purpose 
of diffusing this great evil, this great curse, over a 
1 
wider surface of American earth1" 
1 
Samuel G. Brown, ad., The Works of Rufus Choate 
with a Memoir of His Life (2 vola.; Boston, 1862), II, 274. 
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When Amos Lawrence wrote to a friend in South 
Carolina, it was quite consistent with the conservative 
policies of the Northern businessman that he assured his 
correspondent that the "peculiar institutionn would 
never be interfered with by 11.sober, honest men." 1 Equally 
significant, however, was the fact that Lawrence made it 
a point to add his conviction that the same institution 
would 11 never be allowed to be carried where it is not 
now under the .Federal Government. n2 Since this question 
of territorial expansion was regarded as completely outside 
the original Constitutional provisions which had insured 
the security of slavery in the states, men like the 
Lawrences felt that the South could have no possible grounds 
for thinking that her ~onstitutional rights and pre-
rogatives were being assailed. 
The greatest threat to t h is conservative desire 
of restricting Negro slavery within the prescribed 
limits of the Constitution, came during the late 1830's 
with the movement for Western expansion in general, and 
the issue of Texas, in particular. Once the American 
lAmos Lawrence to a friend in South Carolina, 
June 12, 1852, Lawrence, Diary, PP• 317-19. Also see 
William Sharp to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 25, 1844, A. L. 
Letters, VI, for a letter indicating Southern appreciation 
of conservative Northern principles. 
2Lawrence, Diary, pp. 317-18. 
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settlers in Texas had declared their independence from 
Mexico, sentiment in favor of immediate annexation began 
to grow increasingly strong on the part of the northern 
Republic. Soon there were many who were not only talking 
about adding Texas to the Union, but speculating upon the 
possibilities of the vast western lands beyond. 1 
1bere were many other Americans, however, who 
flatly opposed the admission of Texas, convinced that such 
a step would not only upset the balance of political power, 
but would permit the institution of slavery to spread 
beyond its prescribed ~nstitutional limits. As one 
might suspect, violent Abolitionists like William Lloyd 
Garr i s on immediately set t h emselves against annexation, 
and even went so far as to demand s ecession if Texas were 
2 
admitted to the Union. The more moderate anti-slavery 
groups also took up the cry, and thrilled to the words of 
the Reverend William Ellery nhanning who thundered in protest: 
1 
John D. P. Fuller, ~he Movement for the Acquisition 
of All Mexico, 1846-48 (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 15-16. 
2 
Liberator, XIV, April 12, April 19, 1844. See 
William Lloyd Garrison to John Farmer, June 6, 1837, and 
Garrison to George W. Benson, June 14, 1837, Garrison 
Letters, B.P.L., II, 59, 60. 
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11The .Free States declare that the very act of admitting 
Texas will be construed as a dissolution of the Uniont" 1 
But by now apprehension had struck deep into 
even the most conservative elements of the Boston community. 
Abbott Lawrence, the leading cotton manufacturer and 
capitalist in New England, warned that the movement for 
Texas was the most significant crisis for the Union since 
the days of the Constitution. The ramifications of the 
Texas question, he felt, were enormous. With the admission 
to the Union of a slave-holding territory whose size was 
sufficient to create six future states, the threat to the 
political future of the free states was undeniable. 0 vVhere 
will be the patronage and Executive power of the Government'?n 
he asked. "Will it not be gone, forever departed, from the 
Free States?" Such a thing must not happen, Lawrence 
insisted. Th.e North must nresist every attempt at the 
acquisition of territory t~ be inhabited by slaveslu2 
Abbott's brother, Amos Lawrence, ex~essed 
similar views, and stated that he regarded all other 
11iiilliam Ellery Channing, 11 A Letter to the lion. 
Henry .Clay," August 1, 1837, Works (Boston, 1875) 1 P• 773. 
2 
Lawrence to friends, March 25, 1837, Hill, 
Abbott Lawrence, P• 21. 
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questions of the day as 11 insignificant in comparison with this.n 
·writing to Jonathan Chapman, former Mayor of Boston, and member 
of the ~big Comrrdttee, Amos Lawrence emphasized his belief t h at 
the annexation of 'I'exas and the subsequent extension of slavery 
would be the first step toward national destruction. "Let us 
work,u he urged, 11 in a Christian spirit as we would for our 
individual salvation, to prevent this sad calamity befalling 
us." 1 From New Orleans, Lawrence's friend, Judge Henry Adams 
Bullard, agreed most heartily. A transplanted Yankee, Bullard 
had f irst gone south to fight for the liberation of Mexico, 
and then stayed on to practice law in New Orleans, where his 
fluency in languages and his cultured manner made him a 
popular figure. Now Judge of t he Supreme Court of Louisiana, 
Bullard corresponded with Lawrence frequently and provided 
h im with first-hand evidence of the Southern point of view. 2 
uThe greatest humbug in this life of humbugs is that Texas 
business, n he growled. nonly think of a sea ttered popula-
tion which never exceeded 25,000 men, women, children, 
vagrants, runaways, cutthroats and all, absolutely without 
resources, asking the United States first to recognize 
their independence as a nation and then to admit them into 
the Union. n 'I'h e fact that most of the new citizens would be 
1
.Amos Lawrence to Jonathan Chapman, Nov. £J, 1844, 
Lawrence, Diary, p. 192. 
2lvlelvin Johnson White, "Henry Adams Bullard, n 
Dictionary of American Biography, III, 254-5. 
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leaving American creditors 11 wi th the bag to hold/' only made 
the prospect more dismal t h an ever. 1 
Private opinions such as these were given open 
political expression in Daniel ·~v ebster 's widely discussed 
address at Niblo 1 s Saloon when he condemned the extension of 
an institution which he denounced as 11 a great moral, social 
and political evil. 11 Asserting h is own personal opposition 
to any such expansion, Webster was convinced that "the people 
of t h e United States will not consent to bring into the nion 
a new, vastly extensive, slaveholding country •••• In my 
opinion,n he added, "they ought not to consent to it."2 In 
the House, Robert ,:; • ·winthrop, close friend of t he .La.wrences 
and the App letons, added his protests against t he annexation 
of .l.'exas. I t would, he charged, "break up the balance of our 
system, violate the .Compromises of the Gonsti tu tion, and 
endanger the permanence of the Union." nAbove all," he c on-
eluded, voicing the opinion of Boston's men of business, 
"because I am uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of 
domestic slavery, or to the addition of another inch of 
slave-holding territory to this nation.tt3 
1he issue of expansion, then, proved to be 
unusually troublesome; and in the face of such influential 
l Henry A. Bullard to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 25, 1837, 
A. L. Letters, M.H.S., II, 196. 
2webster, Writings, II, 193-230, M~arch 15, 1837. 
3Winthrop, J.1emo1r, p. 38, Jan. 6, 1845. 
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opposition, most politicians hesitated to comm1t them-
selves publicly on the issue. While Ivia.rtin Van Buren 
endeavored to side-step the explosive issue during most of 
his term as President, 'Whig party leaders were hard at 
work on a plan to unseat the Democrats from national 
power in the coming elections of 1840. Deciding to bypass 
their nominal leaders, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, the 
Whigs chose, instead, the aged but august hero of Tippecanoe--
1 William Henry Harrison. After a raucous campaign which 
saw log cabins and cider jugs play a conspicuous part, the 
old general swept into office by an even greater ele ctcr al 
majority than had been expected. Jubilant Whigs every-
where were delighted that "the wicked Administration of the 
last twelve years" had at last been overthrown, and were 
thankful for "the deliverance that has at last appeared. 02 
·-
Confident that the "old fellow" would quietly collapse 
into the Presidential chair and 11 si t still11 while conserve-
tive Whigs like Clay and Webster guided the nation's 
destiny, most party leaders assumed that the question of 
Texas was a dead issue. 3 "We believe lVlr. Webster and 
1 
Boston Daily Atlas, Dec. 25 1 Dec. 29 1 1835. 
2 
J. w. Patterson to Amos Lawrence, London, Dec. 1, 
1840, A.. L. Letters, M.H.S., V, 185. 
3 
Amos A. Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Sept. 15, 1840 1 
A. L. Papers, M.H.S., Box 1, folder 3. 
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yourself are to be of the Council,n wrote Abbott La.wrence 
to Senator John J. Grittenden of Kentucky, " and we feel 
t hat the success of General Harrison's Administration 
depends upon those who are to be his Mi nisters; and the 
appointments made through t h em of the Federal officers 
throughout the Gountry.nl .Gertainly t h ings were starting 
out beautifully. Henry Clay was getting his legislative 
program ready for Congress, while h is friends took over 
t h eir new Cabinet posts. Daniel Webster had just received 
hi s appointment as Secretary of State; and Abbott Lawrence 
was named as one of the Commissioners to disauss the 
iaine boundary dispute with Great Britain. It looked as 
though the age of expansion were definitely a thing of 
the past. 
The Whig victory celebr ations were sh ort-lived, 
however, when the elderly President died soon after taking 
office, and was succeeded by the Vice-i resident, John Tyler 
of Virginia. A confirmed Democr a t who hated the tariff and 
the Bank, but who loved western expansion, Tyler had been 
nominated for the second position merely as a matter of 
political expediency; and h is unexpected appearance now 
threw the Whi gs into a frenzy of despair. Denouncing 
1yler 1 s defection from party principles in no uncertain 
1Abbott Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, Jan. 7, 
1841, Crittenden Ms s., Library of Congress, Wash ington, 
D. c. (hereafter cited as 11 L • .c."). 
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terms ('1a traitor, a base traitor,n one Southern planter 
called him), the Whig hierarchy began to look around almost 
immediately for a candidate to groom for the next elections. 1 
One of the hardest workers in this program was Abbott 
Lawrence of 1Viassachusetts, who had completed his work on 
the Maine boundary dispute and who now took time out from 
his numerous manufacturing interests to add his voice and 
influence to the campaign against Tyler, convinced that the 
coming election was nthe most important since the adoption 
of the .Gonsti tution. " 2 Presiding at the State Whig 
Convention in the fall of 1842, Lawrence publicly came out 
in support of the candidacy of Henry ~lay--much to the 
disgust of the devoted followers of Daniel Webster. 3 
Although he admitted the great local appeal of Webster and 
praised his contributions to the nation, Lawrence never-
t h eless considered Clay not only as the nomi nal head of 
the ·whig Party, but of much more 11 national influencen 
than the Senator from Nia.ssachusetts. 4 As a member of the 
1-Villiam H. Sparks to Amos Lawrence, Nov. 1, 1841, 
A. L. Letters, Ni .H.S., V, 391. 
2Abbott Lawrence, nLetter to the ll1fu igs of Essex 
.county," Aug. 20, 1844, Hill, Abbott Lawrence, pp. 76-7. 
3Abbott Lawrence to John J. Grittenden, Apr. 5, 
1844, Grittenden Mss, L.C.; Hill, Abbott Lawrence, pp. 73-4. 
4Lawrence, nLetter to Whigs," ibid., p. 76. 
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of the National Whig Convention, and as an elector from 
the state of i~ssachusetts in 1844, Lawrence continued to 
voice his support of Clay, and call ed upon the voters of 
t h e Bay State to do likewise. "How any man ••• in New 
England can cast his vote for Mr. Polk, with his ultra view 
of national policy, is more than I can comprehend, " said 
the noted manuf acturer. "Upon the subjects of 'l'exas and 
the Tariff, ~w. Polk entertains the views of the State of 
South Garolina •••• Mr. Polk has come out boldly in favor of 
the extension of slavery." Opposing Polk, free trade, 
and South Garolina "abstractions," Lawrence led the fight 
for Clay. "Let us go," he cried, 11 for {; lay and 
Frelinghuysen--the American System--and the Union as it is1" 1 
The election of 1844 proved to be close and 
exciting, with the question of Texas always a critical 
campaign issue. Trying to keep a foot in both electoral 
camps, Henry Glay, the unanimous choice of the Whigs, 
straddled the question of annexation.2 The Democrats, 
on the other hand, came up with a vocal, pro- Texas 
1Hill, Abbott Lawrence, PP• 77-8. Also see 
Abbott to Amos Lawrence, May 12, 1844, A. L. Papers, M•H.s., 
Box 1, folder 3. 
2see Abbott Lawrence to John J. ·Crittenden, April 5, 
1844, Crittenden ~a, L.c . 
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Southerner in the person of James K. Polk of Tennessee 
who campaigned on an open enunciation of the doctrine of 
Manifest Destiny. It was a neck and neck race down to the 
finish line, with Polk nosing out Glay by less than 50,000 
popular votes, as many anti-slavery votes were switched 
to the Liberty party in reaction to Clay's vacillating 
tactics. Although it was a hair-line finish--with the 
electoral votes, 170 to 105, indicating the precarious 
political balance--the results provided a sufficient margin 
of safety for most politicians. 
When President Tyler recommended the possibility 
of annexing Texas by a joint resolution of both Houses, 
this time the ~ongress did not hesitate to take up the 
question, and a series of violent debates began. In the 
Senate, Rufus G.hoate of Massachusetts argued vehemently 
against the resolution as both unconstitutional and 
inexpedient; while Robert c. Winthrop continued the fight 
against annexation in the House. 1 Back home Amos Lawrence 
pleaded with the Bay State Congressmen to hold the line--
11if Texas can be kept off, there will be hope for our 
2 government"--and kept in constant touch with the proceedings. 
lBrown, Choate, I, 98-100; Winthrop, if~moir, P• 35; 
Boston Daily Advertiser, Feb. 21, 1845. 
2Lawrence, Diary, p. 192. Also see Abbott Lawrence 
to John J. Drittenden, April 5, 1844, Crittenden Mas, L.c. 
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Winthrop kept the manufacturer up to date on the l atest 
information in the capital, the local newspapers printed 
all the rumor and gossip available, and Faneuil __ Hall was 
filled to capacity with delegates from the various towns 
who came to attend the highly publicized "imti-11exas 11 
1 
convention. All their hopes were in vain, however, for 
both Houses finally passed the resolution, and on March 1, 
1845, just three days before he left office, President Tyler 
signed the document admit t ing Texas to the Union. 2 
With the admission of Texas an accomplished fact, 
Northern Whigs began to warn that t h is was merely the 
opening gun in an all-out assault upon the 'vestern lands. 
War with Mexico was t h e inevitable result of such a 
policy, they prophecied, and declared that they would have 
no part in the consequences. "If any battles and wars 
shall grow out of this affair, 11 warned the Lowell Courier, 
" Massachusetts will l e t those do the fighting who brought 
the war upon us •••• The Bay State will send no militia 
to the South to fight the battles of slavery or to suppress 
3 Negro insurrections." "Texas is not yet annexedL n protested 
1 Boston Daily Advertiser, Feb. 27, March 1, 1845. 
I .bid. , Jan. 25, 27, 30, 1845. 
2 I bid., lvla.rch 3, 1845; Boston Post, March 3, 1845. 
5 Lowell Courier, April 11, 1845. 
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the Advertiser; and the Atlas circulated a pledge comrrdtting 
citizens of Massachusetts not to "countenance or aid the 
United States Government in any war which may be occasioned 
by the annexation of Texas." 1 The Massachusetts le gislature, 
with a Whig Senate and a Vfuig-controlled House, passed 
resolutions stating that an act of .Congress admitting Texas 
to the Union had "no binding force whatever on the people 
of Massachusetts."2 
Especially outspoken in their condemnation of 
annexation were the younger members of the Whig party--men 
like Henry Wilson, Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner 
and Charles Allen--who were already dissatisfied with 
their obscure position and nebulous influence in political 
circles, and who had begun to rattle the bars of party 
conformity. Known as the "Conscience 'VVhigs!' they challenged 
the leadership of the old "Cotton Whigsn and were now 
demanding that the Wbig Party take a definite stand 
against Negro slavery.3 Already they had produced a 
lBoston Daily Advertiser, March 15 1 1845; Boston 
Daily Atlas, June 16, 1845. 
aBoston Post, March 14 1 18 1 1845. 
3Henry Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power 
in America (Boston, 1874), II, 123-5. 
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dynamic, young leader in the person of Charles Sumner who 
had become famous (or infamous--" the young man has cut his 
t hroat! n sputtered former Mayor Eliot) as a result of his 
Independence Day oration in 1845, in wh ich he had publicly 
denounced national g lory and territorial expansion in 
general, and the United States armed forces in particular. 1 
Seeing the possibility of their t raditionally 
conservative party being taken over by young fire brands 
and h oth eads, leading "Cotton V~hig sn like Abbott Lawrence, 
Nath an Appleton, Robert G. Winthrop and Rufus Choate 
became more appreh ensive than ever at the latest political 
trends wh ich threatened the future of the Whig party.2 
Already a new and extremist politica l party had made an 
appearance--the American Republican party--and had shovm 
surprising strengt h in recen t elec t ions. I t h ad a lready 
elected a mayor in Boston and wa s now t hreatening t o cut 
eve n further into local Vfuig votes by offering a State 
ticket ca lling for the restriction of I rish i mmigra tion.3 
1:Pierce, Sumner, II, 341-356; .Charles Sumner, Works 
(20 vols.; Boston, 1900), I, 28 ff., 52 ff.; Boston Daily 
Advertiser, lVIarch 13, 1877. 
2vunthrop, Memoir, p . 31. 
3 Pierce, Sumner, II , 332; Darling , :Massachusetts, 
PP• 327-9. 
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Things had become so serious that even the 
sacrosanct name of the god-like Daniel Webster failed to 
produce the same reverence and respect as in former days. 
Wh en Rufus Choate retired from the Senate early in 1845 
and offered his seat to his friend Webster, party managers 
had all they could do to scrape together the subscription 
of ~100,000 (the t h ird time such a collection had been taken 
up), which would allow the great man to leave his personal 
financial arrangements and return to public life. 1 This 
was just one more outward manifestation of the fact that 
the "c otton Whigs 11 were beginning to lose their hold upon 
a State which had hardly even questioned their superior 
position. 1he appearance of a new party, the growing 
dissatisfaction of the younger elements within their own 
party, and the obvious loss of much loc al political 
support now prompted the "cotton Whigs 11 to redouble their 
efforts to maintain themselves in power. 
As one means of readjusting their precarious 
political situation, the "Cotton Whigsn endeavored to 
establish closer and more personal economic ties with the 
South. A more friendly political understanding with the 
planting community might conceivably produce unexpected 
dividends. Watching the interplay of economic interests 
with cynical amusement, Ralph Wa l do Emerson sneered: 
l Hughes, Forbes, I, 118. 
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nootton thread holds the union together; unites John c. 
Calhoun and Abbott Lawrence •••• cotton thread is the 
union.nl Emerson was nearer to t he truth than even he 
himself possibly suspected, for even as he was writing these 
lines, Abbott Lawrence was n egotiating for a personal 
loan to John c . Galhoun of ~30,000. A group of New 
Englanders would advance the sum, Lawrence proposed, in 
return for an annual payment of 100,000 pounds of Calhoun's 
best cotton. Although Calhoun eventually declined the 
offer--feeling that he might not be able to meet the 
payments, as well as fearing that the too generous advance 
might be misinterpreted in some quarters--his reply 
indicates no irreparable conflict over economic issues. 
"I am no opponent to manufactures or manufacturers, 11 he 
wrote in closing, " but quite the reverse. I rejoice in 
t heir prosperity."2 
The "Gotton Vvh i gs" pressed on. 1 ~as there any-
t hing else t hey could do to relieve sectional tensions? 
Calhoun h ad mentioned the t ariff question, and had 
expressed h is view t h at duties on manuf actured items sh ould 
1E . W. Emerson and ·ijii . E . Forbes, eds.; J ournals of 
Ralph ~w aldo Emerson ( 10 vols.; Boston, 1909-14), VII, 232. 
2 John C. Calhoun to Abbott Lawrence, ..B'ort Hill, 
lvlay 13, 1845, ".Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, " Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association, 1899, II, 
654-6. 
84 
be lowered. 1 Possibly something could be done here% 
I n a letter, marked "Private and Confidential," Abbott 
Lawrence confided to Galhoun that althou@1 New England 
manufacturers consi dered a high tariff as an economic 
necessity, nevertheless a suitable working arrangement 
could be worked out. " ~Ve are quite ready,n assured 
Lawrence, nat a proper time to meet the question in a 
spirit of compromise, and settle 1 t upon such a basis, as 
will insure repose for ten years. n 2 Adding his influence 
to t h is p oint, Edward H.verett, former lVIinister to Great 
Br i tain and now President of Harvard, wrote to Calh oun, 
urging h im to make 11some equitable compromise between 
the tariff and anti-tariff parties. If it is possible 
to be effected, n he added, nit can only be done by you. n3 
A sh ort time later, Lawrence cautioned his friend and 
fe llow manufacturer, Congressman "Nathan Appleton, not to 
push t h e South too far on t he tariff i s sue. "We can afford 
ltt when that is accomplish ed, 11 wrote (;alhoun, 
1 al l conflict between the pl~Dter and the manufacturer 
would cease • ." •• u Gall1oun to Abbott Lawrence, May 13, 
1845, ".Correspondence of Callwun, 11 A. H. A. Annual Report, 
1899, II, 654-6. 
2Abbott Lawrence to Galhoun, Boston, July 14, 
1846, ibid ., pp. 1086-7. 
3Edward Everett to Calhoun, ~ambridge, April 6, 
1846, ibid., PP• 1080-81. 
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to yield something to the prejudices of the people," 
wrote Lawrence, "and I am ready for a new bill with 
discriminations and specific duties at lower rates t h an 
those of '42."1 
Not even recent Southern proposals to industrialize 
the South and produce its own cotton cloth could dampen the 
efforts of the Northern industrialists in trying to arrive 
at an amiable and harmonious working arrangement with the 
South. Here was another potential clash of interests 
which Northern Whigs were convinced could be peacefully 
settled to the mutual advantage and satisfaction of both 
parties. 
For some time there had been a small but vocal 
group below the Mason-Dixon Line who were trying t o 
impress upon the leaders of the South the necessity of 
developing a 11home" economy. One of the most representa-
tive of these early Southern industrialists, illiam Gregg 
of South Carolina, was vehement in his protest against 
the ideas of his political contemporaries who were urging 
nullification as a weapon of protest. Instead of 
embittering "our indolent people," against the North, 
wrote Gregg, these extremists would do well to encourage 
"the same zeal" in "promoting domestic industry and the 
1Abbott Lawrence to Nathan Appleton, Aug. 4, 
1846, Hill, Abbott Lawrence, P• 32. 
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encouragement of the mechanical arts."1 From Georgia came 
similar sentiments on the part of Congressman J. H. Lumpkin 
who called upon the South to rise above its traditional 
prejudices against manufacturing and develop an industrial 
economy which would, in turn, stimulate an even greater 
agricultural production in the South. 2 
James D. B. De Bow, the famous Southern economist 
and editor, added his voice to the movement for Southern 
manufactures going so far as to advocate the employment of 
Negroes in Southern factories. 3 vVhile on a visit to Boston, 
1~. R. L. Allen, a planter from South Garolina, repeated 
these views to Amos Lawrence. If the South continued to 
oppose domestic manufacturing, and hold on to their 
11 foolenes {.Sic7 and nonsense ••• the whole state in fifty 
years will not be worth as much as the parchments on whiCh 
to draw title deeds •••• u Even their "frugal file leader 
in folly," said Allen in a bitter reference to Calhoun, 
"will require aid for his support unless he allows his 
lBroadus Mitchell, William Gregg~ Factory Master 
of the Old South (Chapel Hill, 1928), p. 1. 
2Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Controversy 
(~apel Hill, 1942), pp. 23-4. Also see Hudson Strode, 
Jefferson Davis (New York, 1955), P• 214. 
3DeBow 1s Review of the Southern and Western States, 
v ' (18 4'7 ) ' -5 • 
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1 Negroes to make their own cloth." 
Far from being angered, indignant, or fearful at 
the prospects of Southern industrial competition, business-
men of the North actually offered their Southern counter-
parts advice and assistance. Charles T. James of Rhode· 
Island, former superintendent of the Slater Mills and 
considered one of the greatest factory engineers in the 
country, gave public support to the demands of Southern 
industrialists. Writing in 1849, James pointed out the 
great waste in sending cotton 11 abroad 11 to be manufactured, 
when it "might well be done at home. 112 
It fell to the son of old Amos Lawrence, young 
Amos Adams Lawrence, to provide a more complete and 
formalized answer to these Southern demands for factories 
in the South. A more typical example of the Yankee entre-
preneur and industrialist could hardly be found than this 
young man, now in his mid-thirties, who had established 
himself in his own business after graduating from Harvard 
in 1835. As a senior, poised eagerly on the threshold of 
1R. L. Allen to Amos Lawrence, January, 1849, 
A. L. Letters, M.H.S., IX, 463. 
2Hunt 1 s Merchants' Magazine, XXI (1849), 492-502. 
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his future, he candidly admitted: 11 to be rich would be rrry 
delight. 11 Although he realized with perfect frankness that 
with the successful "machine" which his father and uncle 
had painstakingly created, "my advantages for becoming rich 
are great," the mere accumulation of wealth for its own 
sake was far from being his life's ambition. He was not 
going to be a 'plodding, narrow-minded" merchant, cooped up 
in the noisy city with his mind chained to the counting-
room; no, he was going to be a man of the world, a literary 
man 11 in some measure,n and a farmer too, with a happy, rustic 
cottage somewhere in the suburbs. In an exposition of 
ideas which were to re-emerge a generation later in the 
writings of his own son, William Lawrence, the future 
Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts, noted proponent of the 
"gospel of wealth," young Amos Adams Lawrence considered 
that a man should be "willing and glad to be rich." "A 
good man will willingly endure the labor of taking care 
of his property for the sake of others whom he can so much 
b enefit by it," he wrote, anticipa ting the idea of the 
"stewardship of wealth 11 by half a century. 1 
Now, some t wenty ~ive years later, the young man 
was President of the Gocheco Mills, Treasurer of the 
Salmon F'alls Mills, and held directorates in such i mportant 
1Lawrence Amos A. Lawrence, PP• 23-4. See Rt. Rev. 
William Lawrence, dTb.e Relation of Wealth to Morals," World's 
Work, I (January, 1901), 286-292, ~or a classic statement 
regBrding the relationship o~ personal wealth to the common 
welfare. 
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corporations as the Suffolk Bank, The American Insurance 
Office, the Boston Water Power ~orporation, and the 
Middlesex f~anal. 1 Replying to James through the columns 
of Hunt's ~erchants' Magazine, Lawrence took issue with 
the engineer by indicating his belief that immediate prospects 
for Southern textile mills seemed dim because of the absence 
of sufficient capital and a 11radical defect" in steam power. 
Nevertheless, the New Englander assured his friends in the 
South that with sufficient skill, industry, perseverance, 
and capital, "success will follow at the South as well as 
at the North. 112 Young Lawrence, however, was particularly 
disturbed by what he considered the general Southern notion 
that the Northern textile manufacturer did little work, 
suffered few risks, and made fabulous profits over night. 
"General James, 11 he wrote to a friend, 11 is doing considerable 
harm by writing to the Southern market, stating the great 
profits which we make by manufacturing at the North," and 
expressed his fears that this would lead to a rash of 
hastily constructed factories throughout the South whiCh 
1Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 57-8. 
2Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXII (1850), 26-35. 
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would only add to the "over-grovrth of factories which 
already presses us down.nl 
In a similar vein, young Lawrence wrote to the 
Southern industrialist, William Gregg, commenting favorably 
upon several articles which Gregg had written for Hunt's, 
advocating industry in the South. Praising the calmness 
and objectivity with which the South erner viewed the 
relative advantages of the North and the South for manu-
facturing cotton, Lawrence went out of his way to demonstrate 
the risks and dangers of industrialization. Business is not 
good in the North, he warned: cotton is high, labor is 
high , prices are low, and goods have stock-piled alarmingly. 
"At the present time," he complained, 11we are in a sad 
,-2 
condition.' Gregg's personal reply to Lawrence was 
equally candid. Although Gregg felt that Lawrence did not 
fully appreciate the "Southern character and the capacity 
of the poor of our country to compete with the Yankees in 
manufacturing, n he acknowledged that the New Englander 1 s 
treatment of the economic problem was substantially correct. 
1Amos A. Lawrence to N. Silsbee, Nov. 19, 1849, 
a. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I, 15. 
2Lawrence to William Gregg, Aug. 21, 1850, ibid., P• 
174. 
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Despite the difficulties in the path of Southern industrial-
ism, Gregg maintained, the South would achieve its goal. 
This did not mean, he hastily assured Lawrence 1 that 
economic conflict would necessarily result. On the contrary, 
Gregg continued, 11 I don 1 t think that you Eastern manu-
facturers need have any fears of serious competition from 
the South, for such investments are slowly made in all 
countries where manufactures are introduced •••• 111 
Gregg's opinion, that neither section had anything 
to fear from the other, had its echo in the North. In a 
personal letter to Robert Barnwell Rhett, of South ·Oarolina, 
old Amos Lawrence insisted that New England would never 
stand in the way of the South's industrial progress. 
In response to Rhett's boast that in ten years South 
Carolina would be spinning ita own cotton crop, Lawrence 
offered nothing but encouragement, and indicated ~at 
there was plenty of room for everybody. "We of WJ.assachusetts ," 
he wrote, 11will gJadly surrender to you the manufacture of 
coarse fabrics and turn our industry to making fine articles. n2 
1william Gregg to Amos A. Lawrence, Sept. 2, 1850, 
A. A. L. Letters, M.H.S., VIII, 120. 
2Amos Lawrence to Robert B. Rhett, Dec. 12 1 1849, 
Lawrence, Diary, PP• 274-6. 
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So well known in fact, had the conciliatory and 
encouraging attitude of prominent New Rngland manu-
facturers become in the South, that in 1846 a number of the 
leading citizens of RiChmond, Virginia, most of them members 
of the State Legislature, requested Abbott Lawrence to come 
down and establish a manufacturing town at the Great Falla 
of the Potomac, just as he had founded the city of Lawrence 
at the great falls of the Merrimac. ~~~~e look to New 
England's noble, intelligent and enterprising sons and 
daughters, 11 they wrote, 11 to rear those industrial and truly 
national monuments of labor in the 'Sunny South,' which 
now add so much to the energy, sagacity and wealth of our 
nl Eastern brethren.... Although Abbott Lawrence found it 
impossible to accept the offer, due to the heavy responsi-
bilities of his enterprises in New England, the flattering 
invitation itself indicates the fact that neither the 
industrial interests of the Norti~ nor those of the South 
considered that their respective economic interests pre-
cluded intersectional aid or mutual assistance. 
The leaders of Boston capital obviously could see 
no conflicting economic problem--personal, sectional or 
national--which could not be compromised to the satisfaction 
1Hill, Abbott Lawrence, pp. 32-4. 1Ihe formal 
invitation was transmitted to Lawrence through the Hon. 
Williams. Archer, u. s. Senator from Virginia. 
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of all concerned. This was not merely a temporary policy 
of convenience and expediency, but a matter of permanent 
economic survival. Northern industrialists did not look 
upon the economy of the North as competing with, or 
essentially antagonistic to, the economy of the South--
rather, they regarded both economies as complementary. 
The South produced the raw materials, the North manufactured 
them--and one section was an economic non-entity without 
the other. To preserve political unity within the United 
States, then, was to preserve the balance of sectional 
production. 1ne subordination of sectional interests and 
regional desires to the greater interests of national unity 
now becazoo the chief goal and end of the 11 Gotton Whigs" 
in the decade to follow. Only by means of compromise, 
concession, mutual understanding and forbearance, could the 
unity of the nation be maintained and the northward flow 
of cotton go on uninterrupted. 
Meanwhile, however, the rapid progress of national 
events was running counter to the feverish at t empts of 
the "Gotton Vfnigs 11 to develop sectional harmony and 
national peace. Ever since the annexation of Texas, war 
with Mexico was only a matter of time. On May 11, 1846, 
President Polk sent his famous message to .Congress., stating 
that American blood had been shed "on American soil 11 and 
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asking that all means for "prosecuting the war with vigor't 
be placed at the disposal of the Executive. The answer 
was prompt enough: The next day war was declared, as 
Congress provided an appropriation of @10,000,000 and 
authorized an army of 50,000 volunteers. ~be war with 
1 Mexico was onl 
The Mexican war was far from popular with large 
segments of the American populace--both in the South as 
well as in the North--although the reasons varied greatly. 
In the South, Democrat as well as Whig party 
leaders feared the consequences of a long war prosecuted 
by the Federal Government. With the increased national 
costs which would arise from an enlarged military establish-
ment and the higher number of federal office-holders, a 
demand for a higher tariff would be sure to result. 
Alexander H. Stephens and Robert Toombs of Georgia 
denounced the war in open terms, the {;harleston Mercury 
consistently opposed hostilities, and John G. Calhoun, the 
great pro-slavery leader, was unsparing in his criticism 
of both the justice and the wisdom of the war. 2 
!James D. Richardson, ed., Messa~es and Papers of 
the President (11 vols.; Washington, 1896 , IV, 437-443; 
Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, PP• 796-804. 
2charleston Mercury, May 25, 1846. See Wilson, 
Slave Power, II, 11, and Fuller, Mexico, PP• 35-6. 
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From New England, too, came the uproar and clamor 
of outspoken opposition to the policies of the Polk 
administration. Convinced beyond argument that this war 
with lf~xico was the direct outgrowth of slavocracy's greed 
for empire, an amazing array of politicians, abolitionists, 
pacifists, reformers and anti-expansionists set up a fearful 
din. Anti-slave elements in the Bay State now found them-
selves joined by a party of young Whigs--Gharles Sumner, 
Henry Wilson, James G. Palfrey, Gharles Francis Adams 
and Horace Mann--who had finally bolted the old conservative 
party leadership and were adding their voices to oppose 
violently ·every aspect of the war which they ascribed to 
1 
a diabolical slave-holding plot. 
Reluctant to go to these extremes because of 
their sensitive associations with the South ("Further 
actions would only embarrass our Southern Whig friends in 
Congress," Abbott Lawrence told .Crittenden of Kentucky); yet 
sincerely opposed to further territorial expansion, the 
"Cotton Whigs" cautiously tried to base their opposition to 
the war with Mexico on what they hoped were the less 
explosive and more rational grounds of constitutional 
1Wilson, Slave Power, II, 7-17; Darling, 
Massachusetts, P• 334. 
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principles. 1 Daniel Webster accused President Polk o~ 
having usurped the Cbnstitutional powers o~ Congress: 
11What is the value o~ this Gonsti tutional provision 1 11 he 
asked, "if the President o~ his own authority may make such 
military movements as must bring on war?" 2 In the Senate, 
John Davis, a "Cotton Whig" choice from Massachusetts, 
conscientiously provided one o~ the two negative Senatorial 
votes against the war. 3 Back in Massachusetts, Governor 
Briggs stead~astly refused to commission o~~icers o~ a 
company o~ volunteers unless they promised not to march 
beyond the boundaries o~ the State. 4 Amos Lawrence sneered 
at lVIassachusetts volunteers as 11the most miserable, dirty 
and worn-out wretches that can be scraped up this side o~ 
the in~ernal regions," and even re~used to give a young 
~riend, on his way to the war, enough money to buy a pistol. 
11 I could not wish them success in Mexico," the elderly man 
1Abbott Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, April 5, 
1844, Crittenden Mss., L. e. 
2Webster, Writings, IV, 31-2. 
3 congressional Globe, 29th Congress, lst Session, 
pp. 796-804. 
4Darling, Massachusetts, pp. 334-5; Faulkner, 
11
·Massachusetts, 11 Comm. Hist., IV, 95-6. 
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wrote gravely, "but gave him some books, a Bible, and good 
counse 1. " 1 Congressman Robert ;G. Winthrop summed up the 
conservative position quite well: ttso far as we have power--
constitutional or moral power--to control political events, 
we are resolved that there shall be no further extension of 
the territory of this Union subject to the institution of 
slavery. " 2 'lhis did not mean, he was quick to emphasize, 
that he was being "false to the North or to the South," but 
that, on the contrary, he was trying to combine "that sense 
of the evils of slavery which is common to the Free States" 
with "that respect for the Constitution and the Union which 
would infringe on no right of the Slave States."3 
To the young radicals and eager abolitionists 
of Massachusetts, __ however, the passive resistance and the 
constitutional gestures of the "Cotton Whigs" were regarded 
as nothing more than an obvious subterfuge for maintaining 
economic relations with the South. The Boston Whig, a 
leading party organ controlled by the "~onscience Whigs," 
openly denounced the war as a by-product of the alliance 
1Amos Lawrence to Mark Hopkins, July 19# 1848# 
A. L. Letters# M.H.S., IX; and Lawrence, Diary# p. 236. 
2Winthrop, Ivlemoir # pp. 58-9, "Speech on War with 
Me xi co , 11 .Jan. 8 1 1847. 
3 Robert c. Winthrop to .John P. l~nnedy, .Jan. 21, 
1848, ibid., PP• 79-80. 
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between the "Cotton Whigs" and the Slave-expansionists of 
the South. The l~ssachusetts legislature went so far as 
to state that the war had been nun constitutionally commenced 
by the order of the President to General Taylor ••• ," and 
accused the United States of acting like an aggressor and 
a conqueror. It was a Ghristian and patriotic duty, 
stated the Legislature, "for all good citizens to join in 
. 1 
efforts to arrest this war." 
Sectional opposition to the war with Mexico 
appeared to be confined to isolated pockets of resistance, 
however, as these grave tones of disapproval from the North-
east were virtually drowned out in the wild enthusiasm 
wh ich came rolling in from the Western plains. Spurred 
on by visions of conquest, gold and glory, thousands of 
vv-estern volunteers eagerly joined the colors. The 
Mississippi Valley and Texas together supplied almost fifty 
thousand volunteers--as compared with the thirteen thousand 
2 
who came marching out from the seaboard states. 
1H. v. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal 
Relations (Philadelphia, 1906), PP• 241-2. 
2Ray Allen Billington, The Far Western Frontier, 
1830-60 (New York, 1956), pp. 174-5; Justim Smith, 'lhe War 
With Mexico (2 vols.; New York, 1919), I, 194-5; Fuller, 
Mexico, PP• 35-6. 
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Once the war was actually begun 1 and Americ~ 
troops were meeting the enemy on the field of battle 1 
even hostile public opposition took on a decidedly different 
complexion. There was, after all, no point in continuing to 
hurl hypothetical arguments at a ~ accompli; and so most 
of the opposition shrugged hopelessly and admitted no other 
alternative but to prosecute the war to a victorious 
conclusion. Care would have to be taken, however, to see 
that this undesirable conflict did not produce equally 
undesirable consequences. 1 Beaten in its attempts to 
prevent the war itself, the opposition adopted a "watch-
dog" attitude pledged to eliminate the evil results of an 
unwarranted aggression. Regarded as especially disastrous 
would be the acquisition and annexation of the vast 
stretches of Mexican lands in the far West. In the House, 
Winthrop denounced the idea that "it is worthy of us to 
take advantage of this war to wrest it /territori7 from 
Mexico by force of arms and to protract the war until She 
will consent to cede it to us by a treaty of peace. 11 2 
Southern slaveholders again formed a rather 
incongruous alliance with Northern Whigs in opposing this 
1Winthrop, Memoir, P• 51. 
2 Ibid., pp. 58-9, "Speech on War with Mexico," 
Jan. 8, 1847. 
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possibility--although for completely different reasons. 
The 5outh feared that free states would be formed out of 
conquered territory, and thus upset the precarious balance 
of power; the North feared that slave states would result 
from expansion and that slavocracy would be extended into 
t h e Vies tern lands. Emotion proved more powerful than logic, 
then, as Northern Whigs and Southern Democrats stood shoulder 
to shoulder, agreed that the indestructable force of Mlanifest 
~stiny would dash itself to pieces upon the i mmovable 
object of intersectional accord. 1 nwe believe that this 
war ought never to h ave been begun," declared Robert o. 
Winthrop in the House, summarizing the convictions of his 
colleagues back in Boston, "and we do not wish to have it 
made the pretext for plundering Mexico of one foot of her 
lands. 112 
But they argued in vain. The voices of restraint 
and moderation were practically unheard amid the mounting 
and almost hysterical demands that the victorious United 
States should stop at nothing less than the acqui s ition of 
~of Mexico. Mounting public opinion was chanting the 
1 Charleston Mercury, Feb. 1, 1847; Arthur .c. Cole, 
The Vfuig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), PP• 104-134. 
2speech of Robert c. \'finthrop, Jan. 8, 1847, 
Winthrop, ~~moir, pp. 61-2. Also see Diary Fragment, Jan. 19, 
1848 1 Winthrop Papers, M. H.S., XXXVI, 118. 
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theme of Manifest Destiny, urging that the pending treaty 
be scrapped, and demanding t h at the lands of b~xico be seized 
without further notice or negotiation. 1 President Polk, 
however, anxious to h ead off an uall-Mexico 11 campaign, 
accepted the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and sent it 
immediately to the Senate for ratification. I n March, 1848, 
with a stroke of the pen, the United States relieved 1Iexico 
of about two-fifths of her lands.2 
The "L;otton Whigs" were appalled at the enormity 
of t he crime, and terrified at t h e consequences--especially 
if the victory over I~xico were to be the signal for the 
opening of all the Western lands to the institution of 
slavery. nr do not believe as individual men, t hat one 
fourth of our people would sanction in their nei ghbor's 
conduct towards their fellow men, such as they voc i ferously 
approve in the Government towards poor lVIexi co, n wrote 
William Sharp to Amos Lawrence from his plantation in 
Louisiana. " Noth ing good can come of this. You and I 
may not live to see it, but our ch ildren will," he prophesied. 
l s ee Smith, Mexico, I I, 127-139, 233-240, and 
G. L. Rives, ~he United States and ~ exico, 1821-1848 (2 vols.; 
New York, 1913), II, 423 ff. 
2Allan Nevins, ed., Polk: Diary of a President, 
1845-9 (New York, 1952), pp. 308-15. See u .S. Senate, 
30th Oongress, l s t Session, Senate Executive Document No. 52, 
passim, for debates over the 1v1exican Treaty. 
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11Retri but ion will come in some shape at some day . nl Yes, 
indeed, agreed Lawrence, "God's curse will assuredly rest 
upon the iniquity of our nation. We have acquired 
military renown in this war," the old man sighed, "at the 
cost of our national character for justice and truth. 
Tne wh ole course of our Government from the admission of 
Texas to the present time has been such as to make me feel 
that our foundation (the virtue and intelligence of the 
2 people) is not a sure one for us to rest upon.• 
Although the ~bigs were relieved that the movement 
for the acquisition and absorption of all Mexico had been 
checked, they continued to remain concerned at the prospects 
of the unconditional expansion of slavery. There was only 
one waw in which the evil consequences of the war might be 
mitigated satisfactorily--and at the same time assure the 
continued friendship and co-operation of the South: 
'lhat was for the 11right" Whigs--the 11 Cotton Whigs"--to gain 
political control in the approaching elections of 1848. 
With the right kind of a President and a sufficient number 
of the right kind of votes in Congress, the possibility of 
1William Sharp to Amos Lawrence, Oct. l, 1845, 
A. L. Letters, M.H.S., VII. 
2 Amos Lawrence to Rev. Ivlark Hopkins, July 19, 
1848, i~id., IX, 257. 
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uncontrolled slavery in the Western territories might at 
least be postponed--if not prevented. VV'ith a zest and 
enthusiasm proportionate to what they conceived to be the 
seriousness of the occasion, the "Cotton Whigs" began 
elaborate preparations for the campaign of '48. Slavery 
must be kept out of the territories--but not at the cost 
of secession, disunion and war. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENTLEiviEN 1 S AGREE i1ENT 
The noise of the war with Mexico had hardly 
subsided, and the excitement over the 1reaty had barely 
abated, when the nation began to prepare for the coming 
Presidential election. James K. Polk, exhausted by the 
experiences of his hectic sing le term, refused to stand 
for re-election in 1848; and so t he Democrats chose Lewis 
Cass of Michigan, a well-known and outspoken advocate of 
expans i on, to carry out the ambitious demands of ~ anifest 
Destiny. 1 
'l'he "Cotton fuigs" made their preparations care-
fully, conscious of the disastrous effects wh ich would 
follow a defeat at the polls. Should the Democrats win, 
t h e subsequent discussions in Congress regarding t he future 
of the Western lands would undoubtedly be controlled by a 
pro-slavery element which might throw all Western lands open 
to unrestricted slavery. If, on t h e other hand, the 
nconscience 1fhigsn should succeed in getting a slate of 
candidates into office, slavery in the territories would 
certainly be opposed--but by a group so openly hostile and 
1Nevins, Polk, PP• 323-6. 
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so obnoxiously out-spoken, that the friendship and co-
operation of the Southern states would be lost. No, the 
only possible alternative was for the "Cotton Whigs" to 
control the state and national political conventions, elect 
men of property and standing to public office, and eventually 
work out a national policy regarding Western lands which 
would place restrictions upon slavery in the territories, 
but which would, at the same time, assure the South that 
neither her social nor economic well-being would in any way 
be . impaired •1 
With this thought in mind, Whig party leaders at 
the national convention which opened at Philadelphia in 
June, 1848, passed over such regular candidates as Clay, 
Webster, Scott and McLean, and nominated, instead, the new 
military hero of the day, General Zachary Taylor, the 
colorful hero of Buena Vista. 2 The "·<:onscien ce Whigs" 
were furious. Taylor, they charged, was a "favorite 
candidate of the slave-holders," and was selected because 
he was the 11only Southern man who could be elected."3 
1Abbott Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, Sept. 18 1 
1848, Nov. t' j7, 1848, ~rittenden Mss., L. ~. 
2J. J. Crittenden to A. T. Burnley, July 30, 1848, 
Chapman Coleman, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With 
Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches (2 vols.; 
Philadelphia, 1871), I, 322-3. 
3Wilson, Slave Power, II, 138. 
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'l'he fiery Charles Allen was on his feet t .o denounce 11 the 
perpetual surrender" by Northern Whigs to their "Southern 
confederates" of the 11high offices and powers of the 
Government.u 11 You have even presumed," he continued, 
turning in the direction of Abbott Lawrence, who was rumored 
to be t h e next Vice-President, " t h at the state wh ich led 
the first revolution for liberty will now desert that cause 
for the miserable boon of the Vice-Presidency." 11Sir, 11 he 
roared out, "Massachusetts will spurn the bribe . ~• 1 
Seconding his colleague, Henry Wilson labelled Taylor's 
nomination as "another an~ a signal triump~ of the Slave 
Power," and publicly vowed-- 11 so help me Godu--to do "all I 
can to def eat the election of that c c.ndidate." I n the 
midst of uproar and wild disorder, the two "Conscience 
Whigs, 11 Allen and Wilson, strode out of the convention 
hall. 2 
'l'he 11 Gotton Whigs" went ahead, however, dis-
regar ding the outbursts of their younger members, and 
proceeded to the work of selecting their Vice-Presidential 
c andidate. One of t he most prominent candidates was Abbott 
Lawrence, the nationally known industrialist and textile 
1·~nlson, Slave Power, I .I, 136-8. See J. J. 
Cr ittenden to 1Vioses li . Grinnell, Dec. 9, 1848, .G oleman, 
Crittenden, I , 329-30. 
2Wilson, Slave Power, II, 138. 
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manufacturer of Massachusetts; and the usually reliable 
sources had long ago agreed that it was going to be a Taylor-
Lawrence ticket, with Robert .c; . vnnthrop mentioned as the new 
- 1 
Secretary of State. Certainly there was much to be said for 
the nomination of Lawrence. He had served in the House of 
Representatives, held a position on the Maine Boundary 
Commission, had been an active Whig party worker for many 
years, and was more than acceptable to most Southern Vfuigs. 
Judge Henry Adams Bullard of New Orleans assured his old 
friend, Amos Lawrence, that the delegates from Louisiana 
would certainly back Taylor and his brother Abbott. "A 
stronger ticket could not be formed for the South, " he 
declared. 2 Similar word came from H. M. Judge of South 
,.Garolina, who told Amos Lawrence that "it would please us 
all very much" to see Abbott elected. 11 He would not only be 
ornamental," he added, rrbut useful in Washington in these 
times of trouble. n3 
Abbott ~wrence was to find, however, that he had 
more enemies in the North than in the South. His active 
1Winthrop, Memoir, PP• 90-1; Hill, Abbott Lawrence, 
PP• 78-9. See Abbott Lawrence to s. Draper, Jr., s. Loudon 
and R. M. Blatchford, Esquires, May 12, 1848, A. L. Letters, 
M. H.&., IX, 207. 
2Henry Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, New Orleans, 
June 4, 1848, ibid., p. 219. 
3H. M. Judge to Amos Lawrence, Eutaw, May 2, 1848, 
ibid., P• 191. 
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support of Henry Glay in 1 42 and 144 had angered the die-
hard Webster men, and now his support of General Taylor at 
the 1 48 convention had turned the ~ lay men against him. 1 
F'ree-soil men and 11 ·Gonscience-Whigs 11 sullenly opposed the 
manufacturer, growling that cotton should nd be put at both 
ends of the ticket--a bitter reference to Taylor's back-
ground as a Louisiana slaveholder. 2 It was a hard core of 
these pro-Webster, anti-slavery Whigs who steadfastly refused 
to yield a crucial bloc of six votes to Abbott Lawrence, 
with the result that Millard T. Fillmore of New York was 
brought forward to receive the nomination as Vmig candidate 
for the Vice-Presidency. This was sweet revenge, and with 
obvious satisfaction, Henry Wilson took pride in the fact 
t h at he and his Free-Soil colleagues were primarily 
responsible for Lawrence's defeat. "Unquestionably the 
declarations and actions of 1~. Allen and li~. Wilson led to 
this result," Wilson wrote, 11 and gave to New York the honor 
wh ich was intended for their own .Commonwealth. "3 Burning 
1Hill, Abbott Lawrence, PP• 78-9. 
2Glyndon VanDeusen, Thurlow Weed (Boston, 1947), 
pp. 160-1. Also see Amos Lawrence to President Hopkins, 
June 12, 1848, Lawrence, Diary, pp. 258-9. 
3Wilson, Slave Power, II, 137. 
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with rage 11 Robert G. Winthrop denounced the "Conscience men n 
who had turned against their own party. "First they tried 
to defeat me as Speaker 11 11 he told Nathan Appleton. "Second, 
they tried (and succeeded) to defeat Mr. Lawrence as Vice 
President."1 Lawrence, however, accepted the defeat with 
good grace--he had not looked upon the obscure office very 
high ly, an¥Way--and went on to fi ght what he considered the 
greater battle, the maintenance of moderation and co-
operation between the sections. "I intend ••• to abandon all 
business of a private character and give myself up entirely 
to the great and more important business of the country in 
the election of General 'l1aylor, 11 Lawrence told Senator 
Crittenden of Kentucky. "I have already made engagements 
to address the people, and as far as writing, speaking and 
paying, my friends will £2i f.!.!:!S!. me wanting. 112 "I am willing 
to spend and be spent," he wrote to Nathan Appleton, to 
promote "the great cause of conservatism. "3 He worked hard 
and long for the success of the Taylor-Fillmore ticket 
~obert c. Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, July 23, 
1848 11 Winthrop Papers, M. H.S., XXXVL, 128. 
2Abbott Lawrence to John J. ~rittenden, Sept. 18, 
1848 1 Crittenden Mss., L • . c. 
3Abbott Lawrence to Nathan Appleton, Aug. 11 11 
1848, Hill, Abbott Lawrence, p. 80. 
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unaware that destiny had just passed him by; for ~~. Abbott 
Lawrence might have become the t welfth President of the 
United States but for the margin of those six votes. 
The election of 1848 was marked by the appearance 
of a t h ird national party, the .Free-Soil party, which was 
formed by a combination of those who already disapproved of 
the De mocratic platform of pro-slavery expansion, and t hose 
wh o had now come to regard the regular wlhig party as too 
vacillating and compromising to any longer command their 
political allegiance. 1 Abolitionists, members of the 
Liberty party, anti-slavery Democrats, the dissatisfied 
11 Gonscience Whigs" of Massachusetts, and the radical "Barn-
burners" of New York, all banded together under the slogan: 
nF'ree Soil, free speech, free labor and free men. " 2 Ivioving 
for ward with all the fervor of an evangelistic crusade, the 
Free-Soilers selected the former New York Democrat, Martin 
Van Buren, as their new Presidential candidate, and ch ose 
Charles J?rancis Adams, a prominent Bay State "~ons ci ence 
- 3 ~fui g" as t h eir Vice-Presidential candidate. 
_ 
1rv~ry ~wrence to Amos Lawrence, Nov. 4, 1850, 
A. i.. • .Letters, M. h .S., X, 645. 
2Wilson, Slave Power, II, 373-5. 
3Darling, Massachusetts, pp. 352-3, and Faulkner, 
"Massachusetts , 11 Comm. Hist., l.V, 97-8. 
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Although the new Free-Soil party failed to carry 
a single state, it succeeded in taking so many New York 
votes away from the Democratic candidate, 'Gass, that the 
Whigs were able to capture that stete. In 1848, as New York 
went, so went the nation, and the Whigs victorious l y put 
General Zachary Taylor in the White House. 1 But this was 
destined to be one of the classic ~yrrhic victories of 
American political history. With its subterfuge candidate, 
Taylor, who knew nothing about politics and less about the 
slavery issue, the old-time Vfuigs may have succeeded 
momentarily in disrupting the Democratic machine, but they 
had also succeeded in providing the basis for their own 
destruction. For, regarding Taylor's nomination as the 
final outrage, the "·Conscience ~'higs" could restrain them-
selves no longer, and bolted the Whig party for good. 
Condemning the "conspiracy" between the "cotton-planters 
and flesh mongers of Louisiana and Mississippi" and the 
11 cotton spinners and traff ickers of New England 1 11 Charles 
Sumner branded Tay lor's election as the result of the union 
of "the Lords of the Lash and the lords of the loom." 2 
1abbott Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, Nov. ~ ~' 
1848, Crittenden Mss., L. c . 
2Nathan Appleton and Charles Sumner, Correspondence, 
July-September, 1848, Mse., Rare Book Department, B.P.L., 
from the original letters in the possession of William s. 
Appleton, copied by :F . B. Perkins, 1874. 
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The 'Whig Party had lost the dynamic young "Conscience Whigs" 
forever, and without young blood in its veins it would only 
be a matter of time before political rigor mortis set in. 
For the time being, however, the old-line Whigs 
were content to accept their victory at face value, and use 
the precious time to get as many of their own men into key 
positions as quickly as possible. Although Senator John J. 
Crittenden of Kentucky had been offered any Cabinet post in 
return for his staunch support of Taylor, he preferred to 
accept his election to the Governorship of Kentucky. 1 
Nevertheless, Crittenden carefully scrutinized every new 
Cabinet appointment, to be sure t hat only moderate, pro-
'ray lor v~higs were admitted to the magic circle. Clayton 
of Delaware, iVIeredi th of Pennsylvania, Johnson of Maryland, 
Preston of Virginia and Crawford of Georgia were ~abinet 
appointees whose views were consistent with the conservative 
Whig tradition.2 
Ji'or his part in 'I'aylor 's victory 1 Abbott Lawrence 
of Massachusetts was first considered for the post of 
Secretary of the Treasury, and then offered the position of 
1w. P. Gentry to J. J. Crittenden, Nov. 20, 1848, 
and Alexander H. Stephens to ·Crittenden, Dec. 5, 1848 , 
Coleman, Crittenden, I, 326-8, 328-9. 
2 Robert Toombs to J. J. Crittenden, April 25, 1850; 
Jefferson Davis to Crittenden, Jan. 30, 1849, ibid., PP• 366, 
339-340. 
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Secretary of the Navy. 1 When Lawrence declined the offer, 
apparently because it involved too much administrative work, 
the new administration saw fit to honor the prominent manu-
facturer with the post of I~nister to the Court of St. James, 
which Lawrence proudly accepted as a more suitable tribute 
to the name of his family and his own brilliant career. 2 
With the new administration in the hands of 
moderates and conservatives, it was anyone's guess what the 
outcome would be, and when the Thirty-First Congress assembled 
in December of 1849, the electricity of crisis could be felt 
everywhere as men hunch ed forward in their seats, waiting, 
expectant. It took sixty-three ballots to elect a Speaker 
of t h e House, and tempers had been filed down to a hair trigger 
by the time the explosive issues created by the 1lexica..Y1 ar 
came up for discussion. Northern sentiment was determined 
to keep slavery out of the newly won territories, frowned 
upon slave trade in the nation's capital, and was clearly 
hostile to the idea of returning fugitive slaves. Southerners 
were equally determined that slavery should be permitted in 
1Amos Lawrence to Abbott Lawrence, Feb. 28, March 3, 
March 5, 1849, Lawrence, Diary, pp. 267-8. Also see Robert c. 
Winth rop to Nath an Appleton, Jan. 2, 1849, Winthrop Papers, 
M. E . s ., XXXVI, 128 , and Nathan ~pleton to Millard Fillmore, 
Feb. 6, 184 9, J: ath an Appleton Papers, VI .H.S. 
2Amos Lawrence to a friend, July 18, 1849, Lawrence, 
Diary, P• 269. 
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the territories, that slave trade in the District of Columbia 
was perfectly permissible, and that the Northern attiv~de 
toward fugitive slaves was morall y and constitutionally 
indefensible. Flare-ups were co1nmon and fist-fignts were 
frequent, as taunts,jeers, charges and countercharges 
reverberated t hrough the chambers. nupon the whole," wrote 
Robert G. Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, 11 a seat in .Congress 
is a most undesirable possession."1 
It was against a background of debate and furious 
recrimination that the elderly Henry Clay rose slowly in 
his place in the Senate to provide a solution Which might 
salvage some semblance of national unity and restore some 
measure of sectional harmony. Clay's famous plan was a 
compromise, pure and simple, designed to appeal to as much 
of the moderate sentiment of all parties as possible. 
"Taken altogether, in combination," he explained, " they 
propose an amicable arrangement of all questions in contro-
versy between the free and slave states, growing out of the 
subject of slavery."2 Peace and conciliation were the basic 
1Winthrop, Memoir, pp. 91-2; Winthrop to Nathan 
Appleton, Washington, Jan. 6 1 1850 1 Winthrop Papers, M.H.S., 
XXXVI, 131. Also see Holman Hamilton, "'The ~cave of the 
Winds' and the Compromise of 1850, 11 Journal of Southern 
History, XXIII (1957), 331-353. 
2congressional Globe~ 31st Congress, 1st Session, 
Appendix, pp. 117-127, 567-573. Also see George Poage, Henry 
Clay and the Whig Party (Chapel Hill, 1936), PP• 199-204; 
Glyndon VanDeusen, Life of Henry Clay (Boston, 1937), pp. 394-
413. 
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ingredients of the famous Compromise of 1850--but the 
question was, would any leading political figure second the 
proposals of ~lay? 
On March 7 1 1850 1 Senator Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts, defender of t he Union, statesman of national 
renown, and spokesman of the interes~of tradition, property 
and respectability, rose to speak. In the last great speech 
of his life, the aging Senator gave an eloquent defense of 
the proposals of Clay, and added his own plea for compromise 
and peace. Urging a national policy of tolerance and mutual 
concession, Webster condemned the inflexible attitudes of 
radical abolitionists as well as radical secessionists as of 
equal danger to the future of the Union. 1 
Antislavery elements in Massachusetts rose as a 
man to attack Webster in violent and outraged indignation. 
Condemned in newspapers, magazines, speeches, and sermons, 
the "god-like" Daniel was now excoriated as a self-seeking 
traitor and an opportunistic rascal. Theodore Parker called 
him another Benedict Arnold, Horace Mann likened him to a 
fallen Lucifer, and James Russell Lowell more prosaically 
characterized him as a statesman "whose soul had been absorbed 
~Vebster, Writings, X1 _56-99. Also see Richard N. 
Current, Daniel Webster and the rlise of National Conservatism 
(Boston, 1955) 1 pp. 162-171. 
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in tariff, banks and the Constitution, instead of devoting 
himself to the freedom of the future." He believes that 
"government exists for the protection of property," sneered 
Ralph Waldo Emerson; while Vfuittier sadly lamented " ••• the 
1 light withdrawn which once he wore!" Even some of Webster's 
staunch supporters could follow the great man no longer. 
Old Amos Lawrence angrily compared him to Lord Bacon and 
growled: "I do most sincerely believe him among the wickedest 
men I ever knew ••• ;" and John 1Vlurray Forbes broke with the 
Whig Party forever because of what he considered to be the 
defection of its leader. 2 The Boston Atlas, usually a 
reliable index of conservative opinion, reported that 
Webster 1 s speech caused "dissatisfaction ,n and the editor 
took occasion to assure his readers that these were not the 
sentiments of the Whigs of New England.3 
But to the New England business community as a 
whole, to a majority of the men of wealth and property and 
1 Parrington, Main Currents, II, 314-315; Claude 
Fuess, Daniel 'iebster (2 vola.; Boston, 1930}, II, 218-227. 
2Amos Lawrence to Amos A. 
A. A. L. Letters, M.H.S., VIII, and 
Mr. Woodburn, March 14, 1850, A. A. 
I, 92. Also see Hughes, Forbes, I, 
Lawrence~ Sept. 23, ~850, 
Amos A. Lawrence to 
L. Letterbook, M.H.S., 
142-3. 
3Boston Daily Atlas, ~~rch 11, 1850; David Van 
Tassel, "Gentlemen of Property and Standing--~ompromise 
Sentiment in Boston, 1850," ~ England Quarterly, XXIII 
(1950), 307-319. 
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standing , Senator Daniel Webster was the man of the__ hour. 
Having appreciated the seriousness of the national situation, 
and having realized how close the South had really been to 
secession ("the future historian will pause with ast onishment 
and terror when .he comes to record it,n prophesied Rufus 
Ghoate) the merchants and businessmen of the North had been 
prepared to clutch at almost any plan which offered even the 
slightest measure of national peace. 1 This was by no 
means the best solution, most businessmen agreed, b ut it was 
f ar better than dis~~ion and war.2 As the conservative 
Daily Advertiser expressed it: 11 The Boston public fully 
support Mr. Webster--not with an enthusiastic rush of blind 
admiration, but with a calm belief that he has placed a 
vexed question in a position in whi ch it can be and must be 
n3 fairly settled.... Webs ter 1 s speech, comm:mted the 
Advertiser, was "a monument of his power of analyzing 
public affairs, and of his devotion to t h e interests of the 
Union , and the defence of the eonstitution that is the heart 
1 Brown, ~hoate, II, 313, speech delivered at the 
Constitutional N~eting In Faneuil Hall , Nov. 26, 1850. 
2Robert C. Winthrop to Edward Everett, March 17, 
1850, Everett Papers, M. H.S., and Robert c . Winth rop to 
George lVlorey, lvlarch 10, 1850, ~Hnthrop Papers, lvi . H.S., XXXVI, 
33. Also see Diary of ·vVilliam Appleton, p. 143. 
3Bo st on Dai ly Advertiser, i'vlarch 12, 1850. 
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and life of that Union. " 1 As for the "dissatisfact i on" 
reported by the Atlas# the Advertiser told its readers that 
it had conducted its own "extended inquiryn and found that 
the "general disposition" was to receive Webster's speech with 
favor. Moreover this feeling 11has gained ground and is 
gaining ground as the speech is read and re-read."2 In order 
to impress upon its readers the beneficial effects that the 
speech was having upon the nation, the Advertiser cited the 
Journal of Commerce wh ich reported that "rv.rr . Webster 1 s views 
are acceptable to the South, who are /Sic7 willing to carry 
them out by legislation. nS The f ollowing day, the .Journal 
expanded further upon the importance of Webster's statesman-
ship. 11 vi:r. Webster 1 s views have opened to us a new and 
cheering prospect," said the influential organ. "He has 
inspired confidence in t h e future wh ich was not felt before •••• 
The position of Northern conservatives is gloriously vindicated 
by lVJ.r. vvebster. A conservative may breathe freely in the North · 
after this."4 
1Boston Da i ly Advertiser, March 11, 1850. 
2I bid., March 12, 1850. See Daniel Webster to 
Edward Everett, March 10, 1850, and Edward Everett to Daniel 
Webster, March 12, 1850, Everett Papers, M.H.S. 
3 Journal of Commerce, Washington, Wmrch 7, 1850; 
Boston Daily Advertiser, March 9, 1850. 
4 Journal of Commerce, March 8, 1850; Advertiser, 
March 12, 1850. 
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1he free-breathing, exhilarated, conservatives of 
Boston could hardly withhold t heir gratitude and appreciation. 
All through the State 11 Union Meetings" were organized in 
support of Webster and the Compromise, and eight hundred of 
t h e most prominent citizens of t h e city promptly rushed to 
add their well-known signatures to a public letter to Daniel 
Webster.1 Approving the Senator's actions and endorsing 
his opinions, the letter concluded: " ••• In a time of almost 
unprecedented excitement, When t h e minds of men have been 
bewildered by an apparent conflict of duties ••• you have 
pointed out to a whole people t h e path of duty, have con-
vinced the understanding and touched the conscience of a 
nation." - Merchants such as Lawrence, Appleton, Perkins and 
Amory; lawyers such as Choate, Lunt, and the Curtises; 
scholars such as Ticknor, Everett, Prescott, and Sparks--
all added their voices to t h e paeans of praise for the 
great man whose speech they regarded as a milestone on the 
2 
road to intersectional h armony. ur hope soon to hear of 
the settlement of the slavery question, n wrote Abbott 
Lawrence from his new post in England, and added confidently: 
11I entertain no fears for the safety of the Union •113 A month 
1 Brown, Choate, I, 162, 173-4, II, 310 ff. 
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2Boston Daily Advertiser, April 3, 1850. For 
Webster's reply to the "Boston Letter," see ibid., April 13, 1850. 
3Abbott Lawrence to General Dearborn, April 2, 1850, 
Hill, Abbott Lawrence, P• 79. Also see Abbott Lawrence to 
Edward Everett, March 18, 1850, Everett Papers, M.H.S. 
later the Advertiser could survey t h e national situation and 
confid ently assure its readers that 11 ••• it seems to be 
admitted t h at t h is crisis is to be passed by judg ement a n d 
reaso n instead of the old fashioned rrethod of romahawks and 
dagg ers. 111 
s t h e 11 Got ton ~·migs" were making every eff ort 
to bolster their defenses in support of Webster and the 
compromise pro gram, summer brought t h e tragic news of 
President Tay lor's death. Abbott Lawren ce called the 
Preside n t's death a 11 National calamity,tt and Robert G. 
2 inth rop referred to the news as a 11 thunderclap.tt " Poor 
old Zack1 11 ·inthrop moaned irreverently. "He died in the 
best time for himself, but in the wors t for everybody else. n3 
Uncertain as to Vice-President Fillmore's exact sentiments, 
t h e V: 'higs wai ted nervously. 11 Fillmore is an amiable, 
e x cellent, conscientious fellow, 11 wro te Winth rop to a 
friend. 11 What he wi ll do remains to be seen. tt 4 The 
immediate grief of the ~IJhig party leaders was soon turned 
l Boston Dai ly Advertiser, April 6, 1850. Also 
see ibid., April 11, 1850. 
2Abbott Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Aug. 16, 1850, 
A. L . Letters, M. H. 5 ., X, 585, and Winthrop, Me moir, p. 127. 
3Robert C. Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, July 26, 
1850, V'inthrop Papers, M. R . S ., XXXVI , 135 . 
4~ifinthrop , Memoir, p. 129. 
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i nto joy, h owever, when l''illrnore proved to be even more 
l 
conservative t h an 'I'aylor himself. Daniel 'v~ ebster was 
elevated to the post of Secretary of State in t h e new 
President's cabinet, and Robert G. Winthrop assigned to 
Webster's Senatorial chair for t h e remainder of t h e summer. 
en the f all elections in I'lla. ssachusetts sent Samuel A. 
liot, a strong 11 compromise 11 man, t o .Congress, t o be 
joined the followin g year by William Appleton, Webster 
was de ligh ted: 11 \IVh en Boston h a s been represented by 
co~mer cial men, she has always been better represented 
than at any ot h er time . n2 The New England statesman was 
p laced in a stronger position of political power than 
h e h ad been for many years, and expressed his pleasure 
at see ing t he pendulum of public sympathy moving in 
what h e considered to be the direction of compromi se and 
union. 3 'ro make matters even better, President Fillmore, 
wh o h ad been impressed by the arguraent s in favor of t h e 
Gompromise to which h e had listened as presiding of ficer 
1Robert C. Wi nthrop to J. C. v·arren, Aug . 16, 
18 51, Warren Papers, M.H.S., XXIX . Also see Abbott 
Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Aug . 16, 1850, A. L. Le tters, 
M. H. S ., X, 585. 
2Hill, Abbott Lawrence, p. 58. See also Pierce, 
1ilemoir of Sumner, .l II, 217 , and G. S . Morehead to J. J. 
Crittenden, l'iiarch 30, 1850 , Coleman, Crittenden, I , 361-4. 
3 Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept. 7, 1850. 
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of the Senate, now came out publicly in support of the 
Compromise--·to the disgust of the New York antislavery 
leaders, William H. Seward and Thurlow Weed--but to the 
delight of the moderate Whigs. Abbott Lawrence was now 
convinced that Fillmore's new Cabinet would "command the 
confidence of the Country" and eventually settle the 
"agitating question." 1 Robert G. Winthrop assured 
Nathan Appleton that such "ultra" Southerners as St ephens 
and Toombs (the "duo fulmina belli"} were certain to be 
recalled and repudiated; and was quite convinced that 
"the Union is safe, notwithstanding the occasional 
gasconading of Ultra-ists at both ends of the Union." 2 
Southern ~Yhigs agreed with their Northern brethren as to 
prospects for the future. Judge Ogden of New Orleans 
congratulated old Amos Lawrence that "the danger with 
-
wh ich we have been menaced has passed;" and from Washirgton, 
D. ~ ., Judge Bullard expressed similar sentiments of 
confidence.3 " 'lhere is no serious agitation here," he 
told Lawrence. "'lhe Administration is immensely popular, 
1Abbott Lawrence to Amos Lawrence, Aug. 16, 
1850, A. L. Letters, M.H.s., X, 585. 
2Robert .c; . Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, Aug. 18, 
1850, Winthrop Papers, M.H.S., XXXVI, 139; Winthrop to 
Jo:b...n .G. Warren, Aug. 16, 1851, Warren Papers, M. H.S., XXIX. 
3R. N. Ogden to Amos Lawrence, Dec. 29, l8BD, 
A. L. Letters, X, 709. 
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without, indeed, any formal oppositi on; and public affairs 
go on very smoothly and h armoniousiy.ttl 
With the benediction of President Fillmore, t h e 
direction of young Senator Douglas from I llinois, and t h e 
loyal s upport of Northern and Southern vb igs, Clay's 
"Omnibus Billu was finally passed. California was allowed 
to enter t h e Union as a free state; the princip le of 
popular sovereignty was establi shed in the territories of 
New Mexico and Utah; ten million dollars in claims was 
paid to Texas; the slave trade was abolished in t h e 
Distri ct of Columbia; 'and more effective ~ugi tive slave 
legislation was provided. By a narrow margin , Clay , 
Douglas, Webster and oth er moderates were convi nced that 
they h ad averted secession and prevented the disruption 
of t h e Union. 2 
But the moderates h ad little time to celebrate 
t heir triumph, for within IYiassachusetts an important 
contest of political strength was in process, with the 
conservative advocates of compromi se pitting t heir streng th 
against t h e radical proponents of Free-Soil and free men. 
1Henry A. Bullard to2Amos Lawrence, Jan. 25, 1851, A. L. Letters, ~ . H .S., X, 21. 
2 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States 
from the Compromise of 1850 (7 vols.; New York, 1893-1906), 
I, 168-9, 181-3, and Poage, Henry Clay, PP• 244-264. 
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For the 11Gotton Whigs" it was Armageddon--the last desperate 
battle against the forces of lawlessness and greed, the 
last hope for peace and harmony. Anything less than victory 
at this crucial point, they feared, would mean the end of 
the Union, secession and war. The subsequent withholding 
of cotton supplies, the disruption of credit, and the 
stock market collapse that would inevitably follow, would 
bring financial ruin to every textile mill in the New 
England area. Desperately, the chairman of the Massachusetts 
Whig State Committee called upon every business man in the 
area "to use all the influence h e can over those in his 
employ, or in any way under his control "to bring a 
crushing defeat down upon the heads of Free-Soilers and 
1 Democrats. 
The Whigs were doomed to disappointment in the 
fall elections of 1850 1 however, as their opposition--
"Gonscience Whigs," Free-Soilers and Democrats--decided to 
join forces and pool their voting strength. 2 Ordinarily, 
although they commanded less than forty-nine per cent of 
1Whig circular, Nov. 8 1 1850 1 signed by George 
Niorey 1 ,Chairman of the V~hig State Central Gommittee_. M. H.s. 
2Boston Post, Sept. 19 1 1849. 
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the State vote, the Massachusetts vfuigs had usually been 
able to control the State government through the s olid 
Boston delegation they sent to the Je gislature. 1 I n 1850, 
however, the "coalition,n as it was called, united on 
candidates for t h e legislature in practically every city 
and town in Massachusetts and, as a result, overpowered 
the Boston bloc. By informal agreement, the victorious 
Democrats took over most of the tate offices and put 
Robert Ran toul, Jr., into Webster 1 s unexpired Senatorsh ip; 
while their Free-Soil partners began their preparations to 
send Gharles Sumner to the United States Senate i n the 
spring to take over Webster's seat on a permanent basis.2 
The "Cotton Whigs" were outraged at the prospect 
of this h otheaded firebrand going to Washington to upset 
t h e national equilibrium that Webster and Clay had worked 
so hard to maintain. "For heaven 1 s sake keep him home l" 
Congressman Samuel Eliot pleaded with ~s A. Lawrence. 
11 You can hardly imagine the disgust and loa thing with 
which such men as Sumner, Ha le of New Hampshire, Giddings 
1see Henry Greenleaf Pearson, 11 Preliminaries of 
the Civil Y~ar," Gomm. Hist., IV, 477-8, and Faulkner, 
"Political History," ibid., PP• 98-100. 
2 
.Amos Lawrence to Nlark Hopkins, Nov. ll, 1850, 
Lawrence, Diary, p. 287, and Hopkins to Lawrence, Nov. 27, 
1850, A. L. Letters, M.H .s., X, 663. Also see ilson, 
Slave Power, II , 338-351; Boston Post, Jan. 7, 8, 1851; 
Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 21, .F'eb. 8, 19, 24, 1851. 
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and that set are looked upon by honest men here. 111 Leading 
conservative Whigs of Boston, including Lawrence, the 
Appletons, Robert Gould Shaw, George Lyman, and the others, 
needed little urging, and began to engage in elaborate 
plans to defeat Sumner. The State ~entral ~ommittee 
began contacting the major manufacturing companies for 
contributions, wards and districts were polled with expert 
care, and arrangements were made for a specific number of 
men "good and true" in every town to hunt up all Whigs--
and any man who could cast a Whig vote--and "carry them 
_!2 the ballot box.tt2 Although Amos A. Lawrence objected 
strenuously to the custom of exacting political contri-
butions from corporations, he took a prominent role in 
the battle to defeat Sumner, conscious of the effect 
which such a defeat would have in Southern circles.3 During 
the months of February, ~~rch and April, 1851 1 Lawrence 
conducted numerous private subscription drives among the 
most prominent men of Boston in order to prevent Sumner 
1samuel A. Eliot to Amos A. Lawrence, Jan. 23, 
1851, A. A. L. Letters, M.H.S., VIII, 200. Also see 
Robert c. Winthrop to Nathan Appleton, Jan. 17, 1851 1 
Winthrop Papers, M.H.S., XXXVI, 144. 
2 John E. Tyler (Vfuig State Central Committee} to 
Amos A. Lawrence, li'eb. 11, 1851, A. A. L. Letters, VIII, 210. 
3Lawrence to Tyler, Feb. 12, 1851, A. A. L. Letter-
book, I, 266, and Lawrence to Samuel Eliot, Jan. 20, 1851, 
ibid., I, 245. 
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from reaching Wash ington.l 
I n addition to economic pressures, t h e Whigs 
attempted a politica l coalition of their own by a l lying 
t h emselves with a small group of 11old guard" Jackson 
Democrats to whom Sunmer was loathsome, and who di sapproved 
of the Free-Soil combination. 2 Convinced that Sumner's 
election would be a national catastrophe, the Democrat 
Caleb Gush ing , used all his influence against Sumner in 
the Democratic caucuses; and wh en he failed there, he 
took the fi ght to the floor of the House. 3 Between 
January 14 and April 24, 1851, political fortunes hung in 
t h e balance wh ile twenty-six ballots were taken--until 
Char les Sumner was finally elected by the majority of a 
sing le vote. Tne winners were jubilant,while the 
following day t he 11Cotton V~bigs" appeared on t h e stre ets 
of Bos ton with wide bands of black crepe on t heir arms. 4 
1Lawrence to William Appleton, Feb. 10, 1851, 
Lawr ence to Ezra Lincoln, .E'eb. 10, 1851, and Lawrence appeal 
for funds to defeat Sumner, :iVIa rch 14 , 1851, A. A. L. Le tter-
book , 1\l.H. S ., I , 261, 263, 296. Lawrence: Subs cr i p tion " to 
defe a t Sumner," Ivlarch 14, 1851, and Lawrence: Subscription 
to Anti-Sumner .Fund, April 24 , 1851, A. A. L. Le tters, d.H.s., 
IX , 11, 25. 
2Robert C. Winthrop to George Morey, Jan . 25, 1851, 
Winth rop .t'aper s, lVI .H .s ., XXXVI. , 145, and La·wrence to Dr . Green, 
Nov. 16 , 1850, A. A. L. Le tterbook, I , 211. 
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3Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 16, 17, Feb. 8, ~arch 11, 
13, 1851. Also see Claude M. FUess, Tne Life of ~aleb ~shing 
(2 vols.; New York, 1923), II , 98-108. 
4Advertiser, April 25, 1851; Boston Post, April 25, 
1851. Also see Elias Nason, The Life and Ti mes of' Ch arles 
Sumner (Boston, 1874), pp. 139-140; F'aulkner, "Po l itical 
History," Cornm . Hist., IV, 99-100. 
This coalition of anti-slavery Whigs and anti-slavery 
Democrats had jumped party lines to put into the Senate the 
brilliant orator who would lead the Eree-Soil cause. But 
equally significant, in terms of local politics, this coalition 
had also succeeded in breaking the power of the "Cotton ' ihigs.tt 
For the first time the government of the State of Massachusetts 
was in the hands of a group of politicians who were openly and 
aggressively opposed to the principle of slavery. 
Disheartened, but not discouraged, mindful of their 
solid core of political support in the city, the "Cotton 
Whi g s u continued to fight on--concentrating their efforts on 
developing a breach in the ranks of their combined enemies. 
1he opposition press laughed at the picture of Abbott 
Lawrence 11 going about the State drenching his pocket-hand-
kerchief with tears,n and at the noted manufacturer "dragging 
his wallet and contents out to 'feed' forty-one perambulating 
-whig orators, 11 - ... but the results of such canvassing were soon 
1 
to produce results. 
It would appear that in the year or so following 
the passage of the ~ompromise of 1850, a growing majority 
1 Williams. Robinson, nwarrington" Pen-Portraits 
(Boston, 1877), pp. 203-5. 
129 
of the American people had come to look upon that piece of 
legislation as the only practical solution of a comp lex and 
1 
otherwise insoluble problem. By 1852 the Democratic Party 
itself had come to recognize this feeling~ and nominated the 
non-committal and uncommitted Franklin Pierce of New Hamp shire 
as t heir Presidential nominee~ heading up a party program 
which formally accepted the Compromise of 1850 as the final 
settlement of the slavery problem. With something like a 
national sigh of relief, the bulk of the American people 
cast their vote for the Democratic party as a means of 
push ing t h e extravagant slavery issue into the limbo of lost 
causes. Southern Unionists too, fearing that the Northern 
Uh i gs would all be converted to the "Conscience" cause, 
t hrew the wei ght of their votes to the Democratic ticket.2 
The New York 11 Barnburners 11 broke off their connec t ions with 
t h e F'ree-Soilers and returned t o t heir native Democratic 
party.3 And in l'ilassachusetts, these latest developments 
caused almost i~nediate dissolution of the powerful anti-
·wn i g coalition. Th e local Democr a ts could hardly take a 
1Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept. 7, 1850; Rhodes, 
History, I, 277. 
2 
See Edward Stanwood, History of the Presidency . 
(2 vols.; Boston, 1916), I~ 243-257. 
3van D~usen, 1burlow veed, pp. 191-2. 
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different stand from that of their national party, and so had 
' • 
no alternative but to campaign for Pierce and the Compromise. 
The Eree-Soilers, on the other hand, could never bring them-
selves to accept the outrageous Compromise plank--and so the 
short-lived partnership was dissolved. 1 Although the local 
Vfuigs actually gained few additional votes, the break-up of the 
coalition meant that the Whigs could regain control of the 
State legislature with their solid Boston vote. i~ i th a 
majority of ten votes the Whigs put in a slate of State 
officers and sent Edward Everett of f to the United States 
Senate to offset the effects of Sumner. 2 r:[his wouJd show the 
South that "radicalism and r ascality has not made so much 
progress here as the newspapers would have led them to believe," 
said Amos A. Lawrence happily; "the prospect is good. n3 
But the opposition could hardly agree. 11 The co ali ti on is 
dead ••• , n moaned a prominent anti-slavery journalist. "The 
Whig party remains in the complete control of Boston, and the 
money-bags of Boston rule the State.n4 
~Vilson, Slave Power, li, 361-2, 373-4. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to A. A. Richards, Nov. 20, 1852, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.s., II , 3. Also see Pearson, 
"Preliminaries of the Civil War, 11 Gomm. Hist., IV, 481-2. 
3Lawrence to Samuel Eliot, Jan. 20, 1851, A. A. L. 
Letterbook, I, 245. 
4 Robinson, Pen-Portraits, pp. 203-5. 
'Ihe 11 Gotton Whigs" were proud and happy at what 
seemed to them to be their present victory and their 
future hopes and dreams. ..:<'or the present, they could disregard 
the defeat of t heir presidential candidate, General ~ infield 
Scott, as of little consequence (Winthropdismissed it as 
ulaughably overhwelming 11 ), and h ail the election of the New 
Hampshire Democrat, Franklin Pierce, as the start of a new 
era of national accord. 1 11 Frank 11 Pierce was not only a 
relative, but a close personal friend of Amos A. Lawrence, 
ever since he had taken the young Lawrence to see President 
Andrew Jackson when h e was on a tour of 'viashing ton during a 
summer vacation from Harvard. 2 Lawrence, now a wealthy and 
influential financier, immediately offered the new Pre sident-
elect h is services--"pecuniary or otherwise " --while h is 
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father, hmos Lawrence, insisted that the Pierce faini ly come to 
Boston and accept his hospitality after the strenuous campaign.3 
1vVinthrop, Memoir, p. 161; New York Tribune, Nov. 13, 
1852, Jan. 14, 1853. 
2Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 21-2, and Lawrence, 
Diary, PP• 335-6. 
3 Amos A. Lawrence to F'ranklin ? ierce Nov. ll, 1852, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I, 407; Lawrence to 1r. Conant, 
Dec. 6, 1852, ibid., II , 407. Lawrence, Diary, PP• 335-6. 
Sensing the political opportunities which could be exploited 
as a result of this close personal relationship, young 
Lawrence urged his friend, Congressman William Apple ton, to 
use his influence in vfuig circles and play along with Pierce 
for the time being, obviously anticipating a ·· break in the 
Democratic ranks. "If the conservative part of the Whig party 
will support him, 11 he wrote, 11 i t will make the sacrifice 
easier when he comes to make a break with some of his present 
1 
supporters. 11 
Party alignments and political nomenclatures had 
ceased to have the same importance they once did, as far as 
the 11 Gotton Whigs" were concerned. They were more interested 
in issues and results than in party affiliations. Unmindful 
of the long-term consequences that their new political attitude 
foreshadowed, and apparently unaware of the fact that their 
own political structure was dissolving about them, the "Cotton 
Whigstt were happy in the confidence that they had just 
secured enough valuable time for the entire nation to become 
adjusted to the prospects of inter-sectional harmony and 
national accord. Having already repudiated the ultra-ism of 
suCh fanatical groups as the Abolitionists, the Liberty Party 
1 Amos A. Lawrence to William Appleton, Dec. 28, 
1852, A. A. L. Letterbook, l\I .H.S., II, 23. 
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and the Free-Sailers, t h e "Cotton Whigs" were sure that in the 
follo wing four years the people of America would likewise 
repudiate the ultra-ism of South ern plans for nullification 
and secession. At the end of four years, t h en, t h is would 
mean t h at t h e people of the United States would be ready for 
a real 11 National" party--a party wh ich the true Whig party 
h ad repre sented all along--an American party--above sectional-
ism and localism--a party 11 knowing no North and no South.nl 
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Robert c. Winthrop felt that it augured well for the future that 
the electoral vote of t h e Wnig c andidate, General Scott, was 
divided between t wo widely separated sections of the Union--
IYTB. ssachusetts and Vermont; Tennessee and Kentucky. nLet us 
hope, n h e prayed earne stly, "we shall learn a l ittle wisdom 
2 during t h e next four years." 
1
s ee W. 0. Lynch, "Anti-Slavery Tendencies of the 
Democratic Party," MississiPPi Valley Historical Review, II 
(1924), 319-331. -
2 Winthrop, Memoir, P• 161. 
-CHAPTER V 
AWAKE THE SLEEPING TIGER 
The opening years of the new Administration exceeded 
the fondest hopes and expectations of the 11 Gotton ~'Vbigs" as 
President Franklin Pierce, smiling, confident, looking even 
younger than his fifty years, assured the nati on in his 
I naugural Address that he personally considered the .Compromise 
of 1850 to be the final settlement of the issue of slavery. 
ni fervently hope that the question is at rest," he concluded, 
"and that no sectional or ambitious or fanatical excitement 
may again threaten the durability of our institutions or 
1 
obscure t h e light of our prosperity." And at the close of 
the year in his First Annual Message, the President again 
promised the American people that 11 this repose is to suffer 
no sh ock during my official term, if I have the power to 
avert it."2 
Some folks called it another "Era of Good Feelings •11 
The nation was at peace, the Administration had the support of 
both Houses, the Treasury was overflowing, fore i gn relations 
1Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 2730-2736. 
2Ibid., PP• 2740-2759. 
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were relatively peaceful, and business was getting better 
every day. The great Compromise of 1850 had apparently 
solved all the political nightmares which had almost driven 
the country into a state of national hysteria. North and 
South congratulated each other on the future prospects for 
mutual harmony and accord. Judge Ogden of New Orleans was 
convinced that the danger of war had passed, and told Amos 
Lawrence of Massachusetts that "the sterling intelligence, 
integrity and patriotism of our countrymen will prevent . 
any such suicidal madness as secession or disunion. 111 
Lawrence's old friend and long-time Vfuig, Judge Henry Adams 
Bullard, had just been elected to Gongress, and from 
Washington assured Lawrence that affairs in the nation's 
2 
capital were proceeding nvery smoothly and harmoniously." 
Nathan Appleton later recalled that as a result of the Gompro-
mise of 1850, the free states were "satisfied and content--
in a state of perfect repose. n3 1he slavery question 
_ ~. N._ ~gden t~ Amos Lawrence, Dec. 29, 1850, 
A. L. Letters, M. H.S., X , 709. 
2Hen2y Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, Jan. 24, 
1851, ibid., X , 21. 
3 Nathan Appleton, Letter to the Hon. William G. 
Rives of Virginia on Slavery and the Union (Boston, 1860), 
P• 10. 
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seemed virtually forgotten as the country plunged itself into 
an exciting orgy of building and s pending. 
Over in London, at t h e fabulous ncrystal Palace" 
Exhibition, Yankee inventions were t h e talk of t he town--
from s uch prosaic exhibits as picks and shovels to the more 
complicated intricacies of American sewing machines and 
reapers. As Ambassador to England, Abbott Lawrence had co-
operated whole-heartedly with his British hosts in the prepa-
rations for this great international exhiblt, and in his 
dispatches to t h e Department of State had urged th@,t the 
United States be adequately represented. Europeans were agog 
at the latest evidences of the material progress of their 
trans-Atlantic cousins. 1 Not to be outdone, Amer ica held 
its own industrial exhibition at New York's version of the 
"crystal Palace" during the steaming hot summer and fall 
of 1853. 2 To h osts of interested spectator~ displays from 
all over Western Europe provided a glittering backdrop 
against which America proudly displayed her own amazing wares. 
'l'o many, this was only one more evidence of the fact that the 
United States was passing out of its adolescence of sectional-
ism and parochialism and was beginning to for ge an even more 
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1Abbott Lawrence to Edward Everett, London, I~ch 21, 
1850, Everett Papers, M. H.S. Also see Hill, Abbott Lav~ence, 
PP• 94-7. 
2 Reporting in Harper's Magazine, November, 1853, 
George William Curtis called it 11 Aladdin 1 s Palace. " Also see 
Boston Daily Advertiser, July 14, 1853. 
1 perfect Union. 
Restricted markets gave way to country-wide selling 
areas as Northern manufacturers found customers all through 
the middle West and down into the Gulf States. McCormick 
reapers, Seth 'I'homas clocks and Golt revolvers became house-
hold words. Day by day America was becoming more national in 
its transportation, communication and business markets than 
ever before. The 1850's witnessed such a treroondous expansion 
in the railroad system crisscrossing the nation that in the 
first eighteen months of 1853, America was sadly forced to 
record sixty-five fatal railroad accidents. 2 Every morning 
an avid American public eagerly read about the latest records 
established by the new Yankee 11Glippertt ships, as the tonnage 
of American ocean traffic increased to the point where in 
1853 it exceeded British tonnage by fifteen per cent. 3 
Newspapers everywhere testified to the increasing size and 
wealth of the nation. Capital invested in manufacturing had 
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already doubled, and cotton growers were enjoying an unaccustomed 
prosperity as the price of cotton pushed upwards from its 1845 
1 Journal of ·Gommerce, Aug. 12, Sept. 13, 1853. 
2 DeBow's Review, October, 1853, p. 429. Also see 
Boston Daily Atlas, Aug. 13, 1852. 
3 Ibid., July 2, July 4, 1853. 
low of six cents a pound to over twelve cents during the early 
50's. 1 
'£he same optimism and enth usiasm wh ich marked the 
national attitude was reflected at the state and local levels. 
Proud residents of Massachusetts took delight in displaying 
t h e latest in local developments at a series of fairs and 
expositions. At the Boston Fowl Show in 1852, three ~ochin 
.Chinas sold for :jp lOO; and at t h e grea t Horse Show at Spring-
field the following year, sales of blooded horses varied 
- - 2 between :jj)500 and $ 1,500. The Mechanics Fair at -Faneuil 
Hall in September of 1853 drew t h ousands of excited spectators 
from miles around; and Robert G. Winthrop, who went to the 
.~ attle Show at Lowell, expecting to talk about "bullocks and 
manure" was amazed at wh at he classified as "a sort of 
. 3 
miniature World 1 s Fair • 11 
Boston 1 s fifteen families, united in the "Boston 
~sociation," by 1850 controlled one-fifth of the nation's 
cotton spindles, a third of t he State's railroad mileage, and 
about two-fifths of Boston's banking capital as the value of 
1William E . Dodd, The ~otton Kingdom (New Haven, 
1920), p. 26; Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union (2 vols.; New 
York, 1947), II , 245 , 265-6. 
2Hunt 1 s Merchants' Magazine, XXXII (1855), 583-5. 
3 Boston Daily Atlas, Sept. 21, 1853; Winthrop, 
Memoir, pp. 149-150. 
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Massachusetts manufacturing had risen to almost three hundred 
million dollars. 1 11 We are all at work in New England, and now 
feel a twinge from too fast driving in some branches of 
business," reflected Amos A. Lawrence, 11but in the aggregate, 
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our country is rapidly advancing in wealth, power and strength i •.• n2 
With state-wide attention focused on local prosperity and 
national progress, re-assured that the ,compromise of 1850 had 
already predestined the future freedom of the Western lands, 
Boston's "cotton Whigs 11 relaxed in the firm belief that the 
possibility of sectional conflict had long since passed. 
11Since it has turned out that t he whole of the vast territories 
hereafter to be admitted as States are to be free," wrote 
Lawrence in obvious complacency, 11 it seems most unwise to be 
quarreling about abstractions. "3 
11Men spoke softly not to rouse the sleeping tiger," 
Allan Nevins has dramatically written, 11 but in his sleep he 
4 
stirred and growled.rr It would be absurd, of course, to 
1shlakman, "Ghicopee," Smith Studies,. XX (1935), 36-7. 
I 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Rev. Dr. Scoresby, Bradford, 
England, Aug. 19, 1851, Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, p. 307. 
3Am.os A. Lawrence to J. !:; . Tyler, Feb. 12, 1851, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I, 266. 
4Nevins, Ordeal of t h e Union, II, 78. 
suggest that every last vestige of the extreme bitterness 
which the slavery question had engendered over the past two 
decades had completely died out. The emotional repercussions 
that the F~gitive Slave Act was producing in t h e Bay State 
alone was sufficient evidence of th is fact. First in February, 
and again in April, 1851, law enforcement officials had out-
raged the sympathies of Boston by trying to enforce the 
obnoxious law. A :Ne gro called Shadrach had the good fortune 
to be rescued and s pirited off to freedom by irate Bostonians; 
but the nex t victim, a waiter named Thoma s Si mms, was no t so 
fortunate. He was marched off to a waiting vessel before day-
break on t h e morning of .april 12 , 1851, with an armed escort 
1 
of over a hundred city police. 
This Fugi t ive Slave Law had been carried into effect 
as an integral par t of the Gompromi t::e of 1850 and h ad been 
reluctantly accepted by the Whigs as the only alternative to 
null i f ies tion and secession. Local 11 Cot ton \!~bigs" had put 
t h e mselves on record as opposing t h is vicious law as a matter 
of principle, h ad labelled it a "disgraceful act, 11 and worked 
1 Harold Schwartz, "Fugitive Slave Days in Boston , 11 
New England Q,uarterly, XXVII (1954}, 191-212; Pearson, 
11 Preli minar i es,tt Corron . Hist., I V, 476-80 .. Al so see Boston 





constantly for its repeal. Old Amos Lawrence condemned what 
he ca lled the 11 skunk peculiarities" of the South in passing 
the law, and insisted that the legislation was unconstitu tional.2 
His son, Amos A., declared with equal vigor t hat thvfassachusetts 
never can be made a hunting ground for masters t o pursue t h eir 
r un-aways." 3 And yet, although voicing almost unanimous 
disapprova l of the moral principles, or lack of t h em, upon 
which the law was based, the 11 ·(;otton Yifhigsn ma.de every effort 
to abide by the letter of t h e l aw in practice. Robert G. 
Winthrop assured Senator Grittenden of Kentucky that although 
h e personally never regarded it as "a wise piece of legislati on," 
t h e conservative North would support the Fugitive Slave Law. 
"There is not an agitator in the whole Wbig party here--no 
one who cares to disturb anything that has been done. 114 
1William Means to Amos Lawrence, Nov. 7, 1850, 
A. L. Letters, M.H.S., X, 649, and Amos A. Lawrence to Samuel 
Eliot, Feb. 18, 1851, A. A • .L. Letterbook, IVI . H.S., I, 272. 
2 Amos Lawrence to Amos A. Lawrence, Sept. 25, 1850, 
A. A. L. Letters, VIII, 127, and Amos Lawrence to Mark 
Hopkins, Nov. 11, 1850, Lawrence, Diary, p. 287. 
3Amos A. Lawrence to Gi les Richards, June 1, 1854, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, II, 338. 
4Robert ·c;. Winthrop to John J. Crittenden, I'llay 13, 
1852, Goleman, Crittenden, II, 36. 
In vain did Ralph Waldo Emerson condenm the 11 poor-
smell11 of Beacon and Mt. Vernon Streets, and Theodore Parker 
excoriate t hose who dreamed of "orders from the S.outh. 111 
With n o result did Wendell .t'hillips publicly denounce the 
Fugitive Law as the means of determining whether 11 the mills of 
Abbott Lawrence make him worth two millions or onen; and to 
no purpose did the old Federalist, Josiah ~uincy, shake his 
head sadly and think back to the Boston of 1775. 2 It Boston 
has now become a mere shop--a place for buying and selling 
goods; and I suppose, n h e added mournfully, "also, of buying 
3 
and selling men.n 
All of this had no effect. Boston's men of wealth 
refused to be strunpeded into facing another serious breach 
with their Southern brethren like t h at wh ich had occurred 
after t h e Mexi can 'i~ ar. Although t h ey did not like the 
Fugitive Slave Law, they considered themselves h onor-bound 
under t he i;onstitut ion to obey it to the letter until it was 
l Emerson, Journals, VI II , 363, and 'I1heodore Parker 
Additional Speeches 1 Addresses and Occasional Sermons (2 vols.; Boston, 1855 , 1, 89. 
2 ~·~endell Phillips, Speech es, Le cture s and Letters 
(Bo s ton, 1892), p. 65. Speech before t h e Massachusetts Anti-
Slavery Society, Faneuil Hall, Jan. 30, 1852. 
3Garr i son, Life, I II, 328. 
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repealed. nrt is lamentable to have such a triumph given to 
Nullification and Rebellion , " wrote Robert c. Winthrop in 
reference to the Shadrach episode; while Daniel "ebster 
agreed that the Negro's res cue was, 11 s·tri ctly speaking, a case 
of treason . nl 11Revolution is a terrific remedy, 11 warned 
Professor .Packard of Bowdoin . 11 I should never resist an 
unjust Law • • • until the proper meth od of repealing it had been 
long tried in vain."2 
.. 
Young Amos A. Lawrence su:t11r00d up the 
uncomfortable V~big position by asking the crucial question: 
uShall we stand by the laws or sh all we nullify them? Shall we 
'Z 
uphold t h e Union or shall we break it up?' u As i f in answer 
to h is own question, he went off to offer his services to the 
United States Marshal in Boston, to serve uin any capacity 
' during t h e war 1 • 11 4 " I f we must knock t h ese fellows 
/Abolitionists7 on the head {and it must be done),u h e told 
Congressman Samuel Eliot, 11 we sh ould prefer to do it according 
1vVi nthrop , Memoir, p. 147. Also see Pearson, 
" Preliminaries," Gomm. Hist., IV, 480 . 
2 A. S. Packard to Amos Lawrence , Oct. 28 , 1850, 
A. L. Letters, M. H.S . , X, 641 . 
3Amos A. Lawrence to Dr. Green, Nov. 16 , 1850, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, NI.H.s,., I , 211 . 
4Amos A. Lawrence to 1~rshal ~1arles Devens, 
Feb . 17, 1851, ibid . , p~ 269 . 
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l ul to aw •••• 'Ihis was not a case, he emphasized, of loving 
the Negro less--but of loving the Union more. In replying 
to a story by Garrison that Congressman Eliot supported the 
Fugitive Slave Act because he hated the Negro, Lawrence 
defended Eliot by saying 11he loves the black race more than 
most men •••• But he loves the perpetuity of this Government 
and the Union of these States (even under the present 
system)-better."2 'Ihe "Cotton Whi gsn continued to hold the 
line, maintaining the same devotion to the Union and to the 
goal of inter-sectional harmony which had characterized their 
national attitude during the past twenty years. The Union 
was indivisible, the Gonstitution infallible, and the 
Compromis e indissoluble--this was the Greed of those who 
hoped to escape the dire consequences of nullification and 
secession. 
And then it happened. On January 4, 1854, the 
beautiful dream ended. nwe went to bed one night, old-
fashioned, conservative, compromise, Union Vfu.igs," wrote 
Amos A. Lawrence, nand waked up stark mad Aboliti~nists.tt3 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Samuel Eliot, Feb. _18, 1851, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I, 272. 
2Amos A. Lawr ence to William Lloyd Garrison, 
Feb. 16, 1851, ibid., P• 267. 
3Amos A. Lawrence to Giles Richards, June 1, 1854, 
ibid., II, 338. 
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On that day, Stephen A. Douglas, Senator from Illinois, 
reported a Bill into t h e Senate which called for the 
organization of the territorial government of Nebraska. 
Suggesting t h at the Compromise of 1850 had, for all practical 
purposes, superseded the Missouri C:ompromise of 1820 by 
gr anti ng popular sovereignty to New Mexico and Utah, the bill 
proposed t hat when Nebraska should be admi t ted to the Union, 
it should enter "with or without slavery" as fixed by its 
constitution at t h e time. 1 I t was a simple statement--but one 
which was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences, 
as it virtually brought the entire North to its feet in one 
great indignant protest. "It aroused and alarred the whole 
North /' wrote Nathan Appleton to Rives of Virginia, still 
unable to grasp what had happened. 2 
As expected, leading anti-slavery men like Salmon P. 
~"hase of Ohio, William Seward of New York, and Charles Sumner 
of Massachusetts led the attack upon the measure as further 
proof of an insiduous conspiracy to extend the Slave Empire. 3 
133rd ,~ongress, lst Session, Seriate Report # 15, p. 3. 
2Nathan Appleton, Letter to Rives, p. 10. 
3congressional Globe, 33rd ~ongress, 1st Session, 
Appendix, PP• 262 ff. 
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But among the groups in the North whiCh set themselves against 
this "Nebraska infamy" none were more outraged and resentful 
than the "·Cot ton W'.nigs. u On February 23, 1854 1 they held a 
great protest meeting at Faneuil Hall, attended by some three 
thousand of the "solid" men of the city, and headed by Abbott 
Lawrence, Robert~. ~inthrop and Samuel Eliot. 1 These men of 
standing and property believed that they had shown their 
good faith by having upheld and protected the inst i tution of 
slavery where it was sanctioned by the Constitution; and 
expected that the South, in return, had guaranteed that the 
territories would remain free. ~ully convinced that the 
Compromise of 1850 had unequivocally decided the future of 
the West and had ended the matter once and for all, Boston 
merchants and businessmen now felt cheated and ridiculed by 
what they considered to be the machinations of a cheap dema-
gogue.2 "If I could have prescribed a recipe for reinflating 
Free-soilism and Abolitionism, which had collapsed all over 
the country," Winthrop wrote in utter frustration, "I should 
have singled out this precise potion from the whole materia 
l Boston Daily Advertiser, Feb. 23 1 1854; Boston 
Times, Feb. 23, May 30, 1854. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to George S. Park, Jan. 23, 
1857 1 A. A. L. Letterbook 1 M. H.S., IV, 1. 
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medica of political quackery. 111 Business interests, which 
had always deplored public anti-slavery agitation, now began 
to add their mighty influence to the ground-swell of public 
opinion. Angrily, Amos A. Lawrence condemned the political 
stupidity which had caused the great social gap to be 
breached. 11 mere is the spirit that led us to volunteer to 
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shoot the abolitionists. tind free-sailers and support the Law ••• ? 11 
he wailed, referring to t he past h istory of the "Cotton ~bigs." 
"It 1 a pretty much gone already: this will 1 crush it all out'. tt2 
As he felt himself being borne along with the tide, Lawrence 
was apprehensive as to the future of the Union. After all, if 
the large merchants and the "retired gentlemen who go into 
State St. for an hour or two every day" were being conver•ted 
to the anti-slavery cause, then who else was left? 11 'lhese 
constitute pretty much all the 1 slave power' in this 
community," he confided to a friend, 11 and if they g ive up the 
Compromises and say that they have been cheated, we all know 
that sympathy for the South and their 'Institution' must be 
gone."3 
1winthrop, Memoir, P• 165-6, Feb. 24, 1854. 
2Amos A.. Lawrence to Hon. Samuel H. Walley, i.vlay 12, 
1854, A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., II, 325. Also see Lawrence 
to William Appleton, March 11, 1854, ibid., p. 272, and Lawrence 
to Hon. J. w. Edmonds, March 16, 1854, ibid., p. 273. 
3Amos A. Lawrence . to ~~. Andrews, May 26, 1854, 
ibid., p. 335. Also see Edward Everett, Diary, Mas, M.H.S. 
May 27, 1854. 
There was only one thing to do--and that was to 
defeat Douglas and destroy his nefarious Bill. To this end 
the "Cotton vvhlgs" directed their attention and their energies, 
assuring their close friends below the l~1ason-Dixon line that 
the "Nebraska business" would be a failure, and p leading with 
their Southern colleagues to "pause before they proceed 
farther to disturb the peace which we hoped the Compromise 
measure of 1850 would have made perpetual."1 Cons t antly they 
urged their political representatives to 11pour in the vollies 
of red hot shot" upon the Nebraska Bill and make sure that 
'~'Douglas' day is over. 112 Nowhere, perhaps, is the startling 
metamorphosis of the Boston business man so well demonstrated 
t h an in connection with the seizure of the Negro, Anthony 
Burns, on May 26, 1854. So great was the opposition of the 
people of Bo s ton , that the authorities considered it necessary 
to escort Burns to the wharf under the protection of a special 
"marshal's guard,u the entire city police force, twenty-two 
companies of the :Massachusetts militia and over a thousand 
Federal troops complete with muskets, artillery and cavalry. 
Amos A. Lawrence exploded with rage and told the Mayor that 
he would prefer to see the court house burned to the ground 
1Amos A. Lawrence to R. A. Crafts, New Orleans, 
March 7, 1854, A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.s., I~ , 270. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to S . H. Walley, Representative 
from Massachusetts, May 12, 1854 1 ibid., P• 325, and Lawrence 
to Hon. J. w. Edmonds, March 16, 1854, ibid., P• 273. 
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than have Burns returned to slavery. Vfuen he was finally 
forced to witness the victim's march to the dock, he was 
convinced that only the preliminary preparations and ·the 
immense display of military power "prevented the total 
. l 
destruction of the u. S. i\1:arshal and his hired assistants." 
These were the words of a man who only two years before had 
offered his own services to the u. S. Marshal as a means of 
enforcing the same law 1 nThe commercial class have taken 
a new position upon the great question of the day," reported 
t h e Boston Times; and it rejoiced that now "there is a North 
at last. 112 
The consummate political skill of Senator Douglas, 
however, proved more than a match for the irate protestations 
of his Whig opponents in the North. Borne along by the 
furious energies of young Douglas, supported by administrative 
approval from the Vfuite House and sustained by jubilant 
Southerners--Vfuigs and Democrats a like--the Nebraska bill 
swept aside the Northern Wbig opposition, and was signed into 
law by President Pierce on li/Iay 30, 1854. Providing for the 
new territory to be divided into t wo separa.te units, the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act called for t h e outright repeal of the 
Mi ssouri Compromise and provided a clear-cut defense of the 
1 
Amos A. Lawrence to Samuel 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.S., II, 340. 
Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 75-6. 
2Boston Times, May 30, 1854. 
Lawrence, June~~~ 1854, 
Also see Lawrence, 
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doctrine of popular sovereignty. 1 
¥' i th the passage of the Douglas bill, the mole 
question concerning the extension of slavery was broken open 
once again, leaving t he moderates and conservative s of the North 
aghast. In a panic of bewilderment they desperately tried to 
t h ink of a way to heal this latest breach of national unity 
in a manner which would be consistent with their policy of 
non-extension of slavery. This was precisely t h e dilemma 
in which the Cotton migs now found themselves: As realistic 
men of business and capital, the Yankee manufacturers felt 
obligated to retain the faith and good will of a Southern 
plantation economy whose production of cotton created personal 
fortunes already being reckoned in millions of dollars.2 
As men of political principle, the New England Vfu i gs felt 
constra ined to preserve t h e Union which 'larsh all had defined, 
' ·ebster h ad defended and which the iiWhig party had labored so 
hard and so long to maintain. But as men of honor and 
in t egrity , the keepers of the Puritan conscience felt them-
selves consumed by righteous wrath a t what they cons idered to 
be the selfish designs of unscrupulous politicians who had 
1congressional Globe 1 33rd ~ongress, 1st Session, 
Appendix, pp. 150 ff. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to lfb ses Grinnell, June 21, 1854, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, i.vl . H.S., I, 353. 
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gambled with the stakes of national unity for the sake of 
railroad ties and caucus votes. 'Ihe "cotton Whigs" had pledged 
their word that they would never interfere with the South or 
any of her institutions where the ~onstitution provided 
sanctions; but they had also gone on record as opposing the 
extension of that 11peculiar institution" beyond those pre-
scribed Gonstitutional limits. So, by God, Douglas or no 
Douglas, Bill or no Bill, the New Englanders determined that 
if population was to be the determining factor in deciding the 
fate of Kansas--then there would be a flood of "free citizens 11 
to the new territories the like of wh ich had not been seen 
since the waters of the flood overflowed the earth. 
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh 
forth. .And who can bear the violence of one provoked1 n states 
the Book of Proverbs. dith all the fervor of an evangelistic 
crusade, the New England conscience went into action, with the 
battle cry of William Seward ringing out: "God give the 
victory to the side that is stronger in numbers, as it is in 
1 
rightl" 
The earliest response to the Kansas challenge 
centered about the Iviassachusetts Emigrant Aid Company which 
had been created early in the spring of 1854 by Eli Thayer 
of Worcester, a member of the Massachusetts Legislature. 
1Wilson, Slave Power, II, 464. 
Preparing a charter, ~hayer obtained an act of incorporation 
in February, 1854, and after the legislature adjourned began 
stumping New England to sell stock in his enterprise, 
pointi~g out the dual opportunity of aiding the cause of free 
men, and at t he same time making a sound profit. 1 ~hayer 
proposed to pre-empt blocks of land with Company funds, 
sponsor whole villages of settlers to develop the fertile 
soil of Kansas, and then divide up the profits between the 
homesteaders and t h e investors. 2 Assisted by the monetary 
contributions of such prominent men as Amos A. Lawrence and 
J. lVl . S. V illiams of Massachusetts, and of John Carter Brown 
of Rhode Island, the association was successfully organized, 
and by the end of July, 1854, a company of twenty-four free-
soil settlers had already arrived at Kansas City, Missouri. 3 
1 Eli Thayer, The Kansas Crusade (New York, 1889), 
pp. 25-30; Robert E. Moody, 11 The F-lrst Year of the Emigr-ant 
Aid Company," New England Quarterly, IV (1931), 148-9; 
Samuel A. Johnson, 11 The Genesis of the New England Emigrant 
Aid Company," New England Quarterly, III (1930), 90-100. 
2
organization, Objects and Plan of~erations of the 
Emigrant Aid ~ompany: Also a Description ofsas for the 
Information of Emi~rants (Boston, 1854). Copy in Eli Thayer 
Manuscripts, I, 5 John Hay Library, Brown University) (here-
after cited as 11 Brown Uni v."). 
3Amos A. Lawrence to Moses Grinnell, June 21, 1854, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., II, 352. Also see Lawrence to 
Rev. Edward Cook, Appleton, Wisconsin, June 20, 1854, ibid., 
P• 350. 
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Loading their tents, equipment and baggage--including a 
printing press--onto wagons, the e1nigrants set off along the 
historic Santa ..F'e trail for about fifty miles, unti l they 
came to an elevation of land, just south of the Kaw River, 
from which they could look out for miles in all directions. 
Here they pitched camp and decided to settle permanently on 
what they called 11 Iount Ore ad, 11 at'ter Eli 'I'h ayer r s we 11-known 
"castle" in Worcester. After setting up a collect i on of tents, 
t h atch ed huts and crude log cabins in the weeks that followed, 
the settlers named their new city uLawrence" in honor of the 
New Eng lander who h ad invested so much of his personal i n coiDE? 
in their dreams of t h e future. 1 During the remainder of the 
s urmner of 1854, t h e Emigrant Aid Company sent out five more 
groups under the direction of Doctor Gharles Robinson, an 
experienced colonist, a practicing physician and an ardent 
free-soiler, who h ad been selected as the ~ompany's agent in 
Kansas. All in all, a total of some six hundred h ad settled 
either in Lawrence, or in such nearby settlement s as 
Os awatomie, 1'/ianh attan, and Topeka by the time the f reezing 
winter closed in. 2 
1Eli 'I'hayer, Kansas Crusade, PP• 69-73 ; Charles 
Robinson, The Kansas Conflict (New York, 1889), pp. 90-1. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to Rev. Edward Cook, June 20, 1854, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, :iVI . H. S ., I I, 350; Lawrence t o Charles 
Robinson, Aug. 9, 1854 , ibid., p. 398. Ibid., p. 399 contains 
a letter of recognition for Robinson as the " P....gent of the 
Emigrant Aid Society, 11 signed by Lawrence as Treasurer. 
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Back in Boston, however, things were not going 
quite as smoothly. Hardly a month had passed before Thayer's 
Emigrant Aid Company began to be labelled as a crass, money-
making scheme, and the motives of its membership . were 
ascribed to selfish greed masquerading behind the glittering 
1 fayade of humanitarianism. Amos A. Lawrence, already 
disturbed by the various ugly rumors which he himself had 
heard, and hard pressed by many of the influential investors 
who had suddenly become fearful of the amount of liability 
which they had incurred in Thayer's project, demanded that 
the Company be reformed. 2 Although Thayer objected 
strenuously, Lawrence would brook no opposition, threatening 
to withdraw his name and his money if a change was not forth-
3 
coming. Thayer yielded, and the organization was renamed 
the 11 New England Emigrant Aid Company," with Thayer's plans 
for paying dividends discontinued and with contribu tions now 
exclusively for "charitable" purposes. 4 11he new company was 
1 Thayer, Kansas Crusade, PP• 58-9. 
2 
Patrick T. Jackson to Amos A. Lawrence, June 10, 
1854, A. A. L. Letters, M.H .s., XI, 149. Also see Lawrence to 
Eli Thayer, July 5, 1854, A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., II, 365. 
3Lawrence to Thayer, July 6, 15, 1854, ibid., PP• 
367, 373. 
4 Thayer to Lawrence, July 15, 1854, A. A. L. Letters, 
M.H.S., XI, 176. 
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established as a purely local organization, separate and 
distinct from similar emigrant societies in other states; 
and wary investors were assured of limited liability under 
the careful hand and expert direction of I~. Lawrence who was 
now one of the three Trustees. Henceforth, "aid 11 would 
consist of free information and a fifteen per cent reduction 
in railroad and steamship fares through quantity purchase. 
No political questions were to be asked of emigrants, since 
the avowed purpose of the organization was ,to get people to 
Kansas, and there let them make their own free choice--to 
oppose the establishment of slavery "by all legal and 
constitutional means~~ 
Lawrence was extremely careful to make it clear 
that the reorganized nompany was not a speculative venture. 
When two of the Trustees proposed to buy real estate in 
Kansas, to the amount of twenty-eight million dollars, 
Lawrence vetoed the idea. Such a purchase, he wrote in a 
memorandum, 11 is for the purpose of speculating, to make a 
profit; and it is not necessary in order to accomplish the 
objects for which the Society was formed." 2 Writing to 
1Revised Constitution and By-Laws of the Emigrant 
Aid Company, A.A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., LI, 377, 378. Also 
see Edward Everett Hale to Charles Hale, August 10, 1854, 
Edward E. Hale, Jr., ed., The Life and Letters of Edward 
Everett Hale (Boston, 1917), p. 25'7. 
2Memorandum to Messrs. Williams and Thayer, Aug. 26, 
1854, A.A.L. Letterbook, M.H.S., II, 401. 
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'I'homas Hart Benton of Missouri, Lawrence denied that the 
funds of the ~ompany were used for any other purpose but to 
provide for the basic needs of the emigrants; and insisted 
that the Company stock was worthless and meaningless. l<urther-
more, continued Lawrence, the emigrants were not Abolitionists--
11so far as we know not one known to be of that stamp has gone 
in our parties. 1hey are free to vote and do as they please. 
The Society has no agreement with the~, nor pledge, nor are 
they asked any questions. 0 The Endgrant Aid Society was 
created solely for the purpose of promoting freedom--not 
1 
money. 
With the . Company reorganized, Lawrence not only 
received the additional backing of such men as his prominent 
uncle, Abbott Lawrence, and of William Appleton and Joseph 
Lyman, but was contacted by such leading New York business-
men as Ivloses Grinnell who sought to join forces with the New 
England group. 2 .C:ollecting money, writing letters, 
encouraging friends and denouncing foes, Lawrence de monstrated 
the enthusiasm which motivated many Northern ' whi gs to work so 
zealously for a free-soil Kansas. He had letters sent to 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Thomas Hart Benton, Jan. 2, 
1844, A. A. L. Letterbook, lvi .H.S., III, 1. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Eli Thayer, July 31, 1854; 
Lawrence to Hon. John Goodrich, Aug. 2, 1854, ibid ., II, 
388, 392. 
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every minister in New England, explaining the nature and 
purpose of the Emigrant Aid Society and solici t ing their 
support. 11 We beg you," he urged, "to consult with your 
most influential and patriotic parishioners and townsmen, and 
with them take such measures as shall carry forward this 
1 
undertaking to a successful issue.n So convinced was he of 
the righteousness of his cause that Lawrence told Governor 
Gardner that if he were a member of the Massachusetts legisla-
ture he would go so far as to vote 11 in favor of placing at 
the disposal of the Governor and .c;ouncil a liberal sum to be 
used in case an attempt is made to drive our people from the 
Terri tory /Of Kansaa7 by force. " 2 Assuming that there was 
no question as to the legitimate status of the free-soil 
inhabitants of Kansas, Lawrence formally requested the 
President of the United States to recognize the free settlers 
as the legally constituted Government of Kansas.3 
The New Englanders, however, reckoned wi thout the 
hostile attitude of the pro-slavery settlers just across the 
border in Missouri. Angered at what they considered to be an 
unwarranted interference by outsiders in the normal course 
1
r.etter to be sent to every Minister in New England, 
September, 1854 1 A.A.L. Letterbook, M.H.S., II, 415. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Governor Gardner, March 7, 
1856, ibid., IV, 26. 
3Amos A. Lawrence to President Franklin Pierce, 
April 17, 1855, ibid., III, 89. 
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of events, ivlissouri bordermen--bull-whackers, buffalo hunters 
and Indian fighters--prepared to take whatever steps we-re 
necessary to prevent free-soil Yankee imports from creating 
an artificial free state. 1 n1e first opportunity for such 
action came in the fall of 1854 when the Governor , Andrew 
Reeder, called for elections for territorial delegates. Into 
Kansas swarmed a roaring horde of iVIis souri 11ruffians 11 to stuff 
the ballot boxes in favor of slavery. uvhen Ree der called for 
t h e election of a territorial legislature the following v1arch, 
the Missourians once again carried the day for pro-slavery 
candidates. 2 
Outraged at what he considered to be an unfair and 
illegal interference with a perfectly constitutional procedure 
Amos A. Lawrence wrote directly to Franklin Pierce. Informing 
him of the activities of these. Missouri agitators, Lawrence 
warned the President that if the United States Government 
did not take immediate steps to protect the free settlers, they 
would have to take matters into their own hands . 3 Against 
the current accusations that the free soil emigrants were 
l National I ntelligencer, June 22, 1854. 
2 Jay Monaghan, .Civil War on the Western Border, 
1854-1865 (Boston, 1955), pp. 13-15. 
3Amos A. Lawrence to President Franklin Pierce, 
July 15, 1855, Lawrence , Amos A. Lawrence, p . 95. 
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traitors because they refused to recognize the new territorial 
government of Kansas, Lawrence condemned the government as 
fraudulent, and flatly denied that the emigrants would ever 
resist or even question the laws of the United Stat es--when 
executed by 11 the proper officers." But, he concluded, the 
free-soil settlers would never recognize the present pro-
1 
slavery legislature, 11 nor its enactments, nor its officers." 
Lawrence also took time out to write to Senator Atchison, and 
demanded that the gentleman from .iVIissouri see that the contest 
be conducted according to the rules of fair play. The Kansas-
Nebraska Act had decreed that the future of Kansas was to be 
dependent on the factor of population, and it was to be a wide 
open race--so let the best man winl These New England 
settlers, Lawrence pointed out, were not abolitionists, but 
continued interference on the part of the pro-slavery elements, 
he warned, 11may make them abolitionists of the most dangerous 
kind."2 
Even as he wrote, threatened and argued, Lawrence 
came to the apparent conclusion that stronger measures would 
have to be taken in order to provide adequate protection for 
1Amos A. Lawrence to President Fr anklin Pierce, 
Dec • . 10, 1855, Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, P• 104. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Senator David Atchison, 
March 31, 1855, A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.S., I I I, 78. 
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the emigrants. Charles Robinson, the free-soil leader in 
Kansas had been pleading for guns since the spring elections. 
11 Gannot your secret society send us 200 Sharps rifles as a loan 
till this question is settled?" he begged Eli 'Ihayer on May 2, 
1855; and a few days later, sent a letter off to Edward Everett 
Hale urging that two hundred rifles and two field pieces be 
sent to Kansas.l Not content with waiting, Robinson sent 
George vvashington Deitzler to New England to obtain as many 
weapons as possible for the free-soil cause. A month later 
Robinson was in possession of a letter signed by Thomas H. Webb, 
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Secretary of the Emigrant Aid Society, acknowledging the arrival 
of Deitzler, and assuring Robinson that one hundred . "machinesn 
were on their way. 2 The first shipment of "machinery" arrived at 
Lawrence, Kansas in the middle of May, and when the emigrants tore 
open the crates variously stamped 11hardware, 11 "machinery" or 
"books!' they found themselves in possession of s. hundred of 
the latest and most advanced type of breeCh-loading weapon--
the Sharps rifle. 3 ~H th increased fire-power and accuracy, 
1eharles Robinson to Eli Thayer, April 2, 1855, and 
Robinson to Edward Everett Hale, April 9, 1855, W. H. Isley, 
11 The Sharps Rifle Episode in Kansas History," American 
Historical Review, XII (1907), 511,552. 
2Thomas H. 'Webb to Charles Robinson, May 8, 1855, 
ibid., PP• 552-3. 
3
winston 0. Smith, The Sharps Rifle: It~_ History, 
Development and Operation {New York, 1943), PP• 11-12; 
Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, PP• 97-8. 
the free-soil settlers of Lawrence were, for the first time, 
in a position to offset the numerica£ superiority of the 
hostile ~assourians across the border, most of whom were still 
armed with antiquated muzzle loaders and buffalo guns. 
Up until recently Amos A. Lawrence had refused to 
consider the idea of sending weapons to the emigrants, but 
after the fraudulent elections and the attacks of the "border 
ruffians" he changed his mind. vwriting to Robinson, Lawrence 
told h im of his decision. "You must have arms, or your 
courage will not avail, 11 he admitted. " We must stir ourselves 
here tomorrow and see what can be done. " 1 But Lawrence did 
not wait for the next day to "stiru himself, for on the same 
day he sent out a letter to the secretary of the Emigra nt 
Aid .Company, ordering : "Write to Hartford and get their terms 
for one h undred more of the ~harps rifles at once. 11 2 As far 
as the manufacturer was concerned, the course was clear--
uwhen farmers turn soldiers, they must have arms. 113 '1B"p to 
this time," he wrote to President Pierce accusingly, nthe 
government h as kept so far aloof as to f orce the settlers to 
1 Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, July 20, 
1855, A.A.L. Letterbook, M. H. S ., III, 203. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to Dr. Webb, July 20, 1855, 
ibid.' 204. 
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the conclusion that if they would be s~e, they must defend 
themselves; and therefore many persons here who refused at 
first (myself included), have rendered them assistance by 
1 furnishing them means of defense." 
Undoubtedly encouraged by the extraordinary 
encouragement and assistance they were receiving from their 
patrons in the East, the free settlers of Kansas took things 
into their own hands, and followed the precedent recently set 
by Galifornia, of establishing a state government in advance 
of ·Gongressional permission. They elected delegates to a 
constitutional convention at Topeka, Oct. 23, 1855 and proceeded 
to draw up a free-state constitution. Submitted to a totally 
free-soil electorate, the constitution was adopted, Charles 
Robinson was named "Governor," and a free-soil Legislature 
was elected. Congress was formally requested to admit Kansas 
as a free state. 2 
The question was now throvm back into the 
collective lap of official Washington. Which was the lawful 
government of Kansas? Which votes were legitimate and whiCh 
were fraudu lent? Who wou l d make the final decision? 
1 Amos A. Lawrence to President Pierce, July 15, 
1855, Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, P• 95. 
~~onaghan, Western Border, pp. 32-5. 
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President Pierce personally denounced the action of the free-
soil settlers as treason, and declared that the Government of 
the United States would support the pro-slavery territorial 
1 
government as the only lawful government of Kansas. Senator 
Douglas of Illinois denounced the action of Pierce and argued 
t hat it was not a question for .Congress to decide--the question 
would have to be settled in the territories t h emselves; and 
was supported by Crittenden of Kentucky. 2 Congress itself 
could not arrive at any decision, and in I~Iarch, 1856, sought 
to clarify matters by appointing a three-man committee to 
investigate conditions in Kansas. In midsuilllll3r this committee 
only further confused the issue with a majority and minority 
report which served to bring tempers to white-hot heat. 3 
As the debate on the Kansas issue reached its climax in the 
Senate in "Niay, 1856, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts rose to 
give his famous speech on the ncrime against Kansas." 
Infuriated, a Representative from South Carolina, Preston 
Brooks, lashed the Yankee unmercifully with his cane and left 
lRichardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 2860-2883, 
esp. 2877. 
164 
2 Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st Session, p. 639. 
S.ee J. J. Crittenden to Archibald Dixon; March 7, 1854, and 
Abbott Lawrence to Crittenden, April 25, 1856, Coleman, Drittenden, 
II, 102-3, 119. 
3Monaghan, Western Border, pp. 48-52; 1tl.lton, Eve of 
Conflict, pp. 218-24; Nevins, Ordeal of Union, II, 419-24. 
1 h im lying on the floor of the Senate, unconscious and bleeding. 
Possibly no more striking example of the powerful 
psychological reaction which the attack upon Sumner produced 
in the North was the fact that Amos A. Lawrence, one of 
Sumner's greatest political foes, and the man who had spared 
no effort in his attempt to defeat him in 1850-51, now invited 
Sumner to rest at his ~ottage Farm home on his way back to 
Boston. "You may prefer to be with some one of those who agree 
with you in regard to party politics," wrote Lawrence to the 
injured Senator; 11but I assure you that no one will give you 
. 2 
a more cordial welcome." Sumner accepted the i nvi tation, and 
on h is t riumphal return to Boston, spent the weekend at the 
- h 3 
.Lawrence ome. So far, in fact, had Lawrence's a t titude 
toward Sumner changed, that in 1859 he suggested that it was 
11h igh time" that Sumner be given an h onorary L. L.D. from 
4 Harvard1 
1 Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, lst Session, 
Appendix, pp. 529-44; Sumner, Works, fv, 137-249. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Sumner, Oct. 10, 1856, 
Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, p. 141. 
3 Amos A. Lawrence to Mr s. Gharles Robinson, Oct. 30, 
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1856, Robinson Papers, Folder IV, 4 (Archives, University of 
Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas) (hereafter cited as 11Uni v. of Kansas 11 ) • 
Also see William Lawrence, Iviemori es, p. 7. 
4 Lawrence to Judge Hoar, May 10, 1859, A. A. L. 
Letterbook, lvi. H.S., IV, 329. 
Violence begot violence, for while blood began to 
flow in the Nation's capital, the situation among the 
factions in Kansas h ad degenerated from opposition of 
legislatures and constitutions to the cra:ck of rifle fire and 
t h e thud of bowie-knives. Even as Sumner was sent crashing 
to the floor of the Senate, a pro-slavery 11 posse 11 of about a 
thousand men came riding into the " Boston abolition town" of 
Lawrence, Kansas, arrested 11 treasonous 11 free-state leaders, 
1 
and sacked the town. 'Ihree days later, a "Ranger" named 
John Brown, who had been hired to protect the free settlers, 
struck at Pottawatomne Creek, murdering five pro-slavery 
settlers to avenge the five free men already killed. 
'Ihe lid was off, and the "little civil war" was on in Kansas. 2 
Back in Boston, supporters of the freedom struggle 
sh ipped out more rifles, wrote more checks, call ed for more 
action--and gave only one warning : avoid trouble with the 
Federal authoritiesl Kick 11.Galhoun and his adherents ou t of 
the terri tory," 11 put an end to their operations at once," 
don't let your 11 boys" permit a "handful of scoundrelsu to 
embarrass the Government and breed ill will throughout the 
1 Monaghan, Western Border, pp. 52-6; Nichols, 
Bleeding Kansas, PP• 105-109. 
2 New York Tribune, May 31, June 9, June 10, 1856. 
Also see Charles Robinson, 'lhe Kansas :Gonflict, pp. 265-6, and 
James c. Malin, John Brown and the Legend of Fi f ty-Six 
(Philadelphia, 1942), P• 589. 
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d ' if - 1 Country, urge kr. Lawrence. But--and this was a large 
"but"--th is violence must be employed by "volunteersn who 
have no connection with the free-state Government--and never, 
under any circumstances, must it be directed against t h e 
2 Federal authorities. Lawrence repeated this again and again 
in his personal correspondence with 11 _Governorn Robinson. 
" e would be pleased to hear of their expulsion in any 
informal [Sii/ way, n· he wrote the free-st at e leader. "But it 
is very important that they should be the action of independent 
corps of men and not of the free state Government or any of 
3 
its members." Lawrence was prepared to sanction any ac ti vi ty 
as long as it did not impugn 11 the direct authority of the 
Federal Government." 4 
In this respect, the only danger thet Lawrence 
could see was the unpredictable and irresponsible actions of 
John Brown, and he cautioned Robinson to keep a close watcll 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, De c. 17, 
1857, and Jan. 29, 1858, Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, 
Folder I I I, 12, 14. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to ~arles Robinson, Aug . 16, 
1857, Jan. 2, 1858, ibid., PP• 9, 13. 
3Lawrence to Robinson, Jan. 29, 1858, ibid., P• 14. 
4Lawrence to Robinson, Dec. 17, 1857, and Feb. 3, 
1858 , ibi d ., pp. 12 , 15. Also see Lawrence, Journal, M.H. S ., 
Nov. 5, 1856. 
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on the "ranger." 11 0ld Brown will be your humble servant and 
an efficient one,n he wrote, 11 but he requires s ome coaxing, as 
well as some controlling power near h im."1 See to it t h at 
Brown reports to you regularly, the New Englander urged. 
11 It is bad policy to h ave a ranger like him with money and arms 
at his disposal, and only accountable to people here."2 
Even in the midst of riot and bloodsh ed, Amos A. 
Lawrence clung steadfastly to the strict constitutionality of 
his position--as he saw it. A man was free to act on slavery 
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in the territories, as long as he did not transgress t he 
authority of the National Government, or infringe upon the rights 
of Southern states where they were protected by the ~on s titu­
tion. I t was the only way to obey the letter of the ~ompromise 
of 1850 and still prevent the territorial expansion of 
slavery. This was a supreme effort to make freedo m in Kansas 
consistent with the national unity of the States.3 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, March 31, 
1857, Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, III, 3. 
2Am A _ OS • Lawrence to Charles Robinson, Aug. 16, 
1857, ibid.' p. 9. 
3 James G. Malin, On the Nature of History (Lawrence, 
Kansas, 1954) p. 201. Lawrence 11 understood the issue of 
Federal Nationalism and advised the free-state men repeatedly 
against any cour se in Kansas that would comr.romise their 
position of loyalty to Pederal Nationalism.' 
It was against this background of tense violen ce 
t h at the national elections of 1856 were conducted, which 
were won by the Democratic candidate, James Buchanan. 
Anxious to quiet the fearful Kansas uproar as soon as possible, 
the new Presi dent appointed Robert J. Walker of Mississippi to 
the post of Governor, and promised administrative support of 
1 
an impartial settlement. Walker called for a constitutional 
convention and urged settlers of both local parties to co-
operate in electing delegates. The free-state men, however, 
suspicious of the Administration's motives, refused to parti-
cipate in the convention; and as a result, in the fall of 
1856, the pro-slavery delegates at Lecompton were able to 
draft a constitution which guaranteed the protection of slave 
2 property in Kansas. I t was then decided that t h e entire 
constitution would not be submitted to the people. I nstead, 
t he Kansans would be given the opportunity to vote either for 
"the constitution with slaveryn or for 11 the constitution with 
no slavery." Bven if t h e free-state party voted for "no 
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slavery, n the resultant constitu tion would provide for the 
protection of all the slaves which were already in the Territory.3 
~ichardson, Messages and Pape~, VII, 2961-2967. 
First Inaugural, ~ arch 4, 1856. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Rob i nson, May 16, 1857, 
Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, Folder III , 7. 
3 House Reports, 35th Gongress, lst Session, Vol. I II, 
heport 377. 
Amos A. Lawrence was loud in his protests against 
this latest action. "'l'he wh ole country has become tired and 
disgusted with the perpetuati on of frauds," h e complained, and 
denounced t h e fact t h at the "principles of Constitutiona l 
libertyn had been "crushed down by those who have destroyed 
the elective franchise in Kansas • 11 "I'he time for keeping the 
settlers out of their Constitutional rights is past. Any 
attempt at coercion will result in disastrous defeat to the 
Government, and will bring on a crisis such as we never have 
"1 
seen1 '~11 reasonable measures for ridding the Territory of 
t h e renegades who have disgraced it will be sanctioned by the 
people of t h e country," he wrote to Robinson angri l y. 2 
Governor Walker h imself was outraged at t h is 
flagrant political trickery and announced that he would h ave no 
part in such a stratagem. 11 1 consider such a submission of the 
question a vile fraud, a base counterfeit and a wretched 
device to prevent the people from voting," he declared--and 
was promptly removed from his offi ce by President buch ana.n. 3 
1Amos A. Lawrence to John w. Geary, March 19, 1857, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.S., IV, 32-3; Lawrence to Charles 
Robinson, January 29, 1858, Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kan sas, 
III, 14. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, Jan. 2, 1858, 
ibid., 13. 
3House Reports, 35th Congress, 1st Session, vol. V, 
Report 110, Testimony of Walker. 
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The pro-slavery plan went according to schedule: In the voting 
of December 21, 1857, the pro-slavery voters pushed through 
their 11 wi th slavery" clause with little difficulty as the 
indignant free-soilers refused to participate in what t h ey 
regarded as a fraud. 'l'he victory was short-lived, h owever, for 
two weeks later the newly-elected f ree-state Legislature re-
submitted the entire Lecom~pton Constitution to t he people of 
the Territory, and it was rejected by a free-state vote of 
well over ten thousand ballots. Popular sovereignty had 
spoken1 1 
But President J3uchanan would not have i t1 Announcing 
his unqualified support of the Lecompton Constitution, t h e 
Ch ief Executive urged Congress to accept the pro -slavery docu-
ment .2 Ag ain in February, Buchanan personally relayed a copy 
of the .Lecompton Constitution itself to the .(;ongress and 
requested that Kansas be immediately admitted to t h e Union as 
3 
"an independent State." 
1Amos A. Lawrence to \;harles Robinson, Feb. 3, 
1858, Robinson Papers , Univ. of Kansas , Folder III, 15. 
Also see lVionaghan , Western Border, PP• 99-100. 
2H.ichardson, Messages and Papers , VII , 2983 . 
First Annual 1viessage, Dec . 8, 1857. 
3Ibid., p. 3002. Message to the Senate and 
House of Representatives_, l"eb. 2, 1858. 
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Hardly had the President made his position clear, 
wh en Senator Stephen A. Douglas arose to attack the administra-
tion policy and condemn the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution 
as a violation of popular sovereignty. Aga in supporte d by 
Senator Crittenden who condemned the Constitution as 11 a gross 
violation of principle and good f aith, n Douglas demanded an 
honest vote on the entire cons ti tu tion •1 :B,rom Boston, Amos A. 
Lawr e nce sent a letter to Crittenden, congratula ting h im upon 
h is f orthright stand. " .Permit me to express my gr a titude for 
the important part which you have t~~en in oppo sition to the 
Lecompton scheme," he wrote. "I n doing so, I am impelled by 
t h e natura l de s ire which every Northern man has, to prevent the 
extens i on of s l avery over 'I'err i tory which we have always 
considered devoted to free labor. " 2 
Although Buchanan was able to secure the support of 
the Senate, Dougla s brought about the defeat of t he Kansas 
Admi ssion Bill in the House; and t he issue was dead locked. 3 
A House-Senate compromise, known as t h e English Bill, was 
1 John J. Crittenden to Abraham Lincoln, Ju l y 29, 
1858, Coleman, Crittenden, II, 162-4; Milton, I!:ve of Conflict, 
pp. 271-293. 
2 
Amos A. Lawrence to John J • .Gri ttenden, May 4, 1858, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I V. 179. 
3 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, lst Session, 
Appendix , pp. 194 ff. 
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adopted ivLay 4, 1858 , as a means of fulfi lling the te c.."l-J. ni cal 
requirements of popular sovereignty while at the same time 
assuring passage of the Lecompton Constitution . 1 The people 
of Kansas were to vote for a t h ird time on the constitution. 
I f a ma jority accepted it, the State would be admi tted to the 
Union immediately. I f the constitution were voted down, t h en 
Kansas would h ave to wait until her population was l arge 
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enough to justify admission--the obvious expe ctation being t h at 
the voters of Kansas would be so anxious for Union status t h at 
t h ey would swallow the otherwise unpalatable featur e s of t h e 
pro-slavery docu:ment. 2 In this respect, h owever, t he administra-
tion plans were t hwarted, as t he Kansans overwhelmingl y rejected 
t h e cornpromise in Au gu st, 1858 and voted to remain a territory.3 
... lthough slavery con tinued to remain legal in :t~nsas for the 
time being , the free-soilers kept control of the Legislature; 
and it was apparent to all that slavery would be abolish ed as 
soon as Kansas ach ieved statehood on its own terms. 
For all practical purposes, the battle for Kansas 
h ad been won , and t h e "Cotton Vw'h i gsn back in New Eng land 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, May 6, 1858, 
obinson Papers, Univ . of Kansas , Folder III, 18 . 
2s ee Frank H • .dodder, "The English Bill , 11 Annual 
Report of the Ameri can Historical Association, 1906, I , 201. 
3 A:mos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, May 3, May 4 
1858, Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, Folder III, 17, 19. 
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congratulated themselves upon the fact that by their prompt 
action they had ach ieved a complete moral and political victory 
in the territories, without either impugning the authority of 
the l?ederal Government or infringing upon the constitutional 
ri gh ts of the Southern States. 1 
The various leading participants in the struggle to 
make Kansas free were certain that they had preserved the 
Union, and were convinced that it was the Emigrant ·Aid Company 
which had turned the tide. Eli Thayer took pride in recalling 
a meeting with Congressman Henry J. Blow of St. Louis in 1862, 
when the Nlissourian introduced himself and enthusiastically 
hailed the consequences of the Kansas victory. "Your success 
in making Kansas a free state had kept l'.iissouri in the Union, n 
said Blow, pumping the New Englander 1 a hand warmly. 11 If she 
had seceded, Kentucky and Tennessee would have gone also •••• 
Your Kansas work has made it possible to save the Union£ 11 2 
"Governor" Gharles Robinson, in reviewing the success of the 
free-state movement, said that 11 the people of Kansas almost 
made the Republican party. They have furnished most of the 
l Boston Daily Advertiser, Feb. 4, 1858. Also see 
Joh n C . Underwood to Eli 'l'hayer, February, 1857, 'lhayer 
Manuscripts, Brown Univ, I, 27. 
2 Ibid. , p. 57. 
1 k i i nl materia to mae it what t now s •••• Robinson was 
especially expansive in his praise of the role of Amos A. 
Lawrence. "Without your name," he told the Yankee financier, 
" the Emigrant Aid Gompany would have been a cipher, and without 
your encouragement, courage and support, what little I have 
been able to do would have been left undone. " 2 Lawrence, too, 
felt confident that the crisis of the Union was over, and that 
the work for wh ich the newly created Republican Party had 
been formed had already 11 been effectually accomplish ed" by the 
Emigrant Aid .Gompany . As Lawrence saw it, Charles Robinson, 
Eli Thayer, and all the other free-state leaders in the Kansas 
crusade had 11 in reality carried off the day, and all real 
danger of the extension of slavery had passed. 113 
Now, reflected the Whig leadership, there was only 
one other thing to do--and that was to return the political 
system of the United States back into the hands of men of good 
will: men of wealth, property, standing and intellect, whose 
1 Speech of Gov. ~arles Ro binson of I\ansas in favor 
of the election of Ron. Eli 1'hayer, delivered in Mechanics Hall, 
Worcester, Nov. 3, 1860, Thayer Manuscri pts, Brown Univ. I. 
2Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, PP• 112-13. 
3speech of Amos A. Lawrence in support of the 
Election of ~li 'rhayer, November L'JT, 1860 (NB, American 
Antiquarian Society, Worcester, N~ssachusetts). 
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principles had not been compromised by the petty jealousies 
of party politics and selfish interests. The ttcotton Whigs" 
now went in search of a political party which would represent 
the interests not of a section, nor of a cause, nor of an 
individual; but a Party which represented the interest of the 




THE ELEVENTH HOUR 
In the course of the eventful years during which 
Amos A. Lawrence and his colleagues expended their money and 
their energy to make Kansas free, these same "Cotton fu i gs n 
were also seeking to create a new and moderate political 
party in t h e United States. 
1ne r ·ansas-Nebraska Act had the explosive effect of 
a bombshell upon the structure of American political parties. 
Not only did it cause widespread havoc , but it made a status 
quo ante arrangement a practical i mpossibility. The most 
badly damaged of all the political groups were th e Whigs, who 
saw t h eir organization twisted and broken as a result of 
Douglas's bill. Th e Southern branch of the \.,.hig party, which 
had leaned dangerously in the direction of the emocrats in 
1852 , in opposi tion to General Winfield Scott, went over 
completely in 1854 by siding with Senator Douglas on over-
throwing the Mi ssouri Compromise and upsetting the Compromise 
of 1850. 1 vVhen it was revealed t hat prominent South ern migs 
h ad contributed t h eir support to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
1R. P . Letcher to John J. Grittenden, Dec. 26, 
1857; George T . Curtis to Crittenden, July 10, 1856, Goleman, 
Crittenden, II, 141-2, 130-1. 
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Horace Greeley concluded: "It was clear enough to all 
discerning vision that old party distinctions were super-
ceded and mea.ningless1 111 
F'or all practical purp oses, the dreaded "firebell 
in the night" had sounded the death-knell of the old ·Whig 
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party. Split asunder, their program repudiated, their principles 
ridiculed, and their leadership dying off (Daniel Webster, 
Henry Glay, Harrison Gray Otis, Samuel Eliot, John Davis, old 
Amos Lawrence, Samuel Appleton--all gone), the old-line Whigs 
were in a panic of uncertainty. Where could they go? With 
whom could they ally themselves? Certainly not with the 
Democrats% Any vestige of integrity that party had possessed 
was c onsidered by the ~higs to have been comple t ely dissipated 
by the gross misconduct of its leaders.2 For some the only 
apparent alternative was fusion with the new political party 
which was even now rising up out of the rubble and debris of 
the Kansas debacle--the 11 Republicantt Party. Already there was 
an alarming movement of former Whigs into the ranks of the new 
1New York Tribune, Oct. 16, 1854. 
2Gomnercial Advertiser, June 28, Sept. 19, 22, 23, 
1855. 
organization, as a series of union and fusionist conventions 
throughout the Northern states began to establish party 
tickets and even win local victories during the autumn of '54. 1 
And yet, to one group of men--to Lawrence, Winthrop, 
the Appletons, and many of the other nGotton Whigs" of 
Massachusetts--there was one more political possibility which 
would avoid alliance with the recreant Democrats, but which 
would also eliminate the necessity of joining with the fanatics 
and extremists who composed t h e r ank and file of the Republican 
p arty. The answer was: a complete re-alignment of the entire 
party structure and the subsequent formation of a new party, 
with a new name and with new personnel--but which would 
represent the old --time-honored Wbig traditions • 2 Although the 
Vfuig party had not always been the best, wisest or most 
discreet political party in American history, admitted 
Robert G. Winthrop, it had been "more pure, more patriotic, 
more faithful to the principles of the ,Gountry and the true 
principles of the Constitution."3 In a public letter written 
in response to Republican leaders who had asked him to abandon 
1Springfield Republican, July 21-25, Sept. 8, 1854; 
Boston 1raveler, Sept. 8, 1854. 
2 . 
amos A. Lawrence to Dr. Green, Nov. 16, 1850, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., I, 211. 
3van thr op, Memoir , p. 173. 
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the Whigs and lead a ~•fusion" ticket in Massachusetts, 
Winthrop stoutly d e fended the V~hig party as a constitutional 
party which was pledged to upho ld law and order, and which 
had always advanced the national prosperity and welfare. The 
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Whig party, moreover, Wi nthrop pointed out in a direct reference 
to the recent Free-Soil-Democratic coalition wh ich had sent 
Sumner to the Senate in 1851, h ad never stooped to any " bargain," 
and "tolerates no traffic, as a means of securing office •••• " 
Above all, Winthrop concluded, his was a party which t'deplores 
the existence of domestic slavery within the linuts of the 
American Union," and which would 11 omit no legal effort to 
-
arrest and prevent its extension 1'; but at the same time, it 
was a party wh ich scrupulously ttabstains from all unconstitutional 
d · 11 1 · t f ith · t.. h t nl an ~ ega 1n er ·· erence w 1 w a ever •••• llie se were the 
political ch aracteristics and traditions which, to men like 
Winthrop, h ad made the Whig party a great American i nstitution. 
Now that that institution had, for all practical purposes, 
ceased to have any further political existence, where could 
t h ere be found any other political party to e xpress the hopes 
and aspirations of men who s ought a middle road out of the 
dilemma of slavery? 
1Winthrop, Memoir, PP• 172-9. 
'Ihere had been developing for some time in the 
United States a political grouping which had focused its 
attention upon the alarming growth of foreign immigration into 
the United States, and which was particularly incensed at what 
it considered t o be the rebirth of t he Roman Catholic threat 
in the new world. Pledging themselves to the work of isolating 
and suppressing these undesirable imports--particularly those 
of Irish and German extraction--lace~ societies with elaborate 
names sprang up. By 1852-3 various of these local nativist 
groups had combined to form themselves into a single party, 
known officially as the "Americann party--and unofficially as 
the 11 Know Nothings" because of t h e lack of information which 
could be elicited about its organization and membership.l 
V~ben the Kansas-Nebras ka Act caused the 11 Cotton 
Wh i gs 11 to disown their own traditional party , despise the 
Democrats and reject the .t\epublicans, the presence of a pre-
fabricated political machinery pr esented unlimited possi-
bilities. llfuile in many individual instances the "nativistn 
planks of the American pla tforrn were quite appealing to the 
type of conservative and aristocratic person who composed 
the ranks of the industrial and commercial classes, these 
1 Boston Pilot, Dec. 10, 1853, May 13, Jan. 20, 1855. 
See Ray Allen Billington, 'I'.he Protestant Crusade (New York, 
1938), pp. 193-220, 238-262; Garl Vlillke, The Irish in America 
(Baton Rouge, 1956), pp. 114-124. 
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nationalistic and religious prejudices held essentially a 
secondary and incidental appeal when compared to the political 
and constitutional potential of t he party. 1~ny of the conserva-
tives regarded the American party as a ready-made organiza-
tion which could be taken over, deprived of its more obnoxious 
social characteristics, and utilized as a political wedge to 
splinter and destroy the existing parties. 11 'Ihe leaders of 
the American party are neither my friends nor acquaintances, 11 
said Amos A. Lawrence wh en he fir st approached the party; 
and J. V. c . Smith, Know-Nothing Mayor in 1854, not only continued 
to maintain close business relati ons with his Irish-Catholic 
friends, but as an amateur sculptor, executed a fine bust of 
John Bernard Fitzpatrick, Catholic Bishop of Boston. 1 As 
Henry Wilson pointed out, 11hundreds of thousandsn did not 
believe in t h e principles and purposes of the Ameri can party, 
but were 11willing to use its machinery to disrupt the ihig 
and Democratic parties •••• " 2 'I'ime was of the essence, and 
this was one practical way of by-passing the necessity of 
organizing and developing an entirely new political party with 
a minimum of effort. 
In addition to the organizational factor, the basic 
1 Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, p. 140; George H. 
Haynes, "Know-Nothing :Gegisla ture, 11 Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association, 1896 (Washington, l897}, I, 178. 
2 Wi l son, Slave Power, II, 49. 
tenets of the American Party offered the possib i li t y of a 
national appeal whi ch might drive the divisive elements of 
sect ionalism and slavery back i n to the obscurity of 
forgotten causes. ~ onjuring up a national platform of peace, 
prosperity, Prates tantism and no-Popery, many 11 t;otton 'vVb. igslt 
felt t h ey could envision the possibility of a new bas is of 
understanding with their Southern friends. With a united 
North-South crusade to fi ght t h e terrifying spectre of foreign-
bred Gatholicism, possibly the immediate menace of the slave 
problem might be lost in the shuffle. 1 
Both of these appeals--political conveni ence and 
national pride--were evident in a letter written by Amos A. 
Lawrence to Moses G. Gobb, outlining the advantages to be 
gained in supporting the new party. 2 The American party, 
wrote Lawrence, cherished a "purer nationality," and 
although it would certainly assure toleration for all, would 
"never allow the diversion of the public funds for the support 
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of sectarian schools," because "we love the Protestant religion." 
'lh is new party would refuse to foreigners the right to choose 
l Amos Lawrence to George N. Briggs, Oct. 6, 1859, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., IV, 349. Also see • D. Overdyke, 
1he Know-Noth ing ~arty in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950), PP• 
1-127. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to lVIoses G. Cobb, July 8, 1857, 
A. A. £ . Letterbook , IV, 93-5, 100-101. 
the rulers and the right to make laws. Foreigners had never 
enjoyed those rights in their own countries and should not be 
entrusted with them in America, said the financier. 'l'hat 
power belonged to "those alone who /Were7 educated to 
exercise it." In this way, those principles of the fathers of 
the Republic, as handed down by George Washington, and as 
carried on by the Whig party, might be perpetuated by the 
American party. 1 
Of more immediate importance, of course, was the 
critical issue of slavery. Here again, said Lawrence, the 
American Party was prepared to make a unique political contri-
bution. The Democratic party could offer no solution because 
it was ui ndifferentu to the moral issues involved in the 
institution of slavery. The Republican party was equally use-
less, he argued, since it was essentially "sectional, n and 
its organization and membership limited to the states north of 
the Mason-Dixon line. Only the u.Am::lricansn were willing and 
able to take a stand on slavery which was consistent with the 
moral law and constitutional princi ples. "I believe it should 
be treated like a polite highwayman,n wrote Lawrence. nwe 
must ride along with him, always keeping an eye out, and when 
we see he meditates an overt act, then seize him by the throat 
and down with him.n 'lhen, as if he suddenly realized that his 
vehemence might alarm his correspondent, Lawrence continued in 
1 Lawrence to Gobb, July 8, 1857, A. A. L. Letter-
book, M.H.S., IV, 93-5, 100-1. 
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a more affable vein. The Southerners are not highwaymen, he 
hastily assured Oobb, 11 they are members of the same family 
with ourselves and we must live on good terms with them; in 
order to do so we must use kindness, we must feel i t, and we 
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l must not i r ritate them by words; nor must we let them bully us." 
Almost overnight, the Whig power in such major 
urban centers as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and 
St. Louis, took a sudden and decided swing toward the policies 
and t he politics of the American party. Spring of 1854 saw 
a Y~ow-Nothing sweep in Pennsylvania; New York was estimated 
to have upwards of 70,000 registered nAmerican 11 voters by fall 
of the same year; and in Massachusetts, the newly-formed 
American party came out of nowhere and ran away with the 
State by an overwhelming margin. In less than a year the party 
had been able to absorb enough power to poll over 80,000 
votes--which put it 50,000 votes ahead of its neares t rival. 
With the active support of such prominent ex-Whig leaders as 
Amos A. Lawrence, and Robert c. Winthrop, the "Americans" 
were able to repeat their performan ce in the elections of 1855 
2 by once again sweeping the board. 
1Lawrence to .Cobb, July 8, 1857, A. A. L. Letter-
book, ] .H. S., IV, 93-5, 100-1. 
2 Boston Atlas, Nov. 14, 1854; Commercial Advertiser, 
Oct. 18, 23., 1855; Journal of Gommerce, Oct. 18, 1855; Winthrop, 
Memoir, PP• 167-8. 
I t was a losing fight, however, because the cause 
was nebulous and the is sues comp le t ely artificial. fue cause 
of nna t ivism1t sputtered violently and died quickly in t h e 
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South f or l ack of sufficient substan ce to keep tl1e fl ame bright. 
Not only was t h e total number of immigrants comparatively 
small, but ou t side of M~aryland and Louisiana, l;ath olics were 
few, and t h eir i nfluence trifling . kny hopes t h at an 11 A.meri can 
crusade u could be organized on a n ational level and serve to 
obscure t h e ove~riding issue of slavery in the South , were 
soon extinguished. 1 
I n the North , too, t h e American party was ste adily 
lo s ing adherents after its brief and gaudy triumph . Despi t e 
attempts to divert public interests into other channels, 
national events were forcing men to take a definite stand on 
t h e s lavery i ssue. 1be attack on Sumner, the sack of Lawren ce , 
the massacre at Osawatomie, the Lecompton cons ti tu tion--th e se 
we r e symbolic of t h e issues t h at were causing men eith er to 
join t h e anti-slavery standards of the Republican ranks, or to 
add t heir influence to the cause of the Democrats. 2 11 It looks 
1Avery Craven, Growth of South ern Nationalism, 1848-
~ (Baton Rouge, 1953}, pp. 238-45; Overdyke, Know-Noth ing 
Party in t h e South, PP• 263-295. 
2va nthrop, Memoir, pp. 185-6, July 6, 1856. Also 
see Wilson, Slave Power, II, 433. Joel Parker, Th e True Issue 
and the Duty of the Whigs {Cambridge, 1856). Addres s before 
t h e citizens of Gambridge, Oct. 1, 1856. 
as if Brooks's bludgeon has given a sort of coup de grace to 
the ~mig party} admitted Robert c. Winthrop realistically. 
By the summer of 1856, many leading "Americans" 
had already given up all hope of success, and now occupied 
their time trying to decide whether to give their votes to 
James Buchanan and his 11 dough-face " program, or to vote for the 
H.epublican candidate, John ·C. Fremont. "I cannot go Buchan an 
and his p latform," wrote Robert C. Winthrop, as he tried to 
decide which was the lesser of two evils. 11Personally, I 
could look wi t h complacency upon the election of Fremont and 
Dayton ••• but whether I can see my way clear to giving aid and 
1 
comfort to the Republican party ••• is another matter." 
After pondering :the question for some time, lvir . Winthrop 
decided to vote for whoever "stands the best chance of defeating 
the riepublican ticket. " 2 Apparently there were many other 
voters who followed Winthrop 1 s example, for James Buchanan 
won the election of 1856 with comparative ease. 
And yet, there were many old-line ~~bigs who 
continued to cling to the last vestiges of hope which the 
\nnthrop, lv'Iemoir, p. 186 (July 11, 1856). Also 
see ibid. (Aug. 17, 1856), and ibid., p. 187 (Aug . 18, 1856). 
2
winthrop to Col. J. W. Sever, Oct. 16, 1857, ibid., 
p. 199. Also see Winthrop Papers, M.H.S., XXXVI, 156-8, 
Fragment of Diary, 1856, and George T. Gurtis to John J. 
Crittenden, July 10, 1856, Coleman, Crittenden, II, 130-1. 
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~rican party represented, and dutifully gave their vote to 
Millard T. Fillmore, the nAmerican" candidalte. In New York 
Gity, the remnants of the old powerful uroorcantile" Whigs, 
continued to oppose fusion with the " sectionalist Democrats" 
and Republicans; and in l~ssachusetts, Amos A. Lawrence 
rejected offers of support in the gubernatorial race from 
both Americans and Republicans, in order to support Fillmore 
1 
and work for t h e defeat of Buchanan. Even after the 
elections had clearly demonstrated the weakness of the American 
party, Lawrence continued to be an "American" s t alwart in the 
Bay State, although by this time he too realized the futility 
of the cause.2 Lawrence, however, had little t i me to brood 
about political defeat, nor little inclination to meditate 
about the vagaries of human misfortune, for another problem 
had suddenly appeared which put the issues of slavery and 
sectionalism into a secondary position for the time being. 
Disaster had struck--in the form of a financial panic, the 
"Panic of 1857 ." 
Another dangerous curve in the series of arcs 
~aft of Refusal of Know-Noth ing n omination for 
Governorship, Aug. 26, 1856, A. A. L. Letters, M. H.S.; Amos A. 
Lawrence to Jefferson Davis, Dec. 22, 1859, A. A. L. Letter-
book, M.H.S., I V, 368-9; Lawrence to Charles Robinson, Aug. l, 
1858, ibid., 223-4. 
2 Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, Sept. 16, 
1856, June 6, 1857, Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, Folder 
III, 1, 8. 
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which had already begun to characterize the cyclical movement 
of the American economic structure, the Panic of 1857 was the 
product of multiple forces. Over-expansion of railroads, over-
production of manufactured goods, over-speculation, together 
with an unstable banking system--all these factors had served 
to inflate the economy to the point of bursting. With the 
crash of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, the panic 
was on, as good businesses followed bad ones into bankruptcy 
and ruin. Although the crisis itself was soon ended, the 
economic reverberations continued for several years, as 
depression, unemployment andfinancial indolence provided ample 
evidence of how seriously the ~~rican economy had been 
disrupted. 1 
Upon Northern capitalists, manufacturers, industrial-
ists, merchants, and investors--and upon the "Cotton \~higs" of 
Massachusetts in particular--the Pm ic of 1857 produced a 
startling transformation. Pre-occupation with their immediate 
financial and industrial affairs now forced them to relegate 
their political interests to a secondary position until such 
time as they should once again regain some measure of stability 
1 . George W. Van Vleck The Panic of 1857 (New York, 
1943); Samuel Rezneck, "The Infiuence of Depression upon 
American Opinion, 1857-9, 11 Journal of Economic History, II 
(1942), 1-23. 
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and security. 1 ncommercially, we have been so distres sed as 
hardly to be able to consider anything deliberately , but h ow 
to save ourselves from total prostration , 11 wrote Amos Lawrence 
to "Governor" Charles Robinson out in Kansas. 2 Decidedly worse 
t han t he panic of 137, the New Englander explained, nthe 
financial derangement in the country now absorbs everything . 
Here it has spread ruin over every interest •••• Our manu-
factu ring interest is for t he present comple tely broken down 
and discredited. 113 
As a result of this financial upheaval, and t he 
necessity of h aving to plunge once again into the economic 
complex ities of supply and demand, the 11 Cotton Vfu i gs" f ound 
it necessary to take stock of t heir position with regard to 
t heir 11 Southern brethren. n In t h e years following the intro-
duction of Douglas's Nebraska bill back in 1854, the Northern 
business interests had grown highly critical of and intensely 
hostile to the aims and the institutions of t he Southern 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Eli 1hayer, July 29, 1858, 
Thayer l'lfanuscripts, Brown Uni v. I , 67. 
2Lawrence to Charles hobinson, Nov. 25, 27, 1 8 57, 
Robinson Papers, Univ. of Kansas, Folder III , 10, 11. 
3Lawrence to Robinson, Oct. 19, 1857, ibid., 10. 
Also see John Murray Forbes to Edward Cunningham, Sep t . 28, 
1857, Hughes, Forbes, I, 167-8. 
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states. Business opposition to Douglas 1 its outright support 
of free-soil in Kans a s, and its growing approval of Senator 
Sumner, were all indications of a much more outspoken and 
independent ~ttitude than th e financial North h ad ever before 
dared to express. 
The Panic ch anged all this. The cotton belt had 
not been as serious ly affected by t h e crisis as had been t h e 
industr ial areas of t h e East, and t h e wheat belt of t h e ~~est.l 
With industrial production falling off alarmingly, and with 
Western markets drying up everywhere, Northern manufacturers 
reali zed t hat t hey h ad no alternative but to rely upon the 
relatively prosperous markets of t h e South as t h e only means 
of weath ering this serious financial storm. 2 The South 
realized t h is too, h owever, and took f ull advantage of h er 
momentary position of power to de mand a "new deal tt for t h e 
South ern plant er fr om t h e financial i nterests of t he North. 
Denounc i ng t he 11money ch ange r s " of Wall Street who were bleeding 
t h e p lan ters of t heir just profits, t h e South called for a 
complete read justment of financial policies--or elsel 3 The 
1 Journal of Commerce, Dec. 1, 1858, Aug. 18 1 1859; 
Commercial Adver tiser, April 1, 1859. 
2 Journal of ·Gomm.erce, April 2, .Aug . 28 , Se pt. 25, 
Oct. 2 , 1858. 
3 charleston Mercurv , Oct. 14 , 1857. 
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North, it said, could not possibly survive without Southern 
markets, and unless changes were forthcoming, the South would 
boycott nany article or merchandize /Sic7 or manufacture, 
purchased directly or indirectly in any of the Northern 
States. 111 Furthermore, not only would the North f ind itself 
shut out of ~outhern markets, but would also find itself cut 
off from the precious bales of Southern cotton--until it was 
willing to come to satisfactory terms. nwhat would happe_n, n 
asked Senator H~nond in a speech on the floor of the Senate, 
11 if no cotton was furnished for three years?" Conjuring up 
the awful possibilities of idle .mills and empty spindles, 
Harrunond hurled defiance at the Northern states. ".Cotton is 
F..ing1" he cried exultantly, as the Southland applauded his 
2 battle cry. 
'rhe dire threats of the South were not lost upon 
t h e business interests of the North . In haste, indeed, in 
panic, t h ey tried to disassociate t h emselves from t h ose 
political connect ions which the South mi ght construe as 
hostile to its interests, and once a gain began to assure their 
nsouth ern brethren 11 of their good intentions. The cry of the 




New York Herald, that people must forget about "Bleeding 
Kansas 11 and the 11 Nigger Agitation,~' was taken up in earnest 
193 
by the manufacturers of New England. 1 "Will the v 2.st col11Ill3rcial 
manufacturing interests of the North indorse this horrible and 
suicidal war on the South?"asked the Boston Post. Such an 
"irrepressible conflictlt can bring no good to our New Englarrl 
manufactures. Vote it down l " 2 "I h t s u my eyes and ears to 
politics, sick of the very sound of brawling and bickering 
about slavery, n complained Robert c. VHnthrop, who announced 
his intention of stopping the abolitionist Republicans by 
voting De mocratic in the elections of 1858. 3 
In 1858 Amos A. Lawrence was again approached by 
the Americans and the Republicans to run on the ticket either 
for Congress or for Governor. Lawrence still could not 
stomach the H.epublicans and their "slogans" about ending 
slavery and their policy of "crying and abusing the South , 11 
and so refused their support-- 11 1 cannot desert my friends,u 
he told 11 Governor 11 Robinson. 4 Thinking over the American offer, 
1 New York Herald, October, 1857. 
2 Boston Post, lvlar ch 12, 1860; lvlay 19, 1860. 
3vanthrop Memoir, P• 201 (Feb. 8, 1858), and ibid., 
PP• 202-203. 
4Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Robinson, Aug. 1, 1858; 
Amos A. Lawrence to Charles Hale, Oct. L'_l, 1858, A. A. L. 
Letterbook, lvl . H.S., IV, 223-4, 259-60. 
194 
Lawrence was faced with a choice of two evils. Although he 
might win the ~ongressional election, he would be f orced to 
go off to vashington and spend his time and energy in functions 
in wh ich h e had little interest. 1 Regarding the Governor&~ip, 
Lawrence was equally uncertain, since he feared certain defeat. 2 
The number of men in 1\IIassachusetts who now held ttAmericanu 
views was so small that they could well be "left ou t of the 
account without being missed,n said Lawrence, and was convinced 
that if h e ran for the Governorship nl shall be beat /Sic7 
soundly. n3 
Swallowing his pride, Lawrence reluctantly offered 
to run as uAmerican 11 candidate for Governor, only to be 
completely swamped, as he had expected, by the anti-slavery 
votes that swept Nathaniel Banks into office. "Amos A. 
Lawrence, the 1 American 1 candidate, 11 laughed Greeley's 
Tribune, "is left so out in the cold that he will one day be 
obliged to procure affi davits that h e was ever a candidate 
at all. "4 
1A. A. Lawrence to Eli Thayer, July 29, 1858, 
A. A. L. Letterbook~ M. H.S., IV, 222. 
2A. A. Lawrence to Ch arles Robinson, July 24, 1858, 
ibid., PP• 220-1. 
3A. A. Lawrence to George N. Br iggs, Oct. 6, 1859, 
ibid., P• 349. 
4winthrop, \1emoir, p. 207. Also see Boston 
Daily Advertiser, Nov. 3, 5, 1858 . 
But Lawrence regarded his pe r sonal defea t as insig-
nificant compared with t h e i mportance of e very man t hrowi ng 
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h is inf l uence against the progress of sectionalism and disunity. 
I n fact, he expressed relief when the news from Illinois 
recorded the re-election of Steph en A. Douglas, apparently 
feeling that this Democratic victory in the Wes·t h ad offset 
t he Republican victory in lVIassachusetts • 1 1Nhen Mr . Joh n Henry 
Vessey of England was dining with the Lawrences in the Beacon 
Street home in the spring of 1859, h e was amazed to find both 
Mrs. Lawrence and her husband "express their sympath y with the 
South erners on the slave q~stion, a subject,n he added, 11 I 
sh ould h ave nev er dreamt of ment i oning in Boston, which I h ad 
always considered to be the very hot bed of abolition. 112 
One rath er surprising demonstration of the ex tent 
to which this new spirit of tolerance and conciliation h ad 
filtered into the business community may be seen in the 
enthusiastic reception given to Jefferson Davis during the 
autumn of 1858. Returning from a visit to Maine, the Davis 
family was f orced to remain in Bos ton when their b aby came down 
1 Amos A. Lawrence, Journal, Ms , M.H.S., Nov. 12, 
13, 1858. Also see Boston Daily Advertiser, Nov. 6, 1858. 
2 
Brian Waters, ed., Mr. Vessey of England: Bein~ 
t h e I nciden ts and Reminiscences of 'l'ravel in a 'l'welve Week s 
Tour t h rough the United S.tates and Ganada in the Year 1859 
(New York, 1956), p. 164 (May 20, 1859). 
wi th the croup. Never had Boston extended a more gracious 
we lcome. Mrs. Harrison Gray Otis came over in person to 
nurse t he infant t h rough the night, while the citizens of 
Boston prepared an ovation for their prominent visitor from 
Mi ssissippi. On October ll, 1858 , J:. 'aneuil Hall was packed--
standing room only--while on the platform men like Edward 
Everett, Robert G. Winthrop and Caleb t;ush ing took pleasure 
in introducing their guest as the personification of 
"intellectual cultivation and of eloquence, with the practical 
qualities of a statesman and a general." The audience was 
completely captivated; and when Davis made his appe arance, 
the audience rose ~ masse to g ive the Southern stat esman 
a deafening ovation. 1 
By t he fall of 1859 , t hen , there were many 
reasons for thinking t hat relations with the South were 
readjusting themselves into a more normal pattern. Politics 
had been pushed into t h e background, old friendships were 
being renewed, and even now Amos A. Lawrence and other leading 
conservatives in the Bay State were speculating about the 
possibilities of forming a new co mpromise political party t hat 
1Boston Daily Advertiser, Oct. 12, 14, 1858. Also 
s ee Hudson Strode, Jefferson Davis: American Patriot (New 
York, 1955), pp. 309-311. Elizabeth Gutting , Jefferson 
Davis: Political Soldier (New York, 1930), pp. 124-5, 
provides a facsimile of t he Davis speech. 
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would transcend sectional jealousies and local prejudices . 1 
Although the Ameri can party h ad fallen to piece s , perh aps 
a fre sh attempt might meet with mo re success at this 
particular time l 11 'v've must now look for some orie; inal and 
c:Jmprehensive poli cy wh ich wi l l c::nnmend its e lf to t h e 
patriotism and good sens e of the veople,t wrote El i 'I'heyer 
to Amos Lawr ence., "and shall be in accordance wi th the or i gin 
and sp irit of our government."2 
.r om Philadelphia, Edward Joy Viorris, f orrer Whig 
Congressman from Pennsylvania, sent word to Amos A. Lawr ence 
t h at a "national organization" was being created in that 
state, and 11 Americans n and moderate Republicans were 
c ombining t heir forces in an effort to down the Democr ats. 
1viore such unions were being created in New Jersey and Delaware, 
and news from ~entucky pointed to the development of a similar 
movement there. 11 W.ould it not be well.," asked i.i10rris, 11 to 
3 
start such a movement in iviassachusetts?" Lawrence 
1Amos A. Lawrence to George N. Briggs, Oct. 6, 
1859, A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.S., IV, 349. 
2Eli Thayer to Lawrence, Nov. 16, 1858., A. A. L. 
Letters, M. H.S., XVII, 114. 
3Edward Joy lvlorris to Amos A. Lawrence, Nov. 20, 
18 58, ibid ., p. 117. 
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appar ently thought so, for with a h asty ejaculation of 
" Blessed are the Peacema kers, 11 he immediately set t o work 
to form 11 a party of conciliation i n t h e country, u and 
announced h imself ready for "any sort of combinati on that will 
1 
uni te t h e oppo sition." 11 God grant ••• t hat nat i onal strife 
may ce ase," h e prayed, 11 wh ile a union is made of the 
opposit i on all over the country, that our people may learn 
to discrimina te between hatred of slavery and hatred of the 
South."2 Contacting his influential friends and colleagues 
throughout Boston , Lawrence pleaded with them not t o be 
stampeded i nto t h e extremes of the Democratic or Republican 
positions, but to hold fast to the time-honored vn i g 
pr i ncip les. 3 W.i.1en he heard rumors that George Lunt and 
George s . Hillard, editors of the Boston Courier, were 
t h inking about going over to the Democrats, Lawrence wrote 
and asked that they help f orm a new party. The Democrats, 
argued La wrence, favored a low tariff, sponsored indefinite 
1Lawrence to Gharles Robinson, Jan. 7, 
Robinson Papers, Uni v. of Kansas, .Folder I II, 20. 
Lawrence, Li f e of Lawrence, p. 145. 
1859, 
Also see 
2Amos A. Lawr ence to ~~----~--' A. A. L. Letter-
book, M. H.S., I V, 276-7. 'lhis letter was probably written 
sometime during early December, 1858, but Lawrence neglected 
to i nclude the name of his correspondent. 
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3Lawrence to Charles Hale, Oct. f J, 1858, ibid., 
259-60, and Lawrence to J. lVI . s . 'i illiams, Aug. 18, 1858, 
ibid., ~p. ·· 23Q -40. 
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territorial expansion, and had engineered the "unjust and 
d.isgraceful11 Kansas affair. Por conservatives to give aid 
and support to such a party and to such principles was un-
t h inkable. The real answer, said Lawrence, lay in a new 
co~li tion, a nat ional party, whi ch would unite all those who 
opposed the policies of the Buchanan administration--excluding, 
of course, the extreme B.epublicans, because of their agita-
tion over the slavery question. ~~'Without such a union," the 
financier concluded, "we may as well abandon the government 
to the Democratic party.nl . 
Convinced that such a political coalition was the 
only possible alternative to disunion and war, Lawrence 
worked energetical l y to construct the frame~ork of an organiza-
tion as soon as possible. He pressed into service many of 
' his closest friends--the cotton manufacturer Nathan Appleton 
and his cousin William ~ppleton, George Peabody, famous 
merchant and financie~, Benjamin F. Butler, l awyer and 
investor who was one of the largest stockholders in the Middle-
sex Mi lls of L:>well; as well as such prominent 11C,?tton Whig!' 
political stalwarts as Robert G. Winthrop, George Hillard 
-. 
l Amos A. Lawrence to George Lunt and George s. 
Hillard, Aug. 17, 1858, A. A.. L. Letterbook, id.H.S., IV, 
235-7, and Lawrence to J. lvi . s. Williams, .Aug. 18, 1853, ibid., 
239-40. 
199 
(of the Courier), George Ticknor Curtis and Rufus Choate. 
Known as the "constitutional Uni on Party," the new political 
party, headed by Levi Lincoln, former u Cotton Vb.ign Governor 
of l'IIassa~husetts, began to make its shaky appearance toward 
1 
t h e end of 1859. 
It was just at this point t hat Joh n Brown launched 
his famous attack at Harper's Ferry, October 19, 1859 , which 
sent a shiver of horror throughout the entire Southland and 
caused the "Cotton vvhi gs 11 to throw up their hands in despair. 
IVlournfully, Edward Everett warned Robert Winthrop that this 
would surely pave the way for t h e 11 final catastrophe. 112 
Fearing that the South would interpret Brown's ill-timed 
atta ck as proof that the entire North had turned 11 abolitionist, n 
the business community desperately sought a way out by 
trying to convince the leaders of t h e South t h at this was the 
work of a single, unsupported madman, and was in no way 
sanctioned by the conservative gentleme n of the North . 
·,1/r iting to Jilli am ~J . Se aton, co - editor of the influential 
Nat i onal I ntelligencer, Amos A. Lawrence labeled Brown as a 
"mono-maniac'' who was not men t all y responsi ble , di sm.i ssed the 
1 Amos A. Lawr ence to Levi Line oln, March 21, 1860, 
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a . A. L. Letterbook, 1vi. H.S., f..V, 388-9. See Boston Advertiser, 
ll'larch 30, 1860; . .C aroline Nare, Political 0 inion in Massachusetts 
During the iavil War and Reconstruction New York, 1916 , pp. 
33-5. 
ltl e .li • S • 
1 860. 
2 
Everett to Winthrop , Nov. 13 , 1859, Everett Papers, 
Also see Boston Advertiser, Feb. 24, 18 60, and June 19, 
attack as "quixotic," and pleaded with the leaders of the 
South not to cre ate a martyr out of a madman.l To Senator 
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, Lawrence sent formal assurances 
that neither he nor his associates had been connected with any 
of Brown 1 s plans outside of Kare as; and to Governor ~ ·ise of 
Virginia, Lav~ence issued a direct plea for a fair trial in 
virtue of the fact that Brown 1 s mind had 11 be come disordered 
by hardsh i p and illness.n 2 
Fearing t ha t the latest ca tastrophe would wreck his 
well-laid plans, Amos A. Lawrence contacted such leading 
"unionists 11 in the South as John J. Crittenden of Kentucky 
and John Bell of Tennessee, seeking to form political 
connections with compromise movements in other states so as 
to organize the Constitutional Union Party on a national 
scale before the elections of 1860.3 Lawrence particularly 
singled out Senator Crittenden to be the natlonal figure-
head of the new party. A close friend of the famous Abbott 
Lawrence, long-time supporter of ~~hig principles, out spoken 
1
.funos A. Lawrence to W. W. Seaton, Oct. 25, 1859, 
A. A • .L. Letterbook, M. H.S., IV, 352-3. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to Senator Jefferson Davis, Dec. 22, 
1859, ibid., pp. 368-9; Lawrence to Gov. Henry Wise, Oct. 26, 
1859, ibid., P• 355. 
3 Albert Wiorgan to Lawrence, Dec. 13, 1859, A. A. L. 
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Letters, l . H.S., XIX, 21, Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, Dec. 21, 
1859, A. A. L. Letterbook, IV, 365, and Lawrence to H. and B. 
Douglas, Dec. 22, 1859, ibid., PP• 366-7. 
opponent of t h e .Kansas fiasco, Gri ttenden was considere d t o 
posse s s all t he nece s sary pe r s onal and political qualifica-
tions to capture t h e votes of responsible, t h inking moder-
ates, orth and South . " What is wanted is a programme , 11 
Lawrence wrote to t h e Kentuckian, urging h asty a c t i on. nlf 
you will send me t wo notes of t h ree lines each in your own 
h andwriting , asking me whether t h e Union-loving men of 
1Viassa chusetts are ready to unite with the opponents of the 
Democratic party in the other States f or the defea t of that 
party and of all extre mis t s , I will promise to or ganize this 
1 
wh ole S t a te in e i gh t weeks • 11 ;:;)enator Crittenden himself, 
Lavire n ce pointed out, was the new party's bigge:.st asset, 
and assured t h e Senator from Kentu cky thl:t if he would be 
t h e party's c andidate, even t h e c onservative Republicans 
of !Viassachusetts would vote the Union ticket--especially 
s i nce the party's platform was already calculated to a ppeal 
to t h e wealthy industrialists of t h e North. 2 This was an 
unparalleled opportunity for t h e manufacturing classes of the 
North to j oin with the slaveh olders of the South to opp ose 
1Amos A. Lawrence to J ohn J. Crittenden, Jan. 6, 
1860, A. A. L. Le tt erbook, 11I. H.S., I V, 375-6. Also see 
Coleman, Crittenden, I . I, 183-4. 
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1 
the "irrepressible conflict." 
For a short time, hopes ran high as prospects for 
North-South accord seemed to be taking a turn for t h e better. 
'Ihe 11 -0nion of the States 11 was mora important than anything 
else, said Rufus Choate, who insisted t h at all America's 
2 troubles would be ended when union was preserved. Amos A. 
Lawrence himself took a brief tour through the South early 
in 1860, and upon his return to Boston confidently assured 
h is apprehensive neighbors that he had incurred no risk what-
soever. 11 How mistaken the opinion is of the two sections of 
the country in regard to the feelings of each other, n he 
philosophized. 11 .f uy God make them more friendly and more 
emulous and excel in promoting t h e great cause for wnich our 
- 3 
government was made.n Seeking to impress his Southern 
friends with the need for a united opposition against the 
inroads of the Republican p arty, Lawrence continued to 
plead the cause of national unity. "However badly we think 
of slavery (and the Nor thern sentiment is pretty much alike 
on t h at subject) ,n he wrote to Emerson Etheridge, Whig 
l 
F. H. Valker to Amos A. Lawrence, Feb. 24, 1860, 
A. A. L. Letters, M. :H .S., XIX, 92. Also see Joseph arks, 
John Bell of r:L'ennessee (Baton Rouge, 1950), pp. 366-7. 
2 - 2 Brown, Choate, II, 303; Boston .Courier, 1~Iay 6, 
1860. 
3 Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 163-4. 
203 
204 
Hepresentati ve from ':l.'ennessee, "we cannot jeopardize the 
Union of t h e States by strengthening a sectional organization.nl 
'l'his same appeal for national harmony was echoed, 
in a more formal and public manner, by Lawrence's friend and 
fellow-manufacturer, Nathan Appleton. Appleton had just 
read an article in the Richmond Vihig by the Honorable 
v illiam G. Rives of Virginia, and was so impressed by the 
peaceful sentiments and reasonable approach of the Southerner, 
that he immediately wrote an "open letter'w to Mr. Rives, 
reviewing the mutual problems of the North and the South, ard 
2 p l e ading t h at the Union be preserved. Addressing himself 
to h is fello w-North erners, Appleton asked them to give up 
t heir attempts to abolish slavery. Amalgamation was 
impossible, emigration was i mpractical, and annihilation was 
unthinkable. Since t hi s exhausted the possibilities of any 
probable solution of the slavery question, further actions, 
3 
ne concluded, uare utterly idle and futile .tt 
Turning to the Southerners, Appleton made a similar 
appeal to reason. 11Why continue t h is useless agitation on 
mere abstractions?" argued the manufacturer, when the South 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Hon. Emerson Et heridge, April 2, 
1860, A. A. L. Letterbook, M. H.S., IV, 391-2. 
2 Nath an Appleton, Letter to Hon. William G. Ri ves 
of Virginia on Slavery and the Union (Boston, 1860), pp. 4-9. 
3 . Ibid., PP• 12-13. 
already has possession of all the land where slavery can be 
profitably employed. Why discuss t heories of political 
power when the North is already outstripping the South in 
terms of population? Yfuy discuss the possibilities of 
secession when the South cannot even control a presidential 
election? The time has come to face cold, hard facts. 
"Your true palladium is the Constitution of the United 
States," stated Appleton. 11This is your ark of safety •••• there 
is in reality nothing between the North and the South to 
quarre 1 about •111 
W. ~. Rives was delighted to find t h at his own 
expres s ions of sympathy and affection had produced such a 
responsive reply from t h e Bay State, and immediately had 
copies made of t h e lengthy letter which he then distributed 
to prominent men and newspapers t h roughout the st ate of 
Vi rginia. 2 
With such sentiments and expressions of friendsh ip 
being exchanged between reasonable gentlemen of the North 
and t h e ~outh, Amos A. Lawrence and his friends in Boston 
h astened to organize their new "Constitutional-Uni on" party. 
Headed by levi Lincoln, and backed by such leading citizens 
as Amos A. Lawrence, George Peabody , George Ticknor Gurtis, 
1 Appleton, ~etter to Rives, p. 14. 
2v. ~ . Rives to Nathan Appleton, March f J, 1860, 
Nath an app leton Papers, 11l . H.S • 
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Benjamin Butler and Benjamin Bates, the new party made its 
appearance in December, 1859, basing its platform on 
national unity and declaring an unchangeable union indispens-
1 
able to t h e prosperity of all. 
Despite the fanfare of optimism, and t he initial 
enthusiasm which accompanied the first weeks of t h e new 
p arty's appearance on the political scene, however, t h ere 
was little hope for the ~onstitutional-Union party. Lacking 
grass-root support, bitterly assailed from all sides as 
tt s i iaple-minded" snobs and mercantile " Brahmins, n the Unionists 
could not even prevail upon Crittenden to be a candidate, and 
as a result had to settle for John Bell of Tennessee and 
Edward Everett of Massachusetts as their standard-bearers, 
much to the disgust of Amos A. Lawrence who co n sidered the 
t alents and reputation of Crittenden indispensable. 2 
Robert C . vVi nth rop was f orced to admit, grudgingl y , that the 
Republican candidate, Lincoln, h ad "some ability and som9 
amiability, 11 and even Amos A. Lawrence could see the hand-
wri t ing on the wa.ll with painful clarity. 3 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Levi Lincoln, lvlarch 21, 1860, 
A. A. L . Letterbook, M. H.S., IV , 388-9; Boston Advertiser, 
lYiar ch 30 , 1860 • 
2Am.os A. Lawrence to Joh n J. Crittenden, IVIay 25, 
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lYiay 26, 1 860, A. A. L. Letterbook, lvi . H.S., I V, 400, 401. Also 
see ~oleman, Gr ittenden, II, 206, 207, and t he Boston Advertiser, 
Sept. 19, 1860. 
3Robert _c; . Winthrop to Nath an Appleton, June 15, 
1860, Nath an App leton .Papers, M. H.S. 
Conceding as early as viay, 1860, that "Old Abe and his split 
rails 11 h ad won t h e public support of ivlas sachuse tts, he 
denounced the timidity of his erst-while friends--nthe 
intelligent conservative men, the great mercrwnts and manu-
f a ctPrers u--who had expressed elaborate approval of the 
Union ticket, and t h en voted for someone elsell 
Lawrence's pessimism was well founded. Abraham 
Lincoln was elected in November, 1860, and the Constitutional-
Union party went down to defeat. The first reacti on of t h e 
Northern manufacturer was to heave a disgusted si gh , shrug 
his sh oulders in annoyance, and then proceed to endure life 
under a Republican administration with stoic calm. After all, 
he rationalized, it had been a fair election, and under the 
circumstances it was a part of the American political tradition 
to co-operate with a duly elected government--regardless of 
who was running it. 2 Besides, what did the election of one 
man mean? What could he do with both Houses of .~ongress 
against him'?3 11 It is too early, as yet, to judge of the 
resul t 11 ; wrote Robert C. Winthrop, nbut as IVfr. Linea ln is a 
much more moderate person than any of the leaders of his 
1 Amos A. Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, lv1ay 25, 
18 60, A. A. L. Letterbook, lVI . H.S, IV, 400. 
2Boston Courier, Nov. 10, 17, 1860. 
3Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, p. 156. 
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party, I hope for the best." 1 There was no grea t cause for 
alarm, so why not wait and see wh at developed? Anxi ou s l y , 
t h e Northern conservatives pleaded with t heir Southern 
neigh bors to adopt the same attitude. 2 
The South , h owever, could not bring itself to look 
upon t h e election of Abraham £i n coln with such calm indiffer-
ence. As soon as the results were known, t h e Sou th Carolina 
legislature ca lled for a State convention, wh ich, on 
December 20, 1860, adopted an Or dinan ce of Secession. oefore 
the end of :B'ebruary, 1861, six other states of the lower 
South h ad marched defiantly out of the Union, and were 
organizing themselves into the "Confederate S.t ates of Ame rica."3 
'lhe North was stunned at the swiftness with which 
t h ese events h ad taken place and outraged at the idea of 
secession. Lawrence's friend John Bell, presidential candi-
date of t he Constitut i onal-Union party c ondemned the ide a in 
no uncert ain terms. nBy no prin ciple of public law, by no 
code of mora ls, by no law of earth or heaven/1 h e declared, 
"would Iv'lississippi or any other State be justified, under 
1Robert ~. Winthrop to Count Circourt, Nov. 10, 1860, 
VVinth rop Papers, M. H.S., XXXVI, 168. 
2 Boston Advertiser, Nov. 12, 15, 1860. 
3 See Henry Adams , 11The Secession Winter, 1860-1, 11 
Proceedings of t h e Massachusetts Historical Society, XLI II (1910), 660-687. 
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existing circumstances, in withdrawing from the Union. 111 
The Union was "a government of the people insti. tuted by the 
people of all t h e States, 11 stated the conserve. ti ve Advertiser, 
and not a compact between the states which a.ny state ~. may 
rescind at pleasure. 2 
But of special concern to industrial Massachusetts 
was t he initial i mpact of secession upon the Ba y State 
economy. As early as December, 1860, an a gonizing wail went 
up from the manufacturing centers throughout the State as 
North - South trade came to an abrupt halt--and all for what 
Nath an Appleton contemptuously referr~d to as 11 an impracticable 
3 i dea, a nonentity, connected with t h e institution of slavery. 11 
Charles Eliot Norton commented on the 11 universal alarm, 
general financial pressure and great commerc ia.l embarrassment 11 
wh ich resulted from numerous business failures and factory 
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:1 
shut-downs. · nour money people h er e have been badly fri gh tened," 
1Boston Daily Advertiser, Dec. 13 , 1860. 
2
- b·d J. ~ • , Jan. 23, 1861. 
3National I ntelligencer, Jan. 1, 1861. Speech of 
Nath an App l eton, Dec. 15, 1860. 
4s~a.h Norton a.nd Ivlark DeWolfe Howe, Letters of 
Charles Eliot Norton (2 vols.; Boston, 1913), I, 213. 
wrote John iviurray Forbes to Gharles Sumner, nand many decent-
looking men ••• would try to have a kind of compromise made 
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t h at would promise to patch up difficulti e s and their pockets. 111 
I n southern .Massachusetts, reports told of 11hundreds 11 being 
thrown out of work; and in the western counties observers 
predic ted that the mills would shut down comp letely in ninety 
days •2 'I'he t;ourier reported that t h e "Boston streets today 
are full of disch arged workmen," as the number of business 
3 failures began to mount up. The manufacturing interests, 
now badly fri ghtened, watched the average prices of a sh are 
of stock in cotton sheeting drop from ~518.34 down to ~~304 .22 
while sales were f a lling off at an alarming rate. 4 Some 
measure of t h e degree to which hysteria gripped Boston may 
be seen in the frenzied way in which popular wrath was turned 
upon local iboli tion groups, who were blamed f or h aving 
forced the slavery issue to such a critical and uncompromising 
state of affairs. On Dec. 3, 1860, a howling band of business-
men and off ice clerks, "solid and respectable men, 11 invaded 
1 John Murray Forbes to aharles Sumner, Dec. 22, 1860, 
Sumner M.ss, Harvard University. 
2L. B. Holbrook, North Bridgewater, to Charles Sumner, 
Dec. 22, 1860, 1£1£• Also see Boston Courier, Dec. 16, 1860. 
3Ibid., Dec. 3, 1860. 
4York~. , Pepperell, pp. 44-5. Also see Stampp, Jl.nd 
t h e War .Game, P.P . 124-5. 
Tremont Temple and broke up a meeting cormnemorating the 
execution of John Brown. 1 Wendell Phillips publicly lashed 
out at this ubroadcloth mob 11 the following month, and in a 
thinly-veiled reference to the younger Lawrence, condemned 
the "snobbish sons of' fathers lately rich, anxious to show 
themselves rotten before they are ripe.n2 So great was 
public reaction against the orator, that the combined efforts 
of regular policemen, special detectives and his own private 
bodyguard were required to keep the Abolitionist from being 
lynched as he left the hall. 3 
But obviously, this was a situation which demanded 
steady hands and clear minds. Once again the "Cotton Whigsn 
of Massachusetts were caught up in a frenzied effort to 
forestall bloodshed and restore harmony to the Union. Vfnile 
compromise proposals were being presented to the Congress 
by such men as William H. S.eward .of New York in the Senate 
and Charles lTancis Adruns in the House, back in Boston, Union 
meetings were once again being held in Faneuil Hall in an 
attempt to arrive at some mutual understanding with the South. 4 
1springfield Republican, Dec. 5, 1859. 
2
wendell Phillips, Speeches, Lectures and Letters, 
PP• 319-342. 
3 Garrison, Life, IV, 1-10. 
4 - . 
Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Appendix, pp. 126-7; Boston Courier, Feb. 6, 1861; Boston Post, 
F'eb. 6, 1861. Also see Gharles Sunmer to John Murray Forbes;-
Jan. 13, 1861, Hughes, Forbes, I, 186. 
1:::11 
William Appleton, the manufacturer, hurried down 
to the nation's capital in the middle of December, to 
ascertain the seriousness of the political situation, and 
to use his considerable influence as an outstanding industrial-
ist and former ,Congressman to foster the cause of inter-
sectional peace. Despite his seventy-five years, the slender 
old gentleman received numerous callers, visited both Houses 
of ~ongress, had dinner with President Buchanan, and discussed 
national affairs with his business colleagues from various 
parts of the country. The prospects were not bright, and he 
was disturbed by what he saw--although he was not yet certain 
what it all meant. "No parties of any kind, all anxiety and 
gloom," he wrote in his Diary, trying to fathom the strange 
mood of the city; "yet not without hope, but no present 
light ."1 
Reports of the growing seriousness of the situation 
convinced Appleton's fellow manufacturers back in New England 
that greater efforts were demanded of them. A eommi ttee of 
leading conservatives of Massachusetts, headed by Amos A. 
Lawrence, William Appleton, Edward Everett, Benjamin Curtis 
and George ~rtis Ticknor, all former Constitutional-Unionists, 
circulated a petition through the State calling for the passage 
of the Crittenden compromise. One petition, designed to appeal 
· 




to Republicans, was phrased in general terms and merely called 
for the 11 pacific settlement of our present difficulties." 1 
Labeled the 11 Doughface Petition" and described as about a 
hundred yards long, a foot in diameter "when rolled up, n this 
petition accur~ulated about fourteen thousand signatures. A 
second petition specifically endorsing the Grittenden Compromise 
was circulated throughout the Massachusetts communities and 
gathered over twenty two thousand signatures. Both the docu-
ments were soundly denounced by the Republicans as containing 
the fraudulent signatures of persons who were t h oughtless, 
i gnorant and uninformed. 2 
Nevertheless, a group of "union-savers," led by 
Amos A. Lawrence, Edward Everett and Robert C. Winthrop left 
for Washington, D. ~., bringing with them their highly touted 
petition which Senator Crittenden presented to t h e Senate on 
February 12, 1861.3 Only a small part of a gigantic wave of 
1Bos ton Courier, Feb. 7, 1861; Springfield Republican, 
Jan. 19, 24, 1861. Also see John J. Crittenden to Amos A. 
Lawrence, Dec.l8, 1860, A. A. L. Letters, Ivi . H.s., XX , 193; 
Robert .C. Winthrop to Crittenden, Dec. 24, 1860, Winthrop Papers, 
M. H.S., XXXVI, 169. 
2springfield Republican, Jan. 28, 1861; Boston Daily 
Advertiser, .. F'eb. 23, 1861. Also see David Ivi . Potter, Linoo ln 
and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven, 1942), 
pp. 124-5. 
3Robert .c. Winthrop to Edward Everett, Jan. 21, 1861; 
Everett to Winthrop, Jan. 22, 1861, Everett Papers, lVI .H.S. 
Also see Robert c. Winthrop, I~ . Diary ~~agment, January, 1861, 
Winthrop Papers, XXXVI, 170-2. 
business delegations which poured into Washington during the 
last week in January, 1861, the Bay State leaders called upon 
President Buchanan, Vice-President Breckinridge, General Scott, 
Mr. S.eward, Mr. SW!ll1er, and practically any other prominent 
political figure who would listen to them. 1 Desperately, th~ 
tried to impress the le aders of the Government with the urgency 
of t heir appeal for national unity, as cotton-conscious New 
England held its breath in expectation. But it was a losing 
fight; for the delegates found hospitality and sympathy--Ex-
President John 'l'yler offered 11 sincere sympathy" with their 
mission and IVlillard Fillmore prayed that uyou will do all you 
can to save the Union"--but no action. 2 Perhaps Senator 
~narles Sumner expressed the cold realities of the situation 
when he told the crestfallen committeemen, with a cynical 
smile, that their efforts were "of no more use than a penny 
wh istle in a tempest."3 Their purpose a failure, Everett and 
1Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, pp. 166-7. National 
Intelligencer, Jan. 24, 26, 1861, and Journal of ~ommerce, 
Jan. 30, l''eb. 9, 1861. Foner, ,!?usiness and S.lavery, P• 250, 
suggests that it might have been called 11 Businessmen 1 s 
Week • 11 
2 John Tyler to Edward Everett, Jan. 29, l86l; 
i~tillard Fillmore to Everett, Feb. 16, 1861, Everett Papers, 
Ni . H .S.. 
3Robert c. Winthrop, lVls Diary Fragment, January, 
1861, Winthrop Papers, XXXVI, 170-2, and Lawrence, Amos A. 
Lawrence, p. l67. 
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Lawrence were forced to make their way back to Boston in the 
face of ridicule and laughter. "Only to think of it1--the 
great Boston petition has come to nought," crowed the Spring-
field Republican. "The mission of Everett has failed; 
Lawrence hasn't saved the Union. And Why? Simply because 
their petition didn't mean anything. Just imagine Mr. Everett 
administering a bread-pill to the invalid Union; and Amos 
Lawrence carrying a pint of cold water to extinguish the great 
conflagration which is already licking the pillars of the 
grand Temple of Liberty1" 1 
The only hope, now, that war might be averted, rested 
with the "·Peace Convention 11 that was assembling at Willard 1 s 
Hotel on the corner of .Fourteenth Street in Washington, even 
as the despondent business men of Boston were leaving the 
city. First suggested by Virginia as a means of averting 
hostilities 1 the Peace Oonvention received favorable response 
from a number of Northern and border states, and was sCheduled 
2 to meet early in February, 1861. Although Governor John 
Andrew of Massachusetts, long a bitter foe of slavery, was 
reluctant to give any sign of support or recognition to the 
1 Springfield Republican~ Jan. 24, 1861. 
2Dwight Dumond, The Secession ·Movement, 1860-1 (New 
York, 1931), PP• 239-46 ; Margaret Leech, Reveille in Washington, 
1860-5 (New York, 1941), PP• 8-9. 
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.Gonvention, the fear that men like Lawrence and Everett, who 
"scarcely represent our class of opinionlt might 11 volunteer 11 
their own services, led him to send a group of prominent anti-
slavery Republi cans to join the delegations from fourteen other 
states in a last-minute attempt to stop the clock.l 
Hopes ran high in business circles, stocks began to 
rise, and financial journals reported the disappearance of 
11pani c 11 and the quieting of u commercial fears. t~ 'Ihe "po li tical 
difficulties," it was promised would soon be settled, and the 
crisis ended 11wi thin a short time. n2 'Ihe momentary optimism 
t h at war might be averted was even reflected in the upward 
swing in textile sales during late February and early I~rch . 3 
It wa.s no use. A meeting with President Buchanan 
yielded nothing; and a session with the President-elect, 
Abraham Lincoln , who h ad just arrived in Washington, only 
confirmed the worst fears of the Southern delegates, and 
convinced the Northerners that the new man was inflexible in 
1Gharles F. Adams to John A. Andrew, Jan. 28, 1861, 
Henry Greenleaf Pearson, Life of John Andrew (2 vols.; 
Boston, 1904), I, 155. 
2Hunt's .Merchants 1 Magazine, XLIV (1861), 196-7; 
Journal of ~ommerce, March 1, 1861; New York Tribune, Feb. 26, 
28, 1861; Boston Dai ly Advertiser, March 20, 1861. 
3 -Yorke, Pepperell, p. 45. 
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his purpose to preserve the Union. 1 The situation was even 
more depressing behind the doors of the conference room at 
Willard's, as it became more evident, day after day, that 
compromise was impossible. All attempts to resurrect the 
Grittenden proposals were regarded by Northerners as outright 
11 surrender, 11 while t h e Southern representatives were determined 
to accept nothing less. 2 Just before Inauguration Day, the 
ineffectual Convention concluded its sessions, with most of 
the · departing members convinced that all h ope of reconstructing 
the Union was gone, and t h at cavil War was imminent. 3 ·v· i t h 
t he news that the h i ghly touted 11 .Peace .Gongress" had failed, 
the stock market collapsed, and ,New Eng land sales plumrnetted 
to an appalling new low. 4 By Inauguration Day, the mood of 
the nation matched the raw, biting ch ill of that memorable day 
in lVarch which saw the new .Bresident promise no conflict, 
unless the South provoked it; but which left everyone as tense 
and as uncertain as before. 
1Hughes, l<'orbes, I, 187 ff; Lucius E • .(;hi ttenden, 
Personal Reminiscences, 1840-90 (New York, 1893), pp. 391-3; 
L. E . Chittenden, Report of the Peace ~onvention in 1861 
(New York, 1864), PP• 465 ff. 
2Hughes, .F'orbes, I , 200; C:hittenden, Reminiscences, 
pp. 391-3. 
3 Hughes, .Forbes, I, 200; Dumond, Se cession iviovement, 
P• 258. 
4 Journal of Commerce, March 4, 5, 7, 1861; Yorke, 
Pepperell, p. 45. 
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Hardly had Abraham Line oln taken the solemn oath 
of office, when the problem of the Federal forts put an end 
to any further indecision on the issue of Union. Fort Sumter, 
218 
in Charleston harbor, was without provisions and reinforcements--
but any attempt by Federal warships to relieve the fort would 
1 
undoubtedly mean war. What would the President do? Even as 
Lincoln pondered his deadly dilemma, and as the nation watched 
and waited, Mr. William Appleton was sailing out of New York 
harbor, aboard the steamer Nashville, bound for Charleaton.2 
This trip to the South was for reasons of health, insisted 
the elderly industrialist; but there were many of his Bay State 
neighbors who accused him of other motives. Apparently 
convinced that Appleton intended an eleventh hour attempt at 
compromise, ~harles Hale, editor of the Boston Daily Advertiser 
publicly critieized Appleton's visit, on the grounds that it 
would be unjust to "cruelly deceiveR the South into believing 
they would find an ~active sympathy" in the North.3 
On the evening of Thursday, April 11, 1861, the 
Nashville lay off the Bar outside Charleston harbor, awaiting 
~oy Meredith, Storm over Sumter: the Opening 
Engagement of the Civil War (New York, 1957). 
2 
Diary of William Appleton, p. 236. 
3 Charles Hale to Jrunes S. Amory, April 24, 1861, 
Ytlscellaneous Manuscripts, M.H.s. 
the turn of the morning tide. About four o'clock the next 
morning the crash of cannon brought startled passengers 
rushing from their cabins. Through the darkness before them 
they could see the exchange of fire between the guns of Fort 
Sumter and the shore batteries of Fort Johnson. 11 Every flash 
we could see,n wrote Appleton, breathless with excitermnt, 
11 then the smoke; then followed the report; t h e bombshells we 
saw ascend and would anxiously watch whether they fell in 
F'ort Sumter. 111 As soon as he could reach land, the old 
gentleman elbowed his way through the cheering crowds and 
the marching squares of the "seven or eight thousand troops 
in this vicinity," arid telegraphed the electrifying news to 
his co l leagues in . lvlassacb.usetts. 2 The guns of Sumter had 
spoken. The war was on. 
There was no doubt at all in the minds of the cotton 
manufacturers that their place was with the Union--"we must 
stand by our country, 11 John Whi tin told a customer somewhat 
ruefully.3 Robert c. Winthrop could see no alternative but 
1Diary of Wi lliam Appleton, PP• 236-7. 
2 William Appleton to Nathan Appleton, April 19, 
1861, Nathan Appleton Papers , lvl .H.S. Also see L. P. McDowell to 
Edward Everett, Columbia, So. Carolina, April 20, 1861, 
Everett Papers, M.H.S. 
3 Thorna.s R. Navin, 'lbe Whit in 1~la chine Works (!:ambridge, 
1950), PP• 54-5. Also see Boston Daily Advertiser, April 17, 
1861; Boston Post, June 18, 1861;. Boston Courier, April 13, 16, 
1861. 
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to ttsupport the powers that be ••• in their measures for 
1 defending the Capital and upholding the Flag of the Country.a 
Amos A. Lawrence assured William Appleton that in the North 
there was now "unanimity of sentiment about sustaining the 
gover nment," and he immediately went off to offer his own 
services to the State. 2 Turning all his resources over to 
the disposal of the Federal Government, Lawrence now devoted 
all his extra time to drilling regiments of local volunteers, 
and instructing young Harvard undergraduates in the manual of 
arms. The manufacturer had now become as enthusiastic in the 
cause of winning the war as he had been in preserving the 
peace--indeed 1 he was disappointed that Lincoln had only 
called for 75,000 volunteers; 500,000 would be more like itl 3 
And yet, although war was an accomplished fact, and he himself 
had made his own position clear, Lawrence felt morally bound 
to make at least one last effort to preserve what was still 
left of the Union. In hopes of prevailing upon his friends 
and associates in the border states to remain loyal, Lawrence 
1 
Robert c. Winthrop, Diary, April 19, 1861, Winthrop 
Papers, M.H.S., XXXVI, 173. 
2Amos A. Lawrence to William Appleton, April 15, 
17, 20, 1861, A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., IV, 415, 420, 422. 
Also see Lawrence to Colonel Henry Lee, April 17, 1861, ibid.,p. 
421. 
3Amos Lawrence to William Appleton, April 15, 1861, 
Lawrence to Senator Douglas, April 15, 1861, ibt~ pp. 415, 
416. ~so see Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, PP• -9, 173-7. 
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dispatched a flood of letters, stressing the factor of 
unanimity in the North, and emphasizing the determination of 
its war effort. "The North is becoming erie great army," he 
wrote to Senator Crittenden of Kentucky. 11Every man is for 
supporting the government at all hazards, and there will be 
no delay in moving vast masses of fighting-men down to the 
border."1 Other letters begged prominent persons in the 
various border states to stay with the Union at al l costs. 
Senator John Bell of Tennessee, the Honorable James Guthrie 
of Ioui svi lle, His Honor, Mayor Brown of Baltimore, the 
Reverend R. J. Breckinridge of Kentucky, and Robert Ridgeway 
of Virginia, were all recipients of appeals from the Yankee 
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mill owner. "Every man is a volunteer ••• we all stand together ••• 
the North has been growing more and more conservative ••• the 
South had nothing to fear, absolutely nothing •••• "2 Lawrence 
threatened, cajoled and pleaded with them, possibly with 
some effect, for while Virginia and Tennessee joined their 
embattled sisters in the Confederacy, Maryland and Kentucky 
remained with the Union. 
~Amos A. Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, April 15, 
1861 1 A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., IV, 417-18. 
2Lawrence to Robert Ridgeway, April 16; La~Tence to 
Rev. R. J. Breckinridge, April 21; and Lawrence to John Bell, 
April 26, 1861, ibid., PP• 419, 424-6, 428. 
While the textile manufacturers had no doubt of 
their political responsibilities, their economic position 
was in a state of grave uncertainty. What could be done? 
Their wor kers were either going off to war in large numbers, 
or else they were leaving the mills to take higher paying 
jobs in defense industries. 1 Hundreds of millions of dollars 
owed by Southern merchants were no longer collectible, and 
staggering business losses were being written off by Northern 
wholesalers. Reports from the South pointed out that most 
merchants and planters "seemed to delight in the fancied 
2 
release from their obligations secession gives them." But 
the most serious threat of all was the lack of raw cotton. 
The Union blockade was sure to cut off the export supply of 
cotton; the Confederacy insisted that she would produce no 
more; and Great Britain was bidding lavishly for the reserve 
stocks of cotton held by New England mills.3 Behind closed 
doors in every textile factory, worried groups of men held 
worried conferences in a frantic effort to hammer out some 
solution. What should they do? What could they do? 
1 Navin, Whitin Machine Works, pp. 54-5. 
2 New York Times, ~~rch 2, 1861, and New York Tribune, 
March 30, 1861. 
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3 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLIV (1861), 665 :; 675-688. 
See Also E. M. !:oulter, 'lhe Confederate States of .Ameri ca 
(Baton Rouge, 1950), pp. 240-3; FrankL. Owsley, King Cotton 
Diplomacy (Ghicago, 1931), PP• 31-3. 
The only possibility which offered any hope at all 
to the distraught manufacturer, was that the war would be a 
short one; and with almost childlike naivete they clung 
fiercely to this comforting thought. Amos A. Lawrence assured 
his sister that the Union would be maintained, the "stars and 
stripes" would wave over the entire seaboard "before New Year' a, 
and over the whole country before another New Year's after 
that." Then he added, with finality: "lliere is no more doubt 
about it than that the sun will rise ."'1 . "The rebellion is 
crumbling, 11 stated the Springfield Republican confidently; 
and assured by Senator William H. Seward of New York that 
"sixty days more will give you a more cheerful atmosphere," 
many mill owners acted with a confidence born only of fear. 2 
Gonvinced that the war would be over almost as soon as it had 
begun, the venerable Merrimack Manufacturing .!;ompany took the 
lead in what was later to be called "Lowell 1 a stupendous 
blunder," by closing its doors, dismissing its workers,and 
liquidating its cotton on hand at the high market prices 
which then prevailed. Other mills followed the leader, 
reduced their operations, and likewise sold their surplus 
cotton stocks--all in the expectation that it would be "busina sa 
1Amos A. Lawrence to Mrs. Arnold, May 27, 1861, 
A. A. L. Letterbook, M.H.S., N • 434. 
2 . -
Springfield Republican, July 15, 1861, ·Feb. 2, 8, 
1862; Boston Post :tda.y 8, 1862.. Also see Stampp, And the War 
Game, PP• 18-19. 
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1 
as usual" after a brief but inconvenient interlude. 
~hen the cold light of reality finally dawned, when 
news from the front lines gave every indication that the war 
between the states would drag on indefinitely, the results 
were terrifying. Having already dumped most of their cotton 
reserves on the open market in exchange for short-term profits, 
the mill owners of Massachusetts could only look on in help-
less frustration at empty factories and idle spindles. But 
their great political dilemma was over. The era of compromise, 
concessions, Jo'aneuil Hall meetings and elaborate petitions, 
was a thing of the past. vVhile the manufacturers would have 
to work out their individual financial arrangements during the 
course of the war itself, and resort to almost fantastic 
lengths to obtain their precious cotton supplies, their purpose 
was now clear and their goal was self evident: The Union must 
be saved. 
1 . Navin, Wb.itin Machine Works, PP• 54-5;. George s. 
Gibb, The Saco-Lowell Shops (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 195-6; and 
Geor8e w. Browne, The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company (Manchester 
1915), PP• 77-8. 
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CON.(;IlJSION 
War had come to New England. It was a war 
which many prominent and influential New Englanders had long 
feared, and a war which many of their number had worked long 
and hard to avoid. Although the specific efforts of the 
Massachusetts ";Cotton Whigs" in this regard ultimately proved 
to be unsuccessful and futile, the very!!££ of their efforts 
is significant. That these New Englanders were willing to go 
to such extremes in order to avert a conflict which they 
considered to be both political and economic suicide, shows 
quite clearly that at least one significant portion of the 
North did ~ regard the economic differences between the 
North and the South as essentially divergent or necessarily 
antithetical. On the contrary, it would appear that the 
cotton textile interests of Massachusetts consistently 
regarded the economy of the South as basically supplementary 
and 1 above all 1 necessary to the economy of the North. 
While it is true that these men showed a personal moral 
aversion to the institution of Negro slavery 1 time and time 
again they demonstrated their willingness to forego their 
personal convictions in order to maintain the political unity 
and economic stability of the Nation. 
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1be motives of the cotton manuf acturer of 
l'iia.s s achusett s i n pursuing his course of action were not due, 
solely and exclusively, to reasons of economic self-interest, 
but to an overwhelming desire to preserve the ~onstitutional 
structure of t he American Union--as h e saw it. This was no 
h aph azard rationalization of political views which he 
periodically adjusted to suit h i s temporary financial situa-
tion ; but, rather, a coherent and logical pattern of Constitu-
tiona l belief. I n t h e interests of national unity the Northern 
i ndustrialis t , as t ypified by Amos Lawrence, sh owed h imself 
ready and willing to compromise with the South on matters of 
economic policy: he gradually lessened his insist ence on a 
h igh protective tariff, and even indicated a co-operative 
attitude toward efforts of t h e South to become industri a lized. 
Be gardless of h is personal dislik e of slavery, the manu-
facturer went out of his way to den ounce and attack t h e 
Abolitionists who sought to tamper with the \~peculiar insti-
tutionu where it was already established under the protective 
sanction of Constitutional law. 
The expansion of slavery i nto territories, h owever, 
was not expressly sanctioned by t h e Constitution, and for 
t h at reason the manufacturer felt he not only had a right 
but also a duty to fight against expansion. His opposition to 
the annexation of 'I'exas, and his bitter denunciation of the 
Mexican War, attested to the violence of his opinions on this 
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score. Acceptance of the Compromise of 1850 came only after 
he was morally convinced that the geography and topography 
of the ·iiestern lands would automatically prohibit the 
importation of slaves. In return for granting the South the 
principle of extending slavery into the territories, the 
Northern manufacturer felt assured that his Southern brethren 
would not resort to its practice. I n the year 1850, many a 
mill owner of the Bay State considered his Gonstitutional 
position to have been not only justified in theory, but workable 
in practice : the Constitutional privileges of the South had 
been upheld, but slavery in the territories had been prevented . 
'I'he Kru.1.sas-Nebraska Act upset this delicate 
balance by nullifying the 1\!lissouri Compromise, and throwing 
the Ifidwestern lands above 36° 30' open to slavery. Despite 
the sense of personal outrage which characterized the violent 
reaction of the cotton man of the North, he still continued 
to operate within the rigid framework of Constitutional pro-
cedure. The movement to populate Kansas with ttfree-soilu 
settlers was carefully conducted by Amos A. Lawrence and his 
colleagues as an exclusively volunteer and extra-legal enter-
prise, disassociated from all contact with the federal govern-
ment . Even while every effort was being made to establish 
free government in Kansas, the manufacturer continued his 
efforts to impress the South with the honesty of his intentions 
and the sincerity of his purpose. It was with this objective 
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in mind that Lawrence and his friends worked long and hard in 
their vain attempts to form a unational 11 party during t h e late 
fifties, and with remarkable persistence tried t o f ind a 
peaceful solution to the crucial dilemma even after secession 
had become an historical fact. 
As far as t h e cotton manufacturer was concerned, 
then, the Civil War came about despite his efforts--certainly 
not because of them--and in this point lies the significance 
of whatever value the present dissertation may possess. 
I f, as Philip F'oner has demonstrated in his Business and 
Slavery, t h e New York merchants were unalterably opposed to 
war; and if, as this thesis has attempted to show, the 
Massachusetts cotton manufacturers assumed a similar position--
what Northern economic forces did desire an inter-sectional 
conflict? As more evidence comes to light, regarding the 
economic policies, political beliefs and personal convictions 
of the American businessman before the Civil War, it would 
seem more difficult than ever to sustain the thesis t ha t the 
War was the product of the ninevitable 11 clash of two 
separate and divergent economic systems . On the contrary, 
the American manufacturer would appear to have been among 
the most powerful and influential forces consistently working 
to prevent the disruption of the Union and energetically 
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'Ihe disastrous effects of the War of 1812 upon 
New l!;ng land commerce led to t h e rise and development 
of t h e cott on textile industry as an alternative to 
financi al bankruptcy. During the 1820's, the textile manu-
facturers rose to social and economic prominence in the 
Bay 5tate, and by 1830 had ach ieved a position of virtu-
ally undisputed political power. 
'lhe appearance of ~Villiam Lloyd Garrison and 
his Libe r ator in 1831 presented a distinct threat to the 
political ideals and the economic fortunes of t hese New 
England cotton men. Fearful t h at t h e Abolitionists would 
goad t h e South into secession and war, t h e propertied men 
of Bos to n engaged in a series of efforts designed t o assure 
t h e 5outh of t heir good intentions, and to keep t h e slavery 
issue out of national politics. 
The movement of Westward expansion during the 
late t h irties, however, brough t t h e problem of slavery out 
into t h e open. Unable to prevent t h e annexation of 'l'exas, 
and overridden in their att empts to vote down the war with 
lVIex ico, the 11 Got ton Vilh i gs 11 directed their energies toward 
keeping s lavery out of t h e iJiestern lands through political 
means. When t h e Compromi se of 1850 produced a perio d of 
relative quiet, Bos ton's men of business were convinced 
that alth ough they h ad conceded t h e princi ple of slavery 
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expansion to the South, topography would make its practice 
a virtual i mpossibility. 
This relative calm was rudely shattered by the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. Few groups were as outraged 
as t h e business elements of Boston, and, directed by 
Amos A. Lawrence, they sponsored the emigration of free-
soil settlers to Kansas. Kansas was to be the supreme 
test of the ncot ton \tVhig 11 policy of upholding slavery in 
the States, while opposing the expansion of slavery into 
the Territories. 
Seeking a more positive way to avoid conflict 
with the South, the " 'Cotton Vhi gsu tried to develop a 
compromise political party. When the American, or trKnow-
Noth ing11 party failed to meet their requirements, they 
helped to found the Constitution al Union party. But the 
course of national events was running in the opposite 
direction. 'l'he election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 pro-
duced secession in the South, and although the 11 Gotton 
'Vhigs" continued to work for peace, they worked in vain. 
Vith the outbreak of war they backed the Federal war 
effort and became indistinguishable from any other social 
or political group in the North. 
As far as the cotton manufacturers were concerned, 
t he Civil War came about despite their efforts, not because 
of t h em, and in t he light of this r e search it seems difficult 
246 
to sustain the t hesis that the War was the result of the 
11 inevitable 11 clash of two divergent economic systems. On the 
contrary, the American manufacturer appears to have been 
among t h e most influential forces consistently working to 
prevent t h e disruption of the Union and seeking to establish 
h armonious relations between North and South. 
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